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2The cost of heating has increased dramatically, 
not just recently with the announcements 
of significant price increases from all of 
the six suppliers who supply 99 per cent of 
households with energy, but over the last seven 
years. This has added to the pressure on all 
household budgets, but particularly for those 
with lower incomes and with homes that are 
hard to keep warm. Exceptionally cold months 
at the start and end of 2010 made this even 
harder, raising increased concerns for the 
health of those who could not afford to keep 
warm. At the same time, domestic heating and 
energy use are one of the biggest contributors 
to the country’s carbon emissions, and one 
which offers the best prospects for reducing 
them through better insulation and more 
efficient heating systems. However, those with 
low incomes are not in a position to cover the 
capital costs of those investments.
These problems come together under the label 
of ‘fuel poverty’, an issue which has been a 
concern since the 1970s, but which was the 
focus of an Act of Parliament in 2000. This 
committed governments to its elimination 
within sixteen years.
In March this year, the Secretary of State for 
Energy and Climate Change, Chris Huhne 
MP, invited me to undertake an independent 
review from first principles of the problem of 
fuel poverty and the way in which we measure 
it. The terms of reference are given in Annex A, 
but in essence they focus on three main issues:
•	 Whether fuel poverty is, in fact, a distinct 
problem, or simply a manifestation of 
more general problems of poverty.
•	 If we consider that fuel poverty is 
a distinct problem, how is it best 
measured, and does the current 
approach to doing this capture the 
problems most effectively?
•	 What are the implications of this for the 
way we understand the effectiveness 
of the range of policy approaches to 
reducing it.
This interim report addresses the first of these 
two areas.
That fuel poverty remains a serious problem is 
clear from the evidence we review. It is so from 
three overlapping perspectives:
•	 For those concerned with poverty. 
For instance, our calculations suggest 
that the total ‘fuel poverty gap’ to 
households in or on the margins of 
poverty from facing costs to keep warm 
above those for typical households with 
Causes of  
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much higher incomes added up to £1.1 
billion in 2009.
•	 Living in cold homes has a series of 
effects on illness and mental health. 
But the most serious is its contribution 
to Britain’s unusually high rates of 
‘excess winter deaths’. There are many 
contributors to this problem, but even 
if only a tenth of them are due directly 
to fuel poverty, that means that 2,700 
people in England and Wales are dying 
each year as a result – more than the 
number killed in traffic accidents.
•	 For those concerned with climate change 
and carbon reduction. It is essential that 
we improve the energy efficiency of 
the whole housing stock. Those on low 
incomes in the worst housing cannot 
afford the immediate investment needed 
and need assistance from elsewhere.
Doing something about these problems is 
obviously the priority. However to support 
action we need good measurement, for the 
series of reasons we discuss. Bad measurement 
can hinder. Getting to grips with the 
advantages and disadvantages of the current 
measure and of alternatives to it, technical 
as the issues may seem, is therefore also 
important and is one of the main subjects of 
the report.
The review team and I would welcome 
responses to the consultation issues we raise at 
the end of the report, essentially on whether 
people agree with the analysis we have put 
forward here. A final report to be submitted 
by the end of January 2012 and published 
shortly afterwards will reach final conclusions 
on these issues, but also address what is in 
many ways the key question: in the light of 
this analysis, which policies offer the most 
effective approaches to first reducing and then 
eliminating fuel poverty?
The evidence many organisations have 
submitted and the discussions which I and 
the team supporting me have had with those 
with a wide range of expertise have already 
been invaluable. With such high stakes in both 
understanding and tackling the problem, I 
hope that the consultation that will follow this 
report will give time for careful consideration 
of the issues it raises, which we can then 
consider in making final recommendations. 
I am very grateful to all of those who have 
already been part of this process and look 
forward to further discussions.
I am also grateful to the Department for 
Energy and Climate Change for the way it has 
supported this review while fully respecting 
its independence. But most of all I am deeply 
grateful to the review team, Fern Leathers, 
Jen Offord, Jamie Torrens, Sam Jenkins and 
Damon Wingfield, led by Gareth Baynham-
Hughes, who have carried out the research and 
analysis on which this report is based as well 
as to Phil James, Chris McKee, Laura Williams 
and Alison Colquhoun in assisting them with 
preparing this report, for their painstaking and 
unfailingly cheerful support. Any errors and 
misunderstanding that remain are my own.
John Hills
Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, London 
School of Economics
October 2011
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6Introduction
This report contains interim findings and 
issues for consultation from the review of fuel 
poverty and its measurement commissioned by 
the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate 
Change. The terms of reference for the review 
are presented in Annex A to the report. The 
remit of the review is for England, although 
its conclusions may also be of interest to the 
devolved administrations, and possibly more 
widely. The report draws on discussions with 
and evidence kindly submitted to the review by 
a wide range of individuals and organisations 
concerned with fuel poverty and with tackling 
it, and on detailed analysis by the review’s 
secretariat.
This report examines issues around whether 
‘fuel poverty’ constitutes a distinct problem, 
and the implications of the problems identified 
for its measurement. A final report to be 
submitted early in 2012 following responses 
to this report and further analysis will present 
final conclusions on these issues and on 
their implications for understanding the 
effectiveness of different policy approaches to 
the problem.
As discussed in more detail in Chapter 1, 
fuel poverty is an issue which has concerned 
campaigners since the 1970s or before and 
which became the subject of legislation in the 
Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act of 
2000 (WHECA). This Act lays down that,
For the purposes of this Act, a person is 
to be regarded as living “in fuel poverty” 
if he is a member of a household living 
on a lower income in a home which 
cannot be kept warm at reasonable cost.
It also required the Government to publish 
within twelve months,
a strategy ... for ensuring, by means 
including the taking of measures to 
ensure the efficient use of energy, that as 
far as reasonably practicable persons do 
not live in fuel poverty.
The Act set a maximum target date for this of 
15 years after publication of the strategy, so 
the UK Fuel Poverty Strategy published by the 
then government and devolved administrations 
in 2001 resulted in a date of 2016 for fuel 
poverty to be eliminated (in Wales the target 
date is 2018). The strategy set an intermediate 
target for 2010 for the elimination of fuel 
poverty within ‘vulnerable groups’.
The Act itself did not, however, set out 
how fuel poverty and progress towards its 
elimination should be measured. The 2001 
strategy document adopted a particular 
Causes of  
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definition of what constitutes fuel poverty, 
drawn from previous research on the issue, 
and governments have reported on progress 
against this indicator since then. The most 
recent analysis, published in July 2011, 
suggested that 4.0 million households in 
England were living in fuel poverty in 2009, 
with a projected rise to 4.1 million in 2011. 
This compares with 5.1 million households in 
1996, but a low point of 1.2 million in 2003 
and 2004.
In essence, the current approach defines a 
household as being in fuel poverty if it would 
need to spend more than 10 per cent of its 
income to achieve an ‘adequate’ level of 
warmth through the year and on other energy 
costs. The report examines in Chapters 1 and 5 
the characteristics of the precise measure used 
in more detail, but its key features are that:
•	 It depends on a modelled assessment of 
what it would cost to heat a home to 
particular temperatures, based on data 
from yearly structural surveys of a sample 
of homes and interviews with the people 
living in them, plus an allowance for 
other energy costs, based mainly on the 
average energy use of households for 
the number of people in the household 
and their dwelling size. It does not use 
actual spending, as that might reflect 
very low costs for those who are living 
at low temperatures, or very high costs 
for those who are wasteful in their use 
of energy.
•	 In 2009 space heating accounted for 56 
per cent of this assessment on average, 
and water heating for 10 per cent. The 
remaining third related to other uses 
(cooking, lights and appliances).
•	 It is based on the ratio between required 
spending and household income. The 
higher required spending and the 
lower income, the greater this ratio 
(particularly if income reported in the 
survey is very low).
•	 It uses a particular threshold, 10 per 
cent, whose origins are that in 1988 
this was twice median fuel spending 
as a share of income (that is, half of 
households then spent 5 per cent or 
less of their income on fuel, and half 
spent more).
While this definition has remained unchanged 
since it was officially adopted in 2001, it is 
notable that the 2010 Energy Act additionally 
refers to reducing fuel poverty as potentially 
involving reductions in its depth – the 
difference between required spending and the 
threshold for being counted as fuel poor – as 
well as its extent (the numbers affected).
Is fuel poverty a distinct 
problem?
The first question for the review was to assess 
whether there actually is a distinct problem of 
‘fuel’ poverty, requiring particular strategies, 
or whether it is simply a manifestation of low 
incomes in general. There are many other 
items – some of them equally important – that 
people on low incomes find it hard to afford, 
but we do not have specific ‘food poverty’ or 
‘clothes poverty’ indicators or targets. Some of 
those giving evidence to the review suggested 
that measuring fuel poverty was as important 
in illustrating the impact of poverty, as it was in 
constituting a separate problem.
However, the overwhelming argument of 
those submitting evidence was that it does 
constitute a distinct problem. We survey this 
evidence (summarised in Annex D) and other 
material we have collected in Chapters 2 
and 3 of the report, looking in detail at both 
its causes and its effects. Reviewing this in 
Chapter 4 we agree that fuel poverty is a 
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warmth. However, a sixth would have needed 
to spend more than £1,750, and 9 per cent 
more than £2,000. This degree of variation in 
the fuel bills faced by similar households across 
the country is not to be found in relation to 
other spending requirements. For instance, 
although certain differences in the price of 
food for similar households exist, perhaps 
reflecting regional price differences, the 
disparity is much less significant.
For those interested in establishing whether 
households have a lower standard of living 
because of their high heating costs, and so 
may be pushed into poverty, there is therefore 
a case for adjusting the way in which we 
measure incomes to allow for this. Some 
of the suggestions made to the review for 
measurement approaches that look at the 
‘residual income’ people would be left with 
for their other needs after paying their fuel 
costs (see Section 6.4) follow from this kind 
of concern.
Beyond the physical reasons why some may 
need to spend more to achieve the same level 
of warmth, a recurrent concern has been 
that some of the ‘poor pay more’, as a result 
of payment methods or contracts that are 
considerably less good than those achieved 
by others. While the premium paid by those 
on pre-payment meters by comparison with 
those on standard tariffs has now largely 
disappeared, those on low incomes are least 
likely to be on the cheapest direct debit tariffs 
(see Chapter 2). It is often those with the 
greatest ability to make price comparisons 
– including through the internet – who end 
up with the best deals. The current market in 
energy contracts does not necessarily serve 
those on low incomes well. It is disturbing 
that Ofgem has found that almost as many of 
those on pre-payment meters who switched 
suppliers as a result of doorstep sales did so to 
a more expensive contract than the one they 
had before as switched to a cheaper one. The 
distinct – and serious – problem. Fuel poverty 
is of major concern from three different but 
related perspectives: for those whose primary 
concern is poverty and its reduction; for those 
concerned with health and well-being; and 
for those concerned with climate change and 
reduction of carbon emissions.
The poverty perspective
The amount households have to spend is only 
ever an imperfect measure of the standard of 
living they can achieve, but for many things the 
same cash amount can translate into similar 
items in a shopping basket, meeting their 
needs in similar ways. The greatest exception 
to this is housing, because of the huge 
variations in rents and house prices across the 
country and the difficulty people would face 
in moving. Official measures of incomes and 
poverty rates take account of this by looking at 
them both before and after deducting housing 
costs. Equally, larger households need greater 
incomes to achieve the same standard of 
living, so conventional poverty measures adjust 
incomes to allow for household size.
As we discuss in Chapter 2, households 
also face widely varying costs to achieve the 
same level of warmth. These costs are often 
experienced in ways over which households 
have little immediate control. Further, bringing 
about change would need capital investment 
well beyond what they could afford. The 
primary reason for this is the poor level of 
insulation of much of the country’s housing 
stock, and the high costs resulting from the 
heating systems of some households, for 
instance if they are in rural areas or high blocks 
of flats off the gas grid, or have inefficient 
heating systems. As an example of the scale 
of this problem, the most recent fuel poverty 
assessment was based around a calculation 
implying that in 2009 the median required fuel 
bill for couples without children was nearly 
£1,300 to achieve an adequate standard of 
Fuel Poverty: the problem and its measurement 9
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people’s lives, there is much less of a socio-
economic gradient for some of these outcomes 
than might be expected: they do not only 
result from low incomes.
Key elements in the evidence include:
•	 There are specific health consequences 
of exposure to low temperatures and 
the drivers of fuel poverty are significant 
factors in determining the temperatures 
at which individuals live (Sections 
2.5 and 3.2). Health impacts caused 
by exposure to cold tend to relate to 
cardiovascular and respiratory problems 
at temperatures below 12°C and 16°C 
respectively. Low temperatures are also 
associated with diminished resistance 
to infections and the incidence of damp 
and mould in the home (which are 
also associated with lower standards of 
energy efficiency). These effects are most 
important for the youngest children and 
increase for the most elderly.
•	 Most dramatically, the UK has a higher 
rate of ‘excess winter deaths’ than other 
countries with colder climates (Section 
3.3). While the number in England and 
Wales has fallen from around 40,000 
per year in the 1970s to around 27,000 
per year in the last decade, this is 
comparable to more than ten times 
the number of transport-related deaths 
in 2009.
•	 There is clear evidence of an increased 
risk of cardiovascular-related death 
following days when the maximum 
outdoor temperature falls below 20°C. 
Low indoor temperatures appear only 
to be part of the explanation, however. 
Expert opinion suggests that around 
half of excess winter deaths may be 
attributable to indoor temperatures.
current measurement of the extent of fuel 
poverty allows for variations in prices between 
regions and payment type, but does not allow 
for these sorts of differences. Evidence on the 
overall effect of these problems is scarce, but 
new analysis by the review team reported in 
Section 2.3 suggests that if the poorest 30 per 
cent of customers in 2009 were, in fact, on 
the highest tariffs within each category, fuel 
poverty would have been up to 7 per cent 
higher than reported.
As a corollary of these poverty-related 
concerns, in terms of practical policy, the 
problem of low thermal efficiency of the 
housing occupied by some households on 
low incomes means that there may be cost-
effective and long-term ways of improving their 
standard of living through investment in energy 
efficiency, as well as through improvements 
in income. From some perspectives, giving 
such assistance ‘in kind’ is also politically 
more acceptable than simply increasing cash 
transfers through improving benefits or tax 
credits. The final report of the review will 
look at the evidence on the impacts of past 
interventions which have tried to achieve 
this. The implication of this kind of concern 
is that interventions should be targeted on 
households that both have low incomes and 
have energy inefficient homes.
Health and social effects of 
living at low temperatures
Much of the original concern about fuel 
poverty stemmed from concerns about the 
health of those living at low temperatures. 
In Chapter 3 we review some of the most 
persuasive evidence on this. In interpreting 
this evidence, it is important to note that the 
ill-effects of cold come both from internal 
temperatures when people are indoors and 
from external temperatures when they are 
outdoors. In addition, and in contrast to 
evidence on many other adverse features of 
10
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Beyond physical health, the evidence we 
review suggests:
•	 There is a link between low 
temperatures and poor mental health, 
with those living at low temperatures 
more likely to be stressed and subject 
to common mental disorders (Section 
3.4). The direction of causation is 
unclear, however.
•	 Social isolation amongst adults is 
associated with cold homes, while 
there appears to some association 
between cold homes, truancy, negative 
impacts on educational attainment and 
risk of anti-social behaviour amongst 
adolescents (Section 3.5).
•	 People with hard to heat properties may 
trade off other necessities to keep warm, 
at the most dramatic facing a choice 
of ‘heat or eat’ (with some evidence of 
reduced food spending at times of the 
very lowest temperatures by pensioners 
with the lowest incomes; see Sections 
2.5 and 3.7).
All of these problems are very good reasons for 
trying to ensure that people can and do keep 
warm. Their implications for measurement of 
the problem suggest a focus on establishing 
who is living at a too low a temperature, on 
actual spending on energy being below the 
amount required to keep warm enough, and 
on outcomes such as excess winter deaths 
or cold-related health problems. The overlap 
between low incomes and high heating costs 
which lies at the core of fuel poverty is one of 
the drivers of this, but there are other drivers 
as well, and they do not only affect people on 
low incomes.
•	 This problem is significantly greater 
for those living in the coldest quarter 
of homes than those in the warmest 
quarter of homes. Using this difference, 
recent analysis attributes about a fifth 
of excess winter deaths to living in cold 
homes. Even if only half of this is due to 
fuel poverty, that would still mean 2,700 
deaths – more than the number who die 
on the roads – every year.
•	 Beyond each premature death, there will 
be many more health-related incidents 
and associated costs to the NHS.
Precisely what temperature is needed to 
avoid these ill effects is, however, unclear (see 
Section 3.6). The UK Fuel Poverty Strategy set 
minimum temperature thresholds at 21°C in 
the main living room and 18°C in all other 
rooms, and this is embodied in the heating 
regime for measuring fuel poverty under the 
current definition. It is often said that these 
are the minimum temperatures to which 
houses should be heated to avoid negative 
health impacts, and that they are laid down 
by the World Health Organisation (WHO). 
In fact both the health evidence and WHO’s 
recommendations are less clear-cut. The origin 
of most of the references appears to be a 1987 
WHO review which found “no demonstrable 
risk” within a temperature range of between 
18°C and 24°C. We note that 21°C is simply 
the midpoint of this range. Given also that 
those with average and higher incomes do 
not appear to heat their homes to the official 
thresholds (see Section 2.5), we discuss below 
the extent to which the current fuel poverty 
measure is sensitive to these assumptions. 
From this perspective, it is very unhelpful for 
policy-making that data on actual temperatures 
inside homes are now 15 years old.
Fuel Poverty: the problem and its measurement 11
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One of these decisions relates to a significant 
part of the current strategy to reduce carbon 
emissions – the forthcoming Green Deal and 
the Energy Company Obligation (ECO).  Under 
this framework, people will be able to carry out 
energy efficiency improvements whose capital 
costs are met through a combination of up-
front ECO funding (paid for by energy suppliers 
and recovered from energy bills in general) 
and a Green Deal finance charge (added to the 
particular property’s energy bills).  Eventually, 
once the capital costs have been repaid, people 
will benefit from lower bills. However, almost 
by definition, this approach can only help 
people affected by fuel poverty to a limited 
extent in the short run: if they cannot easily 
afford their existing bills, substituting part of 
a bill with a repayment charge that offsets 
this saving would not solve their problem, 
even if it had national benefits.  Lower income 
households will therefore need higher levels of 
up-front subsidy or even full subsidy in order 
to allow them to improve the energy efficiency 
of their dwelling.  The way ECO resources are 
split between measures directly benefiting the 
potentially fuel poor and measures aimed more 
generally at carbon reduction will therefore be 
crucial for the net effect of the policy package 
on distribution and on fuel poverty.
This discussion illustrates three general issues 
for those whose concern is with carbon 
reduction:
•	 It is important to understand the 
distributional consequences of carbon 
mitigation policies. Exacerbating fuel 
poverty could be one of those, unless 
this is offset in other ways.
•	 If this is not done, the adverse effects 
on those with low incomes could be a 
barrier to implementation of policies 
which have overall benefits.
Carbon reduction and energy 
saving
The third perspective increasing concern about 
fuel poverty is its relationship with the national 
priority of reducing carbon emissions and 
energy consumption in general. Greenhouse 
gas emissions from domestic fuel consumption 
of UK households are currently 26 per cent 
of the national total (on an end-user basis). 
Improving domestic energy efficiency is one 
of the most promising contributors towards 
the 34 per cent carbon emission reductions by 
2020 established by the 2008 Climate Change 
Act and for the targets beyond to which the 
current government (like its predecessor) is 
committed.
In this context, current policy developments 
have some immediate implications.  We 
show how government policies both increase 
and decrease potential energy bills (Section 
2.4).  For example, ‘products policies’, which 
enforce better energy efficiency standards on 
producers of appliances, should reduce energy 
costs for all households.  Here there should 
be a positive distributional impact, with the 
greatest proportionate benefit arising for low 
income households.
By contrast, those energy and climate policies 
that lead to higher prices will largely have a 
regressive impact.  The net effect of these 
policies will depend on how their benefits are 
distributed (that is, who will receive the energy 
efficiency improvements they finance).  DECC 
analysis in 2010 on one set of assumptions for 
this suggest a net cost by 2020 equivalent to 
0.8 per cent of income for the poorest fifth 
of households, but break-even for the richest 
fifth (Figure 2.14).  Whether this regressive 
outcome – which would tend to increase 
fuel poverty – occurs depends on both more 
recent developments (such as the Warm Home 
Discount) and decisions yet to be taken.
12
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•	 It can monitor trends, reflecting changes 
in the underlying factors driving it.
•	 More precisely, it can indicate what is 
happening to its extent and its depth 
(and possibly its persistence).
•	 It can help identify the kinds of people 
affected, so they can be targeted by 
interventions and/or offered appropriate 
assistance and support, both for overall 
policy design, and for finding them on 
the ground.
•	 By judging the effectiveness of 
alternative interventions, both at the 
design stage and after implementation, 
it can support policy design and 
assessment to choose the most 
effective policy mix for people in 
different circumstances.
It is immediately apparent that one single 
indicator may struggle to do all of this at once.
As far as trends are concerned, one would 
expect changes in an indicator to reflect the 
scale of changes in the underlying drivers of 
the core problem. So in this case, one would 
expect a fuel poverty measure to improve if: 
there were fewer people in poverty; if the 
energy efficiency of the homes of those on 
low incomes improved; and if the cost of fuel 
to those at risk of fuel poverty fell. However, 
a single measure may not by itself give an 
adequate description of what is going on. In 
particular, we may well want, as suggested by 
the 2010 Energy Act, to distinguish between 
extent – how many people are affected – and 
depth – how badly those people are affected. 
When measuring poverty in general, we 
distinguish between ‘headcount’ measures of 
the numbers of people below a poverty line, 
and ‘poverty gap’ measures indicating how 
far below that line people fall. It would, for 
instance, be judged by most people to be an 
•	 Improving domestic energy efficiency will 
be an important part of overall carbon 
reduction, but those on low incomes are 
unlikely to be able to afford or achieve 
this without assistance.
All of this suggests that a corollary of climate 
change mitigation policies must be a focus 
on those with low incomes with high fuel 
spending, and on those living in energy 
inefficient homes in particular.
Synthesis
This discussion, and the evidence reviewed in 
more detail in the report, explains why fuel 
poverty is – and should be – a concern within 
different policy debates. Its causes, impacts 
and solutions make fuel poverty a distinct 
problem. It comes at the overlap of different 
concerns, some with poverty in general, others 
with health, and others with domestic energy 
inefficiency. Tackling it therefore offers a 
potential ‘win-win-win’ for different agendas.
A corollary of this is that the distinct problem 
that needs to be measured from all these 
perspectives is in some form the overlap 
between low incomes and high required fuel 
spending. In this light, the wording of the 
Warm Home and Energy Conservation Act is 
entirely appropriate: we are concerned with 
individuals in households “living on a lower 
income in a home which cannot be kept 
warm at reasonable cost.”  The implications 
of this for assessing the current definition 
and modifications or alternatives to it are 
discussed below.
How measurement can 
help (or hinder)
For any social problem of this kind there 
are several ways in which measurement 
– appropriate indicators – can help (see 
Section 4.2):
Fuel Poverty: the problem and its measurement 13
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arbitrary, although it is always hard to establish 
such criteria precisely, and the important issue 
is whether findings are unduly sensitive to 
such choices. In this case they are, as what the 
indicator shows is essentially the ‘tail’ of the 
distribution of costs in relation to incomes (see 
Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1). The number counted 
as ‘fuel poor’ is therefore very sensitive to the 
precise level of the threshold.
Further, as fuel prices change, the distribution 
of spending moves in relation to this fixed 
threshold, and the numbers counted as fuel 
poor can change very rapidly. This can be 
seen in Figure ES.1. This shows the number 
of English households counted as fuel poor, 
characterised by the rapid decline between the 
start of the series in 1996 and 2003, followed 
by an almost equally rapid increase since 2004. 
For an indicator being used to assess the trend 
in the problem as described above and in the 
evidence submitted to us, this gives immediate 
pause for thought. Did the underlying problem 
of fuel poverty really improve by nearly four-
fifths in just seven years – suggesting that 
it was well on the way to being solved with 
little further action needed? Equally, have 
things deteriorated quite so fast in the last six 
years to suggest that the problem has more 
than trebled?
The chart also shows the three key drivers 
of fuel poverty. First, it shows the number 
of English households in poverty, as 
conventionally presented by the Department 
for Work and Pensions (DWP). This number 
was relatively constant over the period 
(although the percentage of individuals 
in poverty in the UK fell somewhat, see 
Figure 2.1). Second, it shows how many of the 
homes of the 30 per cent of households with 
the lowest incomes had the lowest energy 
efficiency ratings (E, F, and G energy efficiency 
groups). This fell from 4.5 million in 1996 to 
3.0 million in 2009. If this was all that had 
happened, one might expect that fuel poverty 
improvement if those who were poor moved 
much closer to the poverty line, even if only 
some of them crossed it. We may also be 
interested in how long people are affected – is 
the problem persistent, or are many people 
affected over time, but only intermittently?
The current fuel poverty 
indicator
Chapter 5 of the report looks at the way in 
which fuel poverty has been measured and 
at how what it shows relates to these kinds 
of criteria. Before summarising some of the 
problems with the indicator as it stands, it is 
important to note its two key advantages. 
First, it is based on a combination of people’s 
incomes, energy requirements and energy 
costs, and so is sensitive to some degree to 
all three, as required. Second, it is based on 
a detailed assessment of a household’s need 
to spend, given their characteristics and those 
of where they live, and so avoids some of the 
problems that might be faced by a simple 
focus on actual spending. These are important 
advantages that should be preserved if the 
indicator is modified or supplemented.
However, the current definition is also open to 
a number of criticisms. Some of these relate to 
the precise way it is calculated, and some to its 
fundamental form, being based on the ratio 
between required spending and income.
In terms of its calculation, a key feature is the 
fixed threshold of 10 per cent for the share 
of income taken by required fuel costs. This 
is derived from an original calculation that in 
1988 the median household spent 5 per cent 
of its net income on fuel, and that twice this 
ratio might be taken as being ‘unreasonable’. 
This threshold is therefore fixed, and does 
not move as the spending and behaviour of 
households in general changes. The factor 
of twice the median level is also essentially 
14
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•	 It is highly sensitive to low reported 
incomes. Even surveys focused on 
income recording suffer from some 
mis-reporting of very low incomes – for 
example some people record zero or 
negative incomes – but this is a more 
serious problem for those with wider 
scope such as the survey used.
•	 It is also sensitive to the temperature 
thresholds used. For instance, using a 
living room temperature of 18°C, not 
21°C, would reduce the number of 
households by nearly 1 million in 2009. 
Conversely, using a higher temperature, 
as in Scotland for pensioners, would 
increase it.
One criterion for measurement is whether 
it can show the depth of the problem for 
those affected by it. In this case, although 
it is not usually the main focus of analysis, 
one indicator is the extent to which people’s 
required spending on fuel exceeds the 10 per 
cent threshold. DECC publishes some figures 
that present this. As discussed in Section 6.3, 
would have fallen over the period, and to have 
done so fairly steadily. The explanation of the 
‘V’ shape of the official fuel poverty measure 
lies in the third factor, real fuel prices, which 
fell until 2003, but have risen very sharply 
since. The particular way in which the current 
fuel poverty indicator is constructed means 
that it is the price index that dominates. But 
this means that over the period, the underlying 
changes in poverty and energy efficiency for 
low-income households have been masked.
One indicator of the sensitivity of the measure 
to price changes is the fact that, had the 
assumptions about fuel prices in the 2001 
strategy been correct, fuel poverty would have 
been in the range 1.0 million-1.6 million in 
2010, not the actual figure of 4.0 million.
The use of a ratio to determine the extent of 
fuel poverty leads to other potential limitations:
•	 In contrast to the focus of WHECA, 
some households with high (above 
average) incomes can be counted as 
‘fuel poor’.
Number of households (millions) Index of fuel prices (2005 = 100) 
Figure ES.1: Fuel poverty, income poverty, energy 
efficiency and fuel prices, 1996 – 2010, England (except 
prices – UK data)
Source: Fuel Poverty Statistics (DECC), Fuel & light Index Statistics ONS (scaled to real 
terms) HBAI statistics (DWP)
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an equivalent increase in state benefits, 
for example.
Alternative indicators of 
fuel poverty
There are therefore issues about whether 
the fuel poverty indicator, as it is currently 
designed, adequately fills the roles it might 
serve. There are, however, problems with 
any indicator of problems of this kind, and 
alternatives may perform worse. Chapter 6 
of this report therefore looks at a range of six 
other potential ways of measuring fuel poverty. 
The first three look at modifications to the 
current approach:
•	 A variant of the current indicator based 
on ‘after housing costs’ incomes, rather 
than on the ‘full income’ on which the 
main official series currently depends.
•	 An indicator based on the spending ratio 
relative to median spending in that year 
(rather than to fuel spending as it was 
23 years ago).
•	 A supplementary ‘fuel poverty gap’ 
indicator, as is, for instance, used in the 
USA (although based on spending need, 
rather than actual spending, as there).
Three more variants are considered, reflecting 
more fundamental changes:
•	 A residual income indicator – examining 
which households would be below a 
poverty line ‘after fuel costs’, if the line 
were adjusted in line with their required 
fuel spending.
•	 A direct measure of the number 
of households that simultaneously 
have low incomes (i.e. are in poverty 
according to the official indicator, after 
allowing for housing costs) and live in 
however, these numbers are affected by the 
presence of some households with very low 
reported incomes, which imply very high ‘fuel 
poverty ratios’, almost regardless of the level of 
their required fuel spending. Such low incomes 
can either reflect misreporting, or are genuine, 
but show that there are households whose 
current income falls so far short of the poverty 
line that they have severe problems affording 
all necessities, rather than necessarily having 
a particular problem relating to exceptional 
heating costs.
An indicator might help with the identification 
of those affected in a way that would help 
those implementing programmes on the 
ground to find people who might benefit 
from programmes designed to counter fuel 
poverty. Many of the submissions to the review 
were clear that the current indicator is not 
helpful for this purpose, and indeed would 
be very hard to calculate on the doorstep. 
Instead, local authorities and others delivering 
programmes use proxy indicators, generally 
reflecting a combination of low income and 
poor energy efficiency.
Finally, an indicator can help the design and 
assessment of effective policies. One feature 
of the current measure is that it is a ratio – 
required fuel spending divided by income. 
A consequence of this is that it is far more 
sensitive to changes in spending than it is 
to changes in income. Near the 10 per cent 
threshold, for instance, a cut of £10 in required 
fuel spending will have as great an effect in 
moving someone out of fuel poverty as a 
£100 rise in income. Policy-makers may see 
the former as more effective, although the 
household would probably have preferred 
the increase in income. From the outside, 
the design of the new Warm Home Discount 
seems to reflect this concern, directly reducing 
the fuel bills of qualifying households by 
£120-£140 per year, and so having more 
effect on measured fuel poverty than would 
16
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appropriate, especially the regional 
distribution of fuel poverty.
•	 Using a spending threshold within the 
current ratio indicator that changes over 
time with median spending patterns 
would remove the extreme sensitivity 
of the current definition to fuel prices 
(Section 6.2). However, it could be 
argued that it would be inappropriate to 
remove all sensitivity to them. In total it 
would identify more households as fuel 
poor at the start and end of the period, 
and show a low-point in 2004.
•	 Using a ‘fuel poverty gap’ can give a 
very helpful sense of the depth of fuel 
poverty, measured both in pounds per 
household and in aggregate (Section 
6.3). It could supplement an indicator 
showing the extent of fuel poverty. Fuel 
poverty gap data at a household or 
population group level could also help 
policy-making and delivery. However, 
basing a fuel poverty gap on the current 
energy inefficient homes, based on the 
‘SAP’ rating.
•	 Subjective indicators of whether 
households have difficulty in affording 
adequate heating or with paying 
their bills.
Aggregate trends in the numbers in fuel 
poverty under the main variants examined are 
shown in Figure ES.2.
Each of the six approaches has advantages, but 
also some shortcomings, which are discussed 
in more detail in the report. In particular:
•	 Measuring income after housing costs 
arguably gives a better picture of the 
true affordability of fuel bills (Section 
6.1). However, logically, the threshold 
used should also be adjusted to be 
based on after housing costs income. 
This means that aggregate trends are 
little changed, but there is a good case 
that the composition would be more 
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Note: there have been some changes in the methodology used to calculate fuel poverty 
statistics from year to year, which affect all the time series presented here. See Annex B 
for details of these changes.
Figure ES.2: Number of households in fuel poverty under all 
indicators compared, selected years 1996 – 2009, England
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different approach from the current one 
and others we examine (Section 6.6). 
One advantage of subjective indicators 
is to cross-check the trends shown by 
other approaches (and it is striking 
that there has been a wide discrepancy 
from trends in the current indicator). 
However, individual perceptions may be 
very different from those of society as 
a whole, and many (particularly elderly) 
people may be reluctant to say that 
they face particular problems – ‘mustn’t 
grumble’. Responses also vary depending 
on precisely what question is asked. 
Such questions are probably most useful 
as a way of complementing other more 
objective indicators, and it would be 
helpful to incorporate relevant questions 
into the survey used to derive them.
Each of these suggestions therefore brings 
important insights into the issue addressed 
by the review, but still has shortcomings. 
We therefore examine in Chapter 7 whether 
it is possible to construct an indicator that 
builds on the advantages of both the current 
definition and of some of the alternatives 
described above.
One attraction of looking directly at the 
number of people who both have low incomes 
and live in energy inefficient homes is that 
it reflects the intention of WHECA, that is, 
focusing on the overlap between the two. 
This captures what makes the problem of fuel 
poverty distinct from several perspectives. 
However, just looking at energy inefficiency 
(as in Section 6.5) fails to allow for other 
factors that affect households’ need to 
spend. The approach we examine therefore 
is to look at households who have both low 
incomes (as conventionally measured by the 
Department for Work and Pensions) and 
high costs (as measured in the current fuel 
poverty definition).
fuel poverty ratio indicator could put 
additional emphasis on observations 
that may not be accurate, and if used to 
generate an aggregate fuel poverty gap 
its extreme sensitivity to price changes is 
compounded.
•	 In essence, residual income indicators  
looking at who is poor ‘after fuel costs’, 
in the same way as we do ‘after housing 
costs’, are a more sophisticated measure 
of the extent of poverty, not a specific 
measure of fuel poverty (Section 6.4). 
They identify nearly all households 
that are low income, regardless of 
their energy requirements relative to 
others. The numbers identified as poor 
‘after fuel costs’ therefore follow those 
in poverty overall (as measured after 
housing costs), remaining around five 
million across the period. This kind of 
approach does have an advantage in 
terms of identifying the impact of high 
fuel costs for those on the margins of 
poverty, by identifying those who are 
pushed into poverty by higher than 
average required fuel costs.
•	 In many ways, looking at which 
households are affected by a 
combination of energy inefficiency 
(relatively low SAP) and low incomes 
better reflects the spirit of WHECA, and 
what many regard as the core issue 
underlying fuel poverty than the other 
approaches examined (Section 6.5). The 
series shows a small improvement over 
the period. However, the SAP rating of a 
dwelling is only an imperfect indicator of 
what constitutes reasonable costs, and 
does not reflect changes in one of the 
drivers of fuel poverty – energy prices – 
at all.
•	 Using households’ subjective description 
of the position they are in is a markedly 
18
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poverty, so the extent to which their required 
costs exceed a reasonable level will give a 
indicator of the depth of fuel poverty, what 
one might call the ‘fuel poverty gap’.
There are, of course, many different ways 
in which thresholds for ‘lower income’ 
and ‘reasonable costs’ could be set, but 
the example we explore has the following 
characteristics:
•	 The arguments in the evidence presented 
to the review for looking at incomes 
after housing costs are persuasive, so we 
use them.
•	 In line with current best practice, 
incomes are measured in the same way 
as DWP does for its Households Below 
Average Income (HBAI) analysis, in 
particular adjusted for household size 
and composition.
•	 Fuel costs are calculated as those 
required to achieve acceptable warmth, 
in the same way as they are for the 
The simplest way of thinking about this 
indicator is illustrated by Figure ES.3. Essentially 
WHECA implies that the households of concern 
are those that have both a ‘lower income’, 
that is have incomes below some threshold, 
and required costs above a ‘reasonable’ level. 
This is those households in the lower left 
quadrant of the diagram. All of those with 
incomes below the income threshold – the two 
left-hand quadrants – are of concern in terms 
of their risk of being in poverty. All of those 
with required energy costs above a reasonable 
level – the two lower quadrants – are of 
concern because of their potential contribution 
to overall energy consumption and carbon 
emissions. But it is those for whom these two 
problems overlap that are affected by the 
specific and additional problem of fuel poverty 
as people normally understand it. Our final 
report will look at how different policies might 
affect the households in different quadrants.
Furthermore, just as the extent to which 
people’s incomes fall short of a poverty line 
gives a ‘poverty gap’ indicator of the depth of 
Income threshold
Energy
cost
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Increasing income  
Increasing
energy
costs
Income above 
threshold/lower 
energy costs 
Income below 
threshold/lower 
energy costs 
Income above 
threshold/higher 
energy costs 
Fuel poor: Income  
below threshold/ 
higher energy
costs 
Figure ES.3: Fuel poverty defined as the overlap between 
low income and high energy costs
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the number of people affected by fuel poverty, 
than the number of households, removing the 
way in which the current indicator gives less 
weight to the problems of larger households, 
particularly those with children.
On this basis, a calculation of who would 
be counted as fuel poor would then be 
those who:
•	 Had	required	fuel	costs	that	were	
above	the	median	level; and
•	 Were	they	to	spend	that	amount,	
would	be	left	with	a	residual	income	
below	the	official	poverty	line.
This gives the more detailed interpretation 
shown in Figure ES.4. This definition reflects 
how some people with slightly higher incomes 
are pushed into poverty by the high level of 
their required costs – (represented by the 
triangular area on the right of the shaded 
area). If energy prices are high, there will be 
more people in this position, and the income 
current fuel poverty indicator (focusing 
on need, not actual spending).
•	 It looks at household energy costs 
relative to a threshold based on 
the median spending needs of the 
population as a whole (see Box 7.2 
in Chapter 7 for a discussion of the 
rationale for this).
•	 It takes account of the way in which 
those with high fuel costs can be pulled 
into poverty.
•	 It embodies a separate indicator of the 
depth of fuel poverty – a ‘fuel poverty 
gap’ – for fuel poor households on 
average and in aggregate, alongside the 
conventional indicator of its extent.
Although we have not been able to do this 
here, ideally the costs used should reflect the 
prices actually paid by people at risk of fuel 
poverty (that is, the actual tariffs they are 
charged). It would also be better to look at 
Increasing income  
Median
required
energy
costs
Increasing
energy
costs
B
A 
Figure ES.4: Calculation of the ‘fuel poverty gap’
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Figure ES.5 shows how the number of 
households and of individuals and the fuel 
poverty gap implied by this definition would 
have moved since 1996 by comparison with 
the numbers shown by the current defintion. In 
1996, 2.9 million households would have been 
classed as ‘fuel poor’, falling to 2.8 million in 
2004 and 2.7 million in 2009. The average 
number of households classed as fuel poor 
over the period would be very similar to those 
counted by the current definition. However, 
the slow downward trend it shows may give a 
much better representation of the scale of the 
underlying problem than the ‘V’ shape from 
the current definition. It is the average fuel 
poverty gap that moves with energy prices – 
falling from £413 in 1996 (at 2009 prices) to 
£256 in 2004, but rising to £409 in 2009 (an 
aggregate amount of £1.1 billion).
Chapter 7 of the report discusses this indicator 
in more detail suggesting that it has a number 
of advantages by comparison with the current 
definition, while retaining its fundamental basis 
in an assessment of required energy spending:
threshold itself will be higher, as median 
required spending would rise. These factors 
would mean more people would be counted 
by the indicator as ‘fuel poor’ if energy prices 
rose in relation to incomes, but the count 
of the number affected would be much less 
sensitive than under the current formula. The 
figure shows how the ‘fuel poverty gap’ – the 
difference between required costs and median 
required costs – could be calculated. This will 
also change as fuel prices change.
Note also that the choice of median required 
costs to define ‘reasonable costs’ means that 
the threshold moves in line with costs for the 
population as a whole (as suggested by those 
proposing a relative version of the current ratio 
indicator discussed in Section 6.2). Given that 
those on low incomes are counted as being in 
poverty if their total income is below 60 per 
cent of the national median, using median 
costs as the threshold is in fact quite a high 
threshold for those with such low incomes, 
who are likely to be living in smaller properties 
than the national average. They are getting by 
on incomes well below those of most others, 
but are counted here as having unreasonable 
costs only if their energy costs exceed the 
national average.
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•	 There are some households with very 
low reported that are currently classed 
as fuel poor, even though they have very 
energy efficient homes. They are clearly 
a high priority for assistance to take 
them out of deep poverty, but it is not 
clear that it is helpful to class them as 
fuel poor. They would not be counted as 
such under this alternative.
Conclusions
The evidence we have examined and presented 
confirms that fuel poverty is a distinct and 
serious problem. It deserves and requires 
attention, as recognised by Parliament when 
it adopted the Warm Homes and Energy 
Conservation Act 2000.
The Act captures, in our view correctly, the core 
of the problem as being the overlap between 
low income and high costs. As it states, a 
household is affected by fuel poverty if it has 
a lower income and faces above reasonable 
costs – which will often be for reasons outside 
its control – to achieve adequate warmth. Fuel 
poverty is a priority for a range of coinciding 
concerns, including poverty alleviation, 
health and well-being, energy efficiency and 
carbon saving:
•	 Our calculation is that households in or 
on the margins of poverty faced extra 
costs to keep warm above those for 
typical households with much higher 
incomes adding up to £1.1 billion 
in 2009.
•	 Living in cold homes has a series of 
effects on illness and mental health. But 
at the top of the iceberg of these effects 
is the way in which Britain has unusually 
high rates of ‘excess winter deaths’. Even 
if only a tenth of them are due directly 
to fuel poverty, that means that 2,700 
people in England and Wales are dying 
•	 It allows separate calculation of the 
extent of fuel poverty (the number fuel 
poor) and the depth of the problem 
(the fuel poverty gap), rather than 
conflating them.
•	 Calculating the extent of fuel poverty in 
this way is more robust than the current 
definition, both to data problems (such 
as mis-reporting of low incomes) and 
to the assumptions used in calculating 
required spending (such as the precise 
temperatures used).
•	 Because the indicator is much more 
stable in who is identified as fuel poor, it 
is also much more stable in which people 
are identified as being at risk of fuel 
poverty than the current indicator. Under 
the current definition, many households 
with low incomes and relatively high 
energy requirements were counted as 
not being fuel poor in 2004 (Figure 7.5).
•	 Correspondingly, interventions that were 
targeted at households that might have 
been thought in common sense terms 
to be at risk were assessed as benefiting 
people outside the target group, 
potentially giving a misleadingly gloomy 
assessment of their effectiveness. An 
overlap indicator should avoid this 
problem.
•	 The use of a fuel poverty gap indicator 
also allows the impact of some 
interventions to be seen, even if they 
do not quite bring someone across 
the line that would bring them out of 
fuel poverty.
•	 However, the impact of interventions 
that only affect incomes without taking 
a household across the threshold 
would reduce the depth of poverty, as 
conventionally measured, not generally 
the depth of fuel poverty.
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million to 4.8 million individuals) affected by 
such a serious problem over thirteen years is 
deeply disappointing, as is the major increase 
in the depth of the problem in the last six 
years, as measured by the fuel poverty gap. 
It is hardly on track for its elimination in five 
years’ time.
As the report explains, there are different 
ways of looking at this problem, and different 
choices that could be made if the approach 
we propose was implemented. We would 
welcome views on the analysis and ideas 
presented in this report. We have included 
some specific questions for consultation in 
Chapter 8. In the final report we will discuss 
the responses to these and how they inform 
our final recommendations. We will also 
consider the implications of our approach for 
understanding the effectiveness of the range 
of policy interventions available to tackle 
fuel poverty.
each year as a result – more than the 
number killed in traffic accidents.
•	 It is essential that we improve the 
energy efficiency of the whole housing 
stock. But those on low incomes in 
the worst housing can neither afford 
the immediate investment needed 
nor afford later repayments without 
additional help.
Doing something about these problems is 
obviously the priority. However to support 
action we need good measurement. Although 
the current definition has the key strength 
that it focuses on required, not actual, energy 
spend, its precise form – based on a ratio 
against a fixed threshold – gives it certain 
weaknesses. It generates, for instance, a 
pattern of trends over the last fifteen years – a 
rapid decline followed by an equally rapid rise 
– which does not reflect what happened in the 
underlying causes of the problem, and is not 
always helpful in designing or evaluating policy. 
It is also highly sensitive to the assumptions 
and data on which it is based.
After examining a series of possible 
modifications or alternatives to the current 
approach, we conclude that while they 
each bring insights into understanding the 
problem, they also have weaknesses. We have 
therefore put forward an alternative approach 
to measuring fuel poverty, drawing on these 
insights, which more directly measures what is 
described in the Act and in everyday discussion 
of what fuel poverty is and how to tackle it – 
looking at those who both have low incomes 
and high costs.
Looked at in this way, the underlying problem 
of fuel poverty did not almost disappear in 
the early 2000s, but nor has progress almost 
entirely been reversed. This is not necessarily 
a huge comfort: a reduction only from 2.9 
million to 2.7 million households (and from 5.1 
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1.1 The independent 
review of fuel poverty
Background to the review
1. According to the Department of Energy 
and Climate Change (DECC):
Fuel poverty means being unable to 
afford to keep warm. We consider a 
household to be in fuel poverty if it needs 
to spend more than 10 per cent of its 
income on fuel for adequate heating.1
2. On March 14 2011, the Secretary of State 
for Energy and Climate Change, Chris 
Huhne MP, announced the appointment of 
Professor John Hills to lead an independent 
review of the fuel poverty definition and 
target.2 The Government had set out its 
intention to establish such a review at the 
time of the comprehensive spending review 
in October 2010, saying,
To ensure the available resources are 
focused most effectively in tackling 
the problems underlying fuel poverty, 
the Government intends to initiate an 
1 http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/funding/fuel_
poverty/fuel_poverty.aspx
2 http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/news/pn11_044/
pn11_044.aspx
independent review of the fuel poverty 
target and definition [...]3
Terms of reference
3. The remit of the review is set out in 
Annex A. In essence, the review has been 
asked to examine fuel poverty from first 
principles, including its causes and impacts, 
and to consider whether the current or 
alternative ways of measuring fuel poverty 
best assist policy formulation and delivery. 
The review is independent. It relates only to 
England, but we hope its findings may be 
of interest more widely.
The conduct of the review 
to date
4. The review has received a wide range 
of evidence from a broad group of 
stakeholders, including the Fuel Poverty 
Advisory Group (FPAG), charities and other 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), 
academics, Government departments 
and the devolved administrations. A call 
for evidence was held from 14 March 
2011 until 6 June 2011.4 A summary of 
3 HM Treasury press release, 20 October 2010, available at: 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/news/csr_hmt_
releas/csr_hmt_releas.aspx
4 See: http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/What%20we%20
do/Supporting%20consumers/Addressing%20fuel%20
poverty/1401-fuel-poverty-review-a-call-for-evidence.pdf
Review background 
and fuel poverty 
in context
CHAPTER 1 
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the replies received is set out in Annex 
D. In addition, the review secretariat 
and Professor Hills have held a series of 
meetings with stakeholders, including 
a workshop event in London on 18 July 
2011.5 
5. The review team has also reviewed a 
great deal of relevant published evidence. 
A selected list of reference material is 
available in Annex C although we have 
considered a wide range of other material.
About our interim findings
6. The publication of this document marks the 
end of the first phase of the review. The 
interim findings focus on:
•	 the history of fuel poverty and the 
context of this review (Chapter 1);
•	 the causes (Chapter 2) and impacts 
(Chapter 3) of fuel poverty;
•	 perspectives on fuel poverty and why 
measurement matters (Chapter 4);
•	 the current fuel poverty indicator 
(Chapter 5); and
•	 alternative options for measuring fuel 
poverty (Chapters 6 and 7).
Our conclusions and questions for 
consultation are set out in Chapter 8.
7. A final report will be published in 
early 2012. As well as making final 
recommendations in the light of the 
responses made to these interim findings, 
it will consider the implications of the 
approach to fuel poverty measurement it 
recommends in terms of understanding 
the effectiveness of different policy 
interventions. 
5 A note of this event is available at:  
www.decc.gov.uk/hillsfuelpovertyreview. 
1.2 Fuel poverty in 
context
From broad concern to 
statutory duties
8. While energy price rises for domestic 
customers have hit the headlines with 
increasing regularity in recent months, the 
fact that certain households cannot meet 
their energy costs and keep adequately 
warm is far from being a new issue. 
Concerns about the affordability of fuel 
bills in general and warmth in particular 
were raised in the 1970s, for example, at 
the time of the oil price shock.
9. In 1979 two economists at the Department 
of Health and Social Security, Baron 
Isherwood and Ruth Hancock, made 
an effort “to identify those consumers 
for whom the payment of fuel bills 
raises difficulties and to examine their 
characteristics in terms of income, age 
etc.”6 Their work appears to be the first 
time the idea of examining the proportion 
of income spent on fuel as an indicator of 
the problem was floated. They did this to 
show that fuel spending and housing costs 
were more variable than other spending 
items (using an – essentially arbitrary – 
threshold of twice median spending to 
do so).
10. In 1983 Jonathan Bradshaw and Sandra 
Hutton, writing in the Journal of Economic 
Psychology, gave their own description 
of the problem, arguing that fuel poverty 
was a broad relative concept concerning 
the ability of households to afford 
customary levels of warmth. And in 1991 
Brenda Boardman published the landmark 
6 Hancock, R and Isherwood, B. (1979). Household 
Expenditure on Fuel: Distributional Impacts. London: DHSS. 
(Not officially published.)
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respective powers, set out in the Act’s 
provisions. See Box 1.1 for a description 
of the situation in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland.
13. In Westminster, WHECA was passed with 
cross-party support, having been proposed 
by David Amess MP as a private member’s 
Bill. It continues to provide the legislative 
context for fuel poverty policy-making in 
England and Wales.
14. The first provision of the Act sets out the 
meaning of fuel poverty:
For the purposes of this Act, a person is 
to be regarded as living “in fuel poverty” 
if he is a member of a household living 
on a lower income in a home which 
cannot be kept warm at reasonable cost.
15. The Act therefore defines the issue as 
the combined impact of having a lower 
income and facing an unreasonable cost 
to keep warm. The Act does not, however, 
book Fuel Poverty offering a detailed 
examination of the area and setting out the 
‘10 per cent’ indicator that, two decades 
later, is the basis for the official definition 
set out in the UK Fuel Poverty Strategy. 
11. The full history of fuel poverty – both its 
definition and the policy measures taken 
to address it – are explained elsewhere.7 
Below we focus on some of the key points 
for the review, starting with the adoption 
in 2000 of legislation designed to bring an 
end to fuel poverty.8
Warm Homes and Energy 
Conservation Act 2000
12. In 2000, Parliament passed the Warm 
Homes and Energy Conservation Act 
(WHECA). The full text of the Act is shown 
in Annex B. The geographical scope of the 
Act is England and Wales, with duties on 
the Secretary of State (in England) and the 
National Assembly (in Wales), and their 
7 See in particular Boardman, B. (2010). Fixing Fuel Poverty. 
London: Earthscan. 
8  
Box	1.1:	Fuel	poverty	in	Scotland	and	Northern	Ireland
Scotland: The Housing (Scotland) Act 2001 provides the legal context for action to address fuel 
poverty. It led to the publication of the 2002 Scottish Fuel Poverty Statement which said, “We are 
committed to ensuring, so far as reasonably practicable, that people are not living in fuel poverty 
in Scotland by November 2016.” This situation therefore very closely mirrors the legal position 
in England.
Northern	Ireland:	There is no statutory requirement to address fuel poverty in Northern Ireland. The 
2001 UK Fuel Poverty Strategy set out a political commitment to eliminate fuel poverty in Northern 
Ireland by 2016, subsequently reaffirmed in Ending Fuel Poverty: A Strategy for Northern Ireland 
(2004). Northern Ireland produced a new fuel poverty strategy called Warmer, Healthier Homes in 
March 2011. While this will address all three primary factors contributing to fuel poverty, a major 
focus will be on removing energy inefficiency as a cause of fuel poverty.8
8 Furthermore, Professor Christine Liddell has conducted a major review of the definition of fuel poverty at the request of the Department for 
Social Development (DSDNI). See http://eprints.ulster.ac.uk/19994/1/FuelPovertyReport(WEB)-5Sept2011.pdf
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date for the eradication of fuel poverty in 
England is November 2016.11
18. Among its other procedural provisions, 
the Act gives the Secretary of State a duty 
to “take such steps as are in [his] opinion 
necessary to implement the strategy.” 
A series of duties to monitor and review 
the strategy, to provide progress reports 
from time to time and to publish any 
revisions made by the Government to the 
strategy is also included in the Act.
The 2001 UK Fuel Poverty 
Strategy
19. Responding to the entry into force of 
WHECA, the then Government prepared 
and published a draft UK fuel poverty 
strategy. Following a consultation 
exercise, the final strategy was published 
in November 2001. As a UK document, 
agreed with the devolved administrations, 
the strategy has a broader geographical 
scope than WHECA. The strategy 
established a technical definition of fuel 
poverty, going beyond the definition 
enshrined in WHECA, to define the 
households to which the strategy applied. 
It also set out an interim goal of “ending 
the blight of fuel poverty” for “vulnerable” 
households by 2010.12 Box 1.2 provides a 
summary of the strategy’s stated objectives.
The policy framework described by 
the strategy
20. A large part of the strategy was given over 
to a description of the policies already in 
place or planned to deliver its over-arching 
11 In October 2008, the Queen’s Bench Division of the High 
Court heard a case for judicial review relating to WHECA. 
In essence, the plaintiffs argued that the Government was 
making slow progress and failing in its statutory duty. The 
case and ensuing appeal were unsuccessful. For further 
detail, see Annex B.
12 “Vulnerable” refers to older people (i.e. 60 or over, children 
and people with a long-term illness of disability.
further define either “lower income” or 
“reasonable cost”. Instead, it gives the 
Secretary of State the power to define 
these terms through secondary legislation, 
while also allowing the meaning of fuel 
poverty to be amended through the same 
means.9 It might be noted that the Act 
primarily refers to individuals as opposed 
to households.
16. A key feature of the Act is the requirement 
to publish, within one year of its entry 
into force, a strategy setting out policies 
to ensure that “as far as reasonably 
practicable persons do not live in fuel 
poverty.” This is often referred to as the 
‘eradication of fuel poverty.’ The Act goes 
on to stipulate that this strategy must:
(a) describe the households to which it 
applies;
(b) specify a comprehensive package of 
measures for ensuring the efficient use 
of energy, such as the installation of 
appropriate equipment or insulation;
(c) specify interim objectives to be 
achieved and target dates for achieving 
them; and
(d) specify a target date for achieving 
the objective of ensuring that as far as 
reasonably practicable persons in England 
or Wales do not live in fuel poverty.
17. For point (d) above, the Act requires the 
target date to be no later than 15 years 
after the publication of the strategy. Since 
the Government published its strategy for 
England in November 200110 the effective 
9 This power has not been used.
10 Defra, DTI. (2001). The UK Fuel Poverty Strategy. London: 
Defra/DTI. Available at: http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/
decc/what%20we%20do/supporting%20consumers/
addressing%20fuel%20poverty/strategy/file16495.pdf 
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of protecting consumers. It highlighted 
the role energy companies could play in 
lowering bills for vulnerable customers, 
alongside the assistance offered by the 
Social Action Plan established by Ofgem, 
the market regulator.14 This Plan was 
designed to make sure that consumers 
could access a range of tariff options 
and payment methods to suit their 
circumstances, as well as appropriate 
advice and help with debt management 
and energy efficiency from suppliers.
23. The strategy also aimed to reduce social 
exclusion as a contribution to eliminating 
fuel poverty. In terms of raising household 
income it highlighted the role of Winter 
Fuel Payments, Cold Weather Payments, 
the Minimum Income Guarantee for 
pensioners, introduced in 1999, and tax 
credits such as the then Working Families 
Tax Credit. The strategy also referred 
to health-focused policies designed to 
reduce health inequalities and to tackle 
the determinants of ill-health, including 
fuel poverty.
14 Ofgem – the Office for Gas and Electricity Markets – is the 
regulator of the electricity and gas markets in Great Britain. 
See www.ofgem.gov.uk for more information. 
policy aims. The strategy divided policy 
interventions into three broad categories: 
energy efficiency measures, energy market 
measures and social exclusion measures. 
21. In relation to energy efficiency, the strategy 
described the then Government’s “Warm 
Front” programme, replacing the Home 
Energy Efficiency Scheme (HEES), and 
drew attention to the role of the supplier 
obligation known as the Energy Efficiency 
Commitment. It also referred to Local 
Authority action (including the Decent 
Homes programme for social housing), 
to advice services from the Energy Saving 
Trust (EST) and to the role of National 
Energy Action, which continues to operate 
in this area (and which has provided 
valuable evidence to this review). 
22. Energy market measures set out in the 
strategy included the impact of the 
liberalisation of energy markets in the 
UK, which was expected to generate 
downward pressure on domestic fuel 
bills.13 The strategy also underscored the 
relevance of the Utilities Act 2000 in terms 
13 Chapter 5 explains what the fuel poverty trend would have 
looked like had the projections proved accurate.
Box	1.2:	Fuel	poverty	policy	objectives	and	targets
“The goal of the Government and the Devolved Administrations is to seek an end to the problem 
of fuel poverty. In particular, an end to the blight of fuel poverty for vulnerable households by 2010. 
Fuel poverty in other households will also be tackled once progress is made on the priority vulnerable 
groups.”
“Once progress has been made on the priority vulnerable groups, the focus will be widened to 
include those healthy adult householders in fuel poverty. While they are at less risk of ill health, these 
householders still suffer from the other problems associated with fuel poverty.”
Source: UK Fuel Poverty Strategy 2001
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if its fuel poverty ratio (required fuel costs 
divided by income) is greater than 0.1. 
27. The threshold was fixed at 10 per cent 
since this was twice median fuel spending 
as a share of income in 1988.16 In other 
words, one half of households then spent 
5 per cent or less of their income on 
fuel, the other half spent more. (As set 
out in the strategy, 10 per cent was also, 
coincidentally, the actual average level 
of spending by the poorest three-tenths 
of households in 1988.) More detail on 
the implications of these elements of the 
definition is set out in Chapter 5.
28. In fact, the strategy set out two technical 
definitions, which measured income in 
different ways. The first definition – used 
for the purposes of target setting – 
measures income net of income tax and 
national insurance but including housing 
benefit and Income Support for Mortgage 
Interest (ISMI). This is referred to as the ‘full 
income definition’17. The second definition 
does not include housing benefit and ISMI 
and is referred to as the ‘basic income 
definition’. Using the basic measure of 
income – which would often show lower 
incomes – can give higher fuel poverty 
ratios and therefore classes more people as 
fuel poor for any particular threshold ratio.
29. Common to both definitions is a needs-
based approach to calculating energy 
requirements. The strategy made the case 
for this approach as follows:
Importantly, the definition focuses on 
what people would need to spend, 
rather than what they actually spend 
on heating. This is because fuel poor 
16 As set out earlier, the idea of taking twice the median 
as a threshold appears to emanate from Hancock and 
Isherwood’s 1979 paper.
17  In addition, the ‘basic income’ definition excludes Council 
Tax Benefit, while the ‘full income’ definition includes this 
benefit and deducts the Council Tax payable.
Targets set by the strategy
24. The strategy attracted some criticism in 
2001 for failing to set an explicit target 
date for the fulfilment of the main aim of 
WHECA, that is, the eradication of fuel 
poverty as far as reasonably practicable. 
The terms of WHECA mean that, by 
default, the latest date for achieving this 
target is 2016. However, the strategy did 
set out an interim target – the elimination 
of fuel poverty in “vulnerable” households 
by 2010. At the time of the strategy’s 
publication, some 80-85 per cent of fuel 
poor households fell within this far-
reaching definition. The strategy stated 
that the focus of activity would broaden to 
remaining fuel poor households after the 
2010 target date.
25. For England, the strategy also established 
an interim target that by 2004, 800,000 
vulnerable households would be assisted 
through Warm Front and that the number 
of “non-decent” social sector properties 
would be reduced by one third. The 
third annual progress report15 stated 
that by 2005, Warm Front had assisted 
over 1 million households and that the 
number of non-decent homes had fallen 
by 13 per cent, according to the 2003 
English House Condition Survey (EHCS), 
since 2001.
The definition of fuel poverty set 
out in the strategy
26. Crucially for this review, to define fuel 
poverty the strategy introduced a fuel 
poverty ratio measure: a fuel poor 
household is one that would need to spend 
more than 10 per cent of its income to 
maintain a ‘satisfactory’ heating regime. 
Put another way, a household is fuel poor 
15 Defra, DTI. (2005). The UK fuel poverty strategy: 3rd Annual 
Progress Report. London: Defra, DTI. Available at:  
http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file10717.pdf 
30
CHAPTER 1 REVIEW BACKGROUND AND FUEL POVERTY IN CONTEXT
Water heating – 10 per cent – and all 
other energy uses – 34 per cent – are the 
remaining components.
Monitoring the strategy
31. Since its first publication in 2001, the 
strategy has been revised occasionally, as 
required by the Act. None of these revisions 
has affected the objectives, targets or 
definitions set out initially. The most 
recent revision was introduced in 2011 to 
reflect changes to the eligibility criteria for 
Warm Front.
32. Since 2002, the Government has published 
a series of reports on progress. The most 
recent progress report, the seventh, was 
households have to balance the need for 
fuel and other essentials, and very often 
cannot heat their homes properly.
30. Chapter 5 below gives details of the 
model that provides the technical basis 
for measuring fuel poverty under these 
definitions. Note that the assessment of 
energy use needed in households includes 
an allowance for energy use in the home 
other than for space and water heating 
(i.e. cooking, lighting and appliances).18 
Space heating accounted for 56 per cent 
of the average modelled bill in 2009. 
18 The reasons for doing this, as given in the strategy, are i) that 
not including such an allowance would change the numbers 
of people in fuel poverty and ii) that cooking could be 
argued to be essential.
Box	1.3:	Fuel	Poverty	Advisory	Group
In the consultation on the draft UK fuel poverty strategy, the Government announced its intention to 
establish the Fuel Poverty Advisory Group (FPAG). The Group is now constituted as an advisory Non-
Departmental Public Body (NDPB) sponsored by DECC. The Group consists of senior representatives 
of relevant organisations, including energy suppliers, consumer groups, charities and other NGOs. 
The role of FPAG is:
•	 to consider and report on the effectiveness of current policies aiming to reduce fuel poverty;
•	 to consider and report on the case for greater co-ordination;
•	 to identify barriers to reducing fuel poverty and to developing effective partnerships – and to 
propose solutions; 
•	 to consider and report on any additional policies needed to achieve a reduction in fuel poverty; 
•	 to encourage key organisations to tackle fuel poverty; 
•	 to consider and report on the results of work to monitor fuel poverty.
FPAG is therefore an important part of the accountability system that has been put in place as part 
of the Government response to its duty under WHECA. FPAG’s annual reports provide independent 
commentary on the Government’s progress.  The series of reports since 2002 is available on the 
DECC website, with the most recent report published in July 2010.
Throughout the review, FPAG’s members and its Chair, Derek Lickorish, and Vice-Chair, Gill Owen, 
have been active contributors and have provided very useful evidence.
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35. The first part of this relates to the overall 
extent of the problem i.e. the total 
number of people affected. The second 
part relates to what this review considers 
to be the depth of the problem i.e. the 
degree to which an individual is affected. 
The Act goes on to say how both of these 
should be defined21. The definition of 
“living in fuel poverty” is the same as that 
used in WHECA. The following definition 
is used for reducing the depth of fuel 
poverty faced:
The extent to which a person is living in 
fuel poverty is reduced if the difference 
between the cost of keeping the person’s 
home warm and what would be a 
reasonable cost for doing so is reduced.
The significance of considering both 
the extent and depth of fuel poverty is 
discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
36. Other legislation of relevance to fuel 
poverty includes the Climate Change 
Act 2008 and certain European Union 
Directives. Further details can be found in 
Annex B.
1.3 Fuel poverty statistics
37. The final part of this introduction describes 
what official statistics have suggested 
the level of fuel poverty in England to 
have been since 1996. In Chapter 5 
of this report, the current definition of 
fuel poverty is examined in detail and 
information provided about who is found 
to be fuel poor under this definition. This 
section gives a brief picture of the overall 
levels of fuel poverty found in England.
21  Legally speaking, the definitions given are for the purposes 
of the Energy Act itself. They provide a useful broader insight 
for this review.
published in 2009.19 Since 2009, a separate 
statistical report has also been published 
on an annual basis. As will be seen, the 
Government was initially able to report 
considerable progress in terms of reducing 
the number of households found to be 
fuel poor under the published definitions; 
since 2004 the number of households has 
been rising.
Other relevant legislation
33. There is a range of additional legislation, 
including European legislation, that 
provides a backdrop to consideration 
of fuel poverty in England. In terms of 
energy market regulation, among the most 
significant Acts are the Gas Act 1986, the 
Electricity Act 1989, the Utilities Act 2000, 
the Competition Act 1998, the Enterprise 
Act 2002 and the Energy Acts of 2004, 
2008 and 2010. At the time of printing, a 
further Energy Bill is awaiting Royal Assent.
34. Of particular note for this review is the 
Energy Act 201020 which introduces the 
concept of reducing both the extent and 
depth of fuel poverty. The Act does so by 
saying:
Fuel poverty is reduced if – 
The number of people living in fuel 
poverty is reduced, or
The extent to which any person is living 
in fuel poverty is reduced.
19 DECC. (2009). UK Fuel Poverty Strategy: 7th Annual Progress 
Report. London: DECC. Available at: http://www.decc.gov.
uk/assets/decc/statistics/fuelpoverty/1_20091021091505
_e_@@_ukfuelpovertystrategy7annreport09.pdf 
20 See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/27/contents 
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39. As can be seen in Table 1.1, the number of 
fuel poor households in England according 
to the current definition was at its highest 
at the start of the period in 1996, with 
5.1 million households in fuel poverty. In 
the period 1996-2003 there was a rapid 
reduction in the number of households 
in fuel poverty to 1.2 million. By 2004, 
the level of fuel poverty in England had 
therefore officially fallen by three-quarters 
from 1996 levels. However, since 2004, 
fuel poverty has increased as rapidly, 
with the number of households in fuel 
poverty in 2009 (4.0 million) the highest 
level since before 1998. DECC’s projection 
for 2011 suggests that fuel poverty will 
have increased further, to 4.1 million 
households, more than three times as 
high as in 2004 (but still a fifth less than 
in 1996).
38. The latest official fuel poverty statistics 
were published by DECC in July 2011, 
providing information on fuel poverty 
numbers until 2009.22 It is worth noting, 
particularly when looking at fuel poverty 
statistics presented as a time series, 
that there have been changes to the 
measurement of fuel poverty over the 
last few years that will have had an effect 
on the numbers compiled throughout 
this report. These changes are generally 
either amendments to the English Housing 
Survey, or to the methodology used to 
model bills or income. See Annex B for a 
detailed description of the main changes 
that have taken place.
22 DECC. (2011). Annual report on fuel poverty statistics. 
London: DECC. Available at: http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/
decc/Statistics/fuelpoverty/2181-annual-report-fuel-poverty-
stats-2011.pdf
Table 1.1: Number and percentage of households in fuel poverty, 1996 to 2011, England
Year Number of 
households in fuel 
poverty (millions)
% of households 
in fuel poverty
Number of 
vulnerable 
households in fuel 
poverty (millions)*
% of vulnerable 
households in fuel 
poverty
1996 5.1 26.0 4.0 30.0**
2001 1.7 8.1 1.4 9.8
2003 1.2 5.9 1.0 6.6
2004 1.2 5.9 1.0 6.4
2005 1.5 7.2 1.2 7.8
2006 2.4 11.5 1.9 12.8
2007 2.8 13.2 2.3 14.6
2008 3.3 15.6 2.7 17.5
2009 4.0 18.4 3.2 20.7
2010 (projected) 4.0
2011 (projected) 4.1
* “Vulnerable” means people with a long-term illness or disability, people 60 or over and children 
** This is an approximate value
Source: Fuel poverty statistics (DECC)
Fuel Poverty: the problem and its measurement 33
CHAPTER 1 REVIEW BACKGROUND AND FUEL POVERTY IN CONTEXT
2009 while the median ratio has changed 
from 3.5 per cent in 2004 to 5.5 per cent 
in 2009 (i.e. half of households‘ modelled 
bills equated to more than 5.5 per cent of 
income in 2009 and half less). The mean 
ratio was 4.6 per cent in 2004 and 7.4 per 
cent in 2009.
40. Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of fuel 
poverty (by fuel poverty ratio) in 2004 
and 2009. In this period the distribution 
of fuel poverty ratios shifted to the right. 
This means that the number of households 
whose required spending exceeds the fixed 
threshold of 10 per cent is bigger. The 
modal fuel poverty ratio (the densest part 
of the distribution) has moved from 3 per 
cent of income in 2004 to 4 per cent in 
0
1
2
3
4
5
Households (millions)
Fuel Poverty Ratio
Source: Fuel Poverty data (DECC)
0.240.220.200.180.160.140.120.100.080.060.040.02
2009
2004
Figure 1.1: Fuel poverty ratios (required spend on energy as 
a proportion of income), 2004 and 2009, England
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Chapter	1	summary
The key elements of this Chapter are:
•	 Fuel poverty has been a social policy concern for a number of decades. The adoption of the 
Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act (WHECA) 2000 marked a milestone in recognising 
the issue.
•	 The Act defines the core issue as the combined impact of having a lower income and facing an 
unreasonable cost of warmth.
•	 The adoption of the Act was followed by publication of the 2001 UK Fuel Poverty Strategy, which 
set out the Government’s policy framework for ensuring that as far as reasonably practicable  
no-one lived in fuel poverty by 2016 (in England). It established a target (which was not reached) 
of eliminating fuel poverty for vulnerable households by 2010.
•	 The strategy also contained the current fuel poverty ratio. It defined a fuel poor household as 
one that needs to spend more than 10 per cent of its income to maintain a satisfactory heating 
regime.
•	 The 10 per cent threshold was fixed at this level on the basis that this was twice median fuel 
spending as a share of income in 1988. 
•	 The spending requirement used to calculate the extent of fuel poverty is based on an assessed 
need to spend, not actual spending. In 2009 space heating accounted for 56 per cent of this 
assessment on average, and water heating 10 per cent. 34 per cent related to other uses 
(cooking, lighting and appliances). 
•	 The Energy Act 2010 additionally defines “reducing fuel poverty” as reducing either the number 
of people who are fuel poor or the difference between needed spend and reasonable costs. This 
reflects a distinction between the extent of fuel poverty and its depth.
•	 Under the current measure of fuel poverty, the number of English households affected fell 
by three-quarters from 5.1 million households in 1996 to 1.2 million in 2004. The number of 
households then rose more than threefold, reaching 4.0 million in 2009.
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1. We have seen how the Warm Homes and 
Energy Conservation Act 2000 (WHECA) – 
and indeed the Energy Act 2010 – define 
fuel poverty as a dual issue: the condition 
arises where a household has a “lower 
income” as well as “unreasonable costs”. 
It is now appropriate to consider what 
these terms might mean and what lies 
behind them.
2.1 Principal drivers of 
fuel poverty
2. Responses submitted to the Review 
overwhelmingly agreed that there are three 
main drivers of fuel poverty:
•	 low income;
•	 energy efficiency;
•	 fuel prices.
These three drivers act in different ways 
on the elements of fuel poverty set out in 
WHECA, and are discussed below. 
3. WHECA establishes being on a “lower 
income” as a precondition of a household 
as being in fuel poverty.23 
23  As will be seen in Chapters 5 and 7 the current definition 
used for measurement does not necessarily reflect this 
in full.
We examine later the implications for 
measurement of fuel poverty of the choice 
of approach to income measurement. To 
illustrate recent trends in the number of 
people with low income, Figure 2.1 shows 
data from the Households Below Average 
Income (HBAI) series published by the 
Department of Work and Pensions (DWP). 
Over the whole period since 1994/95 
poverty has fallen slowly if measured 
relative to contemporary living standards 
(whether this is done before or after 
allowing for households’ housing costs). 
Against a fixed absolute standard it has 
more than halved. 
4. This review cannot explore in any detail 
the issues surrounding income distribution, 
wealth and poverty in England.24 The 
causes of income poverty are manifold and 
the cash amount households have to spend 
is only ever an imperfect measure of the 
standard of living they can achieve. A core 
issue for this report is the extent to which 
those on lower incomes face high costs in 
achieving particular standards of warmth. 
24 See Hills, J. et al. (2010). An Anatomy of Economic 
Inequality, the report of the National Equality Panel London: 
Government Equalities Office/CASE. And Hills, J., Sefton, T. 
and Stewart, K. (eds) (2009). Towards a More Equal Society? 
Poverty, inequality and poverty since 1997. Bristol: The Policy 
Press.
Causes of 
fuel poverty
CHAPTER 2 
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5. Reflecting this, the other key element of 
WHECA is the inability to keep warm at 
reasonable cost. In theory a household’s 
energy costs will be a combination of their 
needs (which reflect the energy efficiency 
of a property) and household preferences 
and behaviours, and fuel prices. In practice, 
while many households can use energy in 
a relatively unconstrained manner, others 
may have to limit use because of limited 
resources, so that the amount of energy 
they use does not reflect what others might 
see as their needs. 
6. Needs and prices reflect a number of other 
factors. Needs – for instance to maintain 
a particular minimum temperature in a 
home – will reflect the energy efficiency 
of a dwelling, its size and the size of the 
household, the energy system in place, the 
amount of time during which a dwelling 
is occupied and so on. The price paid 
by households also reflects a range of 
factors, including geographical location, 
the amount and type of fuel used and the 
payment method. 
7. The rest of this Chapter considers energy 
costs further, looking first at energy use in 
relation to need and the factors that lock 
households into high energy costs.
2.2 Ability to turn 
income into heat
8. Across English households there is great 
variety in the amount of expenditure needed 
to deliver the same standard of warmth. For 
example, DECC estimates that in 2009 the 
median required fuel bill for couples without 
children was nearly £1,300 to achieve an 
adequate standard of warmth25 in 2009. 
But 16 per cent needed to spend more than 
£1,750 and 9 per cent more than £2,000.
25 Chapter 3 discusses the origins of the standard heating 
regime used and Chapter 5 sets out how the regime is used 
when modelling fuel bills. 
CHAPTER 2 
% of individuals
Source: HBAI: An analysis of income distribution 1994/95 and 2009/10, 
May 2011 (DWP). Before 98/99 data refers to GB.
Figure 2.1: Poverty rates, 1994/95 to 2009/10, UK 
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in an inefficient dwelling will face a higher 
energy bill.
11. The energy efficiency rating of a dwelling 
is often expressed in terms of the building’s 
Standard Assessment Procedure (SAP) 
rating (see Box 2.1 for details). For a 
particular dwelling, a higher SAP rating 
indicates a greater level of thermal 
efficiency and a lower required energy bill.  
12. Figure 2.2 shows the relationship between 
the SAP rating and annual energy costs 
for a typical semi-detached, cavity wall 
dwelling that is attached to the gas grid.26 
The curve highlights the very significant 
impact that the thermal efficiency of the 
dwelling can have on household energy 
costs. A semi-detached property with no 
insulation and no central heating system27 
would have a SAP rating of 1 and an 
estimated annual energy bill (excluding 
costs for appliances etc) of around 
£1,700, at 2003-05 energy prices. The 
same property with loft and cavity wall 
26 Based on the SAP 2005 methodology. For further details 
of SAP 2005 methodology, see: http://projects.bre.co.uk/
sap2005/ 
27 For this property the SAP methodology assumes that the 
property is heated using portable electric heaters.
9.  A household’s ability to turn income into 
heat reflects three main factors:
•	 dwelling characteristics – this covers 
the type of dwelling and its thermal 
efficiency;
•	 how energy bills are paid – this covers 
both payment method and tariff; 
•	 the impact on household bills of certain 
Government policies – this includes not 
just taxation (such as the reduced rate of 
VAT on fuel), but also the distributional 
impact of the cost of a range of social 
and environmental policies not directly 
funded through taxation.
Thermal efficiency of homes
The relationship between SAP and 
energy costs
10. The thermal efficiency of the dwelling is 
one of the key determinants of household 
energy costs. An inefficient dwelling 
requires a larger amount of energy 
compared to a more efficient dwelling to 
maintain a specific internal temperature 
and, all things being equal, a person living 
Box	2.1:	the	Standard	Assessment	Procedure
The Standard Assessment Procedure (SAP) is the Government-recommended measure used for 
assessing the energy performance of dwellings. The SAP rating of a dwelling is an indicator of 
energy consumption per unit of floor space and includes the costs associated with space heating, 
water heating, ventilation and lighting, less any cost savings from self-generated energy. The rating 
is adjusted to the floor area so that the rating is independent of the dwelling size. The SAP rating 
is expressed on a scale of 1 to 100, where higher numbers denote greater thermal efficiency and 
lower energy costs. 
The SAP assessment assumes a heating regime where the main living area is heated to 21°C 
and all other habitable rooms are heated to 18°C. However, the calculation of the SAP rating is 
independent of household characteristics (i.e. the calculation does not take account of household 
size or composition).
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efficiency beyond what is achievable 
through the most cost-effective measures. 
However, the incremental impact of such 
improvements on SAP is both smaller and 
increasingly expensive.
15. The relationship between SAP and energy 
costs (and the capital costs of making 
improvements to household SAP) varies 
across dwelling types. On average, larger 
houses28 and houses that are not attached 
to the gas grid (and use more costly 
heating fuels or electricity) will face higher 
energy costs. Figure 2.4 shows the costs of 
improving the SAP rating of a typical cavity 
wall detached property that is on the gas 
grid. In addition, there are some dwellings 
where the structure of the building will 
make it more costly to make improvements 
to the SAP rating. For example, it is 
significantly more expensive to insulate 
28 SAP rating is a measure of energy cost per m2 of floor space. 
As such a large house at a particular SAP rating will have 
a higher notional energy bill than a smaller house with the 
same SAP rating. 
insulation, double glazing and gas central 
heating would have a SAP rating of 73 and 
an annual energy bill of about £350 (again, 
excluding the costs of appliances). 
13. Making improvements to a dwelling’s SAP 
rating requires capital investment. Figure 
2.3 shows the costs of improving the SAP 
rating of the same semi-detached dwelling 
– where the improvements to the home 
are made in order of cost-effectiveness – 
and how these improvements will affect 
fuel costs. This shows that there are some 
relatively cost-effective ways of making a 
sustained reduction to the cost of heating 
through energy efficiency improvements. 
For example, basic insulation and a 
heating system result in a very significant 
improvement in SAP at an overall cost 
of around £4,000. However, many low-
income households lack the means to be 
able to make these improvements and are, 
therefore, locked-in to high energy costs. 
14. The curve also shows that it is possible to 
make further improvements to thermal 
 
Figure 2.2: The relationship between SAP and required 
household energy costs for a typical cavity walled, 
semi-detached house on the gas grid (based on average 
energy prices 2003 – 2005)
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(2003-05 prices) in an off-grid terraced 
property with solid walls, compared to 
an investment of £4,000 to achieve a bill 
of around £400 in an on-grid detached 
property with cavity walls. 
solid wall dwellings compared to dwellings 
with cavity walls. It also tends to be more 
expensive to install new heating systems 
for off-grid properties. As shown by Figures 
2.5 and 2.4, an investment of £9,000 is 
needed to reduce the bill to around £500 
Figure 2.3: The cost of improving the SAP rating and the 
resulting impact on the household energy bill for a typical 
cavity-walled, semi-detached property on the gas grid 
(average prices 2003-2005)
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Figure 2.4: The cost of improving the SAP rating and the 
resulting impact on the household energy bill for a typical 
cavity-walled, detached property on the gas grid 
(average prices 2003-2005)
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energy requirements than higher income 
households. 
18. There has been a steady increase in the 
thermal efficiency of the housing stock over 
the past four decades. Figure 2.6 shows 
that the average SAP rating of a dwelling 
in England rose from around 18 in 1970 to 
around 53 in 2009. This is in many ways 
a major success. However, these average 
figures mask some significant differences 
between different house types and tenures. 
The average SAP rating in 2009 amongst 
owner occupiers and private renters was 
51 and 52 respectively. Houses in the social 
The housing stock
16. Household energy costs are determined 
by both the size and the SAP rating of the 
dwelling. This section looks at the housing 
stock with respect to these characteristics 
to determine whether there are particular 
groups of householders that are living in 
expensive to heat dwellings.
17. Table 2.1 shows average house size across 
different income groups. The data suggest 
that lower income households tend to live 
in smaller houses and would therefore, 
other things being equal, have lower 
Source: BRE
Figure 2.5: The cost of improving the SAP rating and the 
resulting impact on the household energy bill for a typical 
solid wall, terraced property off the gas grid (average prices 
2003-2005)
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Table 2.1: Average floor space by income group in 2009, England
Income group
Bottom 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Top
Average 
dwelling floor 
space (m2)
80 79 78 83 85 88 94 98 104 125
Source: English Housing Survey (DCLG) 
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20. Table 2.2 shows the average SAP ratings 
of the housing stock in England split by 
tenure and household income group. It 
shows quite clearly the difference in the 
average SAP ratings between households 
that are on and off the gas grid and also 
the relatively high SAP ratings of social 
housing. Interestingly, the data do not 
suggest that, within different tenures, there 
is a social gradient with respect to thermal 
efficiency of dwellings (i.e. on average, low 
income owner occupiers do not appear to 
live in lower SAP properties compared to 
owner occupiers in higher income groups).
sector – where the Government’s Decent 
Homes programme has had a major impact 
on the thermal efficiency of the stock – 
have an average SAP rating of 61.
19. Across all tenures, there are certain housing 
characteristics (e.g. off gas grid, solid wall) 
that make the home more costly to heat 
and more expensive to upgrade. As we 
might expect, the average SAP rating is 
lower in off-grid dwellings – the average 
SAP rating of off-grid dwellings in England 
in 2009 was 41 compared to 55 for 
households that are on the gas grid.
Average SAP Rating
Source: Energy consumption in the UK (DECC)
Figure 2.6: Trend in the average SAP rating of the housing 
stock in England, 1970 to 2009 (based on 2005 methodology)
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Table 2.2: Trend in average SAP across income groups (based on SAP 2005 methodology), 2009, England
House type Share 
of total 
housing 
stock (%)
Average 
SAP 
across 
group
SAP of Equivalised AHC Income group
Bottom 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Top
On	gas	grid 87 55 57 57 57 55 55 55 55 53 54 53
Of which: 
Social housing 15 63 62 63 62 63 63 63 62 62 64 *
Private rented sector 12 55 55 55 55 55 53 55 57 57 57 57
Owner-occupiers 60 53 54 53 54 53 53 54 54 53 53 53
Off	gas	grid 13 41 41 43 43 41 43 36 42 41 41 41
Of which:
Social housing 3 53 51 54 52 55 57 50 55 * * *
Private rented sector 3 39 38 39 38 37 38 35 47 41 42 41
Owner-occupiers 8 38 32 35 37 35 38 35 39 40 40 40
* suppressed due to small sample size
Source: English Housing Survey, 2009, DCLG. Groups are by household income adjusted for household size.
The evidence presented in this section shows how dwelling size and SAP rating affect the size of 
the household energy bill. Investments in energy efficiency can greatly improve SAP ratings but for 
some kinds of property it is easier to achieve gains than others. The household data from the English 
Housing Survey suggests that the size of the dwelling is related to income (where, on average, 
poorer households tend to live in smaller dwellings). However, within tenure groups, there does not 
appear to be a strong relationship between income and SAP rating (i.e. poorer households do not 
appear to be living in lower SAP dwellings). The data do suggest, however, that households that are 
off the gas grid tend to have lower SAP ratings than households that are attached to the grid and 
that the SAP rating of social housing tends to be relatively high. Average SAP ratings have improved 
substantially over the last forty years.
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the benefits of doing so) – and so who 
pays what. We then turn to off-grid energy 
considerations.
Payment methods 
25. The transition of gas and electricity supply 
to a competitive market has delivered 
greater choice in the tariffs available. But 
it is important to understand whether 
consumers take advantage of these and 
what happens when they switch supplier, 
tariff or payment method.
26. At present, there are three main payment 
methods: standard credit (i.e. quarterly 
bills), direct debit and prepayment meter. 
The use of these methods varies widely 
between household type, as shown by 
Figure 2.8. All households are most likely to 
use direct debit. Using prepayment meters 
is most prevalent amongst lone parents 
(33 per cent). In each population group, 
between 19 and 31 per cent use standard 
credit. 
27. Figure 2.8 shows how payment methods 
are spread across and within income 
groups (in this case, incomes have not 
been adjusted for household size and 
composition, or housing costs). It can be 
seen that, although direct debit is the 
most commonly used payment method 
in all income groups, low income groups 
are more likely to use either prepayment 
or standard credit methods than those 
on a higher income (45 per cent in the 
lowest tenth compared to 18 per cent in 
the highest tenth). In addition, those in the 
lower income groups are more likely to not 
have access to the gas grid, meaning they 
will be using more expensive fuels such as 
electricity or heating oil. 
2.3 The cost of energy
21. The second factor in people’s ability to 
turn their income into heat is how they 
engage with the energy market. Whilst 
the wholesale price of fuel makes up 
the single largest component of any bill 
(54 per cent for gas, 46 per cent for 
electricity),29 other factors also play a part 
in determining a household’s final bill: how 
they pay their energy bills, what tariff they 
are on, and whether they switch energy 
supplier regularly. All of these can make a 
considerable difference to a household’s 
annual fuel bill. Another key difference is 
whether households are connected to the 
gas grid.
22. 91 per cent of English households use 
either gas or electricity (or a combination) 
to meet their energy requirements. Since 
the market was liberalised in the 1990s, six 
main suppliers have dominated the market, 
accounting for 99 per cent of all gas and 
electricity supplied. There has been a 
limited number of new entrants in the last 
10 years. The liberalisation of the market 
allowed consumers to switch between 
suppliers in search of the best deal. In 
practice the experience of consumers has 
been mixed. 
23. In contrast the market for supplying fuel 
to those off the gas grid (heating oil, LPG, 
etc.) is characterised by hundreds of small 
suppliers. The market is not subject to a 
specific regulatory regime. 
24. This section first looks at the experience 
of consumers who use gas and electricity, 
including how they pay their bills, the 
different tariffs available and whether 
consumers actively engage in the market 
to switch provider on a regular basis (and 
29  DECC. (2010). Estimated impacts of energy and climate 
change policies on energy prices and bills. London: DECC.
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% of households
Source: Fuel poverty data, 2011 (DECC) and EHS, 2011
Figure 2.7: Payment method for gas by household type, 
2009, England
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Figure 2.8: Payment method for gas by income group, 
2009, England
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Figure 2.9: Payment method for gas by tenure, 2009, England
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31. The Ofgem energy supply probe of 2008 
looked at electricity and gas supply costs 
across all suppliers.30 It found that there 
were cost differentials between prepayment, 
standard credit and direct debit reflecting 
these different factors. These were as much 
as £88 between prepayment and direct 
debit and £25 between standard credit 
and direct debit. However, average actual 
tariff differentials were found to be higher. 
Between prepayment and direct debit, 
this was as much as £125. The difference 
between standard credit and direct debit 
amounted to £80.
32. Since the Ofgem probe, there has been 
some standardisation of prices between 
the different methods (standard credit 
and prepayment in particular had roughly 
equal bills by 2010), though direct debit 
remains the cheapest. This can be seen in 
Figure 2.10. The figure also shows the way 
in which standardised electricity bills fell 
in real terms from 1998 to 2004, but have 
since increased by about half. Gas bills fell 
only slightly between 1998 and 2004, but 
had nearly doubled by 2009. 
Tariffs and switching
33. For each of the payment methods 
discussed, there is a wide array of tariffs 
to choose from, reflecting the impact of 
market liberalisation. There has been a 
marked proliferation in recent years. In 
January 2007, there were around 175 
on-line and off-line tariffs available; at the 
beginning of 2011, there were nearly 400.31
30 Ofgem. Energy Supply Probe (2008). See: http://www.ofgem.
gov.uk/Markets/RetMkts/ensuppro/Documents1/Energy%20
Supply%20Probe%20-%20Initial%20Findings%20Report.
pdf 
31 Ofgem. Retail Market Review (2011). See: http://www.
ofgem.gov.uk/Markets/RetMkts/rmr/Documents1/RMR_
FINAL.pdf 
28. There are also clear variations in payment 
methods when examined by tenure.  
Within the social housing sector (local 
authority or registered social landlords),  
33-37 per cent of households use 
prepayment meters; the majority of owner 
occupied households (63 per cent) use 
direct debit. 
29. The way in which payment methods 
are spread between different types of 
household is significant because of the link 
between payment method and the cost of 
the energy used. For example, traditionally, 
prepayment meters have tended to be 
more expensive than either standard credit 
or direct debit methods of paying bills. 
This means that, given the distribution of 
payment methods shown above, one third 
of lone parents and one third of social 
housing households – and more generally 
lower income households – have faced 
some of the most expensive unit costs.
30. According to energy suppliers, a factor in 
the price differentials between payment 
methods is the different costs faced by 
the supplier for each method. Prepayment 
meters have greater costs associated with 
buying and servicing the meter, as well as 
a specialised administrative system for the 
allocation of payments from customers to 
suppliers. Visits to customers’ homes may 
be required to recalibrate the meter when 
prices change. For both standard credit and 
prepayment there are costs associated with 
the recovery of fuel bill debt (in the case of 
prepayment meters, these are debts that 
have previously been incurred under other 
payment methods).
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electricity supply than in any other sector.33 
75 per cent of customers objected to the 
way in which prices were presented and 
61 per cent found it difficult to choose a 
supplier. The reasons were given as:
•	 the market was too confusing and 
complicated (40 per cent);
•	 these were too many options 
(21 per cent);
•	 it was too difficult to calculate the 
amount due (40 per cent);
•	 it was difficult to choose because the 
suppliers used different terms to describe 
the same thing (37 per cent); 
•	 price comparison sites were too 
confusing (16 per cent).
33 See Annexe H to Office of Fair Trading. (2010). A consumer’s 
view of pricing advertising. London: Office of Fair Trading. 
Available at: http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/markets-work/
completed/advertising-prices/
34. It is essential to understand whether 
consumers are taking advantage of the 
choice available to them and to understand 
the impact of the proliferation of tariffs on 
certain population groups. In other areas 
proliferation of a large range of complex 
pricing structures has been found to act 
against consumer interests, with too many 
options making it more difficult for people 
to make a choice.32 
35. There is evidence to suggest that the 
availability of choice in this case, too, has 
not helped consumers to navigate the 
market and that, for some, the proliferation 
of choice has had a detrimental effect. An 
Office of Fair Trading survey of consumer 
attitudes to price information found 
that consumers felt complex pricing 
was encountered more often in gas and 
32 See Pensions Commission. (2005). A new pensions 
settlement for the 21st century: the 2nd Report of the 
Pensions Commission pp. 373-377. London: Pensions 
Commission. Available at: http://www.webarchive.org.
uk/wayback/archive/20070802120000/http://www.
pensionscommission.org.uk/publications/2005/annrep/
annrep-index.html 
Cost of bills (£)
Source: Quarterly Energy Prices, March 2011 (DECC)
Figure 2.10: Average annual standardised domestic gas 
and electricity bills 1998 – 2010, England and Wales 
(2010 real prices)
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reasonably confident about switching.37 
Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that 
tariff complexities are a potential barrier 
to switching for a small but significant 
proportion of consumers. 
38. On the other hand, the evidence worryingly 
suggests that the assumption that switching 
leads to lower prices does not always hold 
true. Again, this has been highlighted by 
the Energy and Climate Change Committee. 
Using figures from Ofgem and additional 
evidence gathered during an enquiry on 
the Ofgem Retail Review, the Committee 
showed that while approximately 60 per 
cent of consumers who switched tariffs 
succeeded in reducing their bills, 40 per cent 
of consumers were worse off. 
39. Ofgem’s own review found that for those 
who switched, the average net saving was 
1-2 per cent for gas customers and 3-4 per 
cent for electricity customers. In general, 
customers who switched as a result of 
their own enquiries made greater savings 
than those who switched as a result of a 
doorstep sale. In the case of prepayment 
meters, Ofgem found a tendency towards 
higher churn rates. However, despite 
switching more often, the number of 
customers found to be worse off after 
switching was very high, at 48 per cent 
for electricity and 46 per cent for gas. As 
we have seen, it is low-income households 
who are most likely to be on prepayment 
meters. 
40. From a fuel poverty perspective, the 
impact on low-income households of 
the operation of the domestic market 
is clearly important. Switching rates are 
lowest amongst older and lower income 
households as well as those on standard 
37 See Annexe N to Office of Fair Trading. (2010). A consumer’s 
view of pricing advertising. London: Office of Fair Trading. 
Available at: http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/markets-work/
completed/advertising-prices/
36. This difficulty in navigating the market is 
reflected in the rates of people switching 
provider. While at least 75 per cent of 
GB consumers who take both gas and 
electricity have switched energy supplier 
at least once, equivalent to just under 
20 million households, the headline figures 
mask very different switching behaviours. 
Only a small proportion of households 
(17 per cent) regularly shops around for the 
best deal, and these are most likely to be 
those households in full-time employment 
on higher incomes. Most either switch 
in response to a direct approach from 
an energy company (either by phone or 
on the doorstep)34 or never switch at all. 
The reasons cited for not switching were: 
consumer behaviour (e.g. loyalty to a 
supplier, lack of interest, scepticism about 
the advantages of switching), supplier 
behaviour (e.g. debt blocking and lack 
of simple information) and technical 
issues (e.g. the lack of internet or a bank 
account).35
37. The House of Commons Energy and 
Climate Change Select Committee has 
found that some energy consumers 
have found interacting with the market 
disconcertingly complex. Even the Minister 
of State, Charles Hendry MP, “had been 
so confused by tariff options when 
trying to switch that he decided to stick 
with his current tariff.”36 According to 
the Office of Fair Trading survey most 
(70 per cent) consumers said they felt 
34 Doorstep selling has been in the spotlight in 2011 and three 
suppliers – Scottish and Southern Electricity, British Gas and 
EDF Energy have announced they are ending or suspending 
the practice.
35  For those on a prepayment meter, there are additional 
barriers to being able to switch from a prepayment meter 
to either standard credit or direct debit. The most significant 
of these are the upfront charges demanded by some energy 
suppliers to cover the cost of switching from a meter. In 
addition a deposit may also be required. These are often 
beyond the means of many low income customers.
36 See: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/
cmselect/cmenergy/1046/11062203.htm 
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Off-grid energy
42. Not all households have access to the gas 
grid and instead rely on other heating fuels 
or electricity for warmth (2.9 million or 
13 per cent of English households in 2009). 
These households tend to be located in 
rural areas with no gas grid (32 per cent 
of households in rural areas are off the 
gas grid), although there is also a smaller 
but still significant number of households 
off the gas grid in urban areas (8 per cent, 
falling to 2 per cent if flats are removed 
from the population).42 
43. These households instead use either 
heating oil (0.8 million), solid fuel (0.2 
million), community heating schemes (0.2 
million), LPG (0.1 million), or electricity 
(approximately 1.5 million). Using heating 
fuels and electricity to heat a domestic 
property tends to be more expensive than 
using gas, with the average modelled bill 
for an off-grid property estimated by DECC 
to be £1,580, compared to an average bill 
for a property on grid of £1,300. 
44. As a result, and as Figure 2.11 shows, 
there tends to be a higher proportion of 
people in fuel poverty under the current 
definition amongst those who are off-grid. 
In rural areas, where over half of those 
in fuel poverty are off the gas grid, this 
is the result of the higher than average 
bills and lower than average SAP rating. 
Those off the gas grid also have lower than 
average incomes. 
45. Unlike gas and electricity markets, there 
are hundreds of suppliers in the domestic 
off-grid heating fuel market. Prompted by 
concerns raised earlier in 2011 regarding 
the high price of heating oil, the Office of 
42 Many of the homes using electricity for warmth are found in 
tower blocks where gas cannot be installed. Data from DECC 
fuel poverty statistics (2011) and DCLG EHS data (2009).
credit. This reflects the greater concern 
among low-income groups about the 
effects of switching, with many citing 
concern that something would go wrong if 
they switched and they would subsequently 
be less able to deal with the consequences 
of a unexpectedly high bill.38 
Significance of tariffs39 
41. Some of the variation in tariffs is allowed 
for in DECC’s calculations of whether 
households are in fuel poverty. Specifically, 
the model is based on values for average 
tariffs by region and payment type. The 
model does not allow for variations within 
these groups. As a measure of the potential 
impact of tariff variation, if all households 
with the lowest three tenths of incomes 
paid the lowest tariffs40 (the fifth percentile 
level within each payment type and region), 
fuel poverty in 2009 would have been 
15 per cent lower than calculated using 
the average for the groups. If, in fact, the 
poorest 30 per cent of households paid the 
highest tariffs (the ninety-fifth percentile 
for each group), fuel poverty would be 7 
per cent higher than officially calculated.41 
We hope that data will become available 
allowing a more accurate investigation than 
is currently possible of the extent to which 
the poor may pay more for energy. 
38 Ofgem. Energy Supply Probe (2008). See: http://www.ofgem.
gov.uk/Markets/RetMkts/ensuppro/Documents1/Energy%20
Supply%20Probe%20-%20Initial%20Findings%20Report.
pdf 
39 In our final report we will examine issues around tariff 
structures, including suggestions made to us that a move to 
a ‘rising block tariff’ would help reduce fuel poverty.
40 Excluding fixed and social tariffs. 
41 Calculations for the Hills Fuel Poverty Review. This impact 
is the theoretical maximum impact of a variations in tariff 
scenario. The calculation does not take account of possible 
impacts on the market, and availability of tariffs. For instance, if 
a large number of customers switched to lower tariffs, one 
would expect tariffs overall to increase to offset this, at least 
in part.
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sector) and energy suppliers will 
generally recoup the costs of these 
policies through higher energy prices; 
and 
•	 the thermal efficiency of buildings and 
appliances: some policies (e.g. Feed-
in Tariffs (FITs), the Renewable Heat 
Premium Payment (RHPP) and the 
forthcoming Green Deal) will deliver 
energy efficiency and renewable heat 
measures to households. These measures 
will help to improve the thermal 
efficiency of the housing stock and, for 
the households that receive measures, 
will reduce energy costs. Also, policies 
and standards that are put in place 
to improve the energy efficiency of 
products (e.g. refrigerators and boilers) 
will help to reduce household energy 
consumption and energy bills. 
2.4 The impact of 
government policies on 
energy bills
46. A third factor in a household’s ability to 
turn income into heat is the range of 
policies that the Government has put in 
place to reduce carbon emissions, both in 
terms of increased energy efficiency and a 
decarbonised electricity system. Policies can 
impact on household energy bills through 
one or both of: 
•	 energy tariffs: many climate and 
energy policies put obligations on 
energy suppliers (e.g. the Renewables  
Obligation (RO) requires that a certain 
proportion of electricity generation 
is from renewable sources, while the 
Carbon Emission Reduction Target 
(CERT) requires energy suppliers to make 
carbon reductions in the household 
which is being published at around the 
same time as this report. 
Fair Trading has undertaken a study into 
the functioning of the off-grid market, 
Payment method, tariff and fuel type can all have a (significant) impact on a 
household’s final fuel bill. All types of tariff have become much more expensive since 
2004. The difference between prepayment meter and standard credit costs has 
narrowed, but those on low incomes remain least likely to be on the cheapest, direct 
debit, tariffs. In theory, there are opportunities to switch payment method, tariff or 
supplier but in practice only a small proportion of consumers are taking advantage 
of this opportunity. Difficulties in accessing the best deals (e.g. because of lack of 
internet access) are exacerbated by the complexity of the market which can make 
it difficult to navigate. The evidence suggests that these barriers disproportionately 
affect those on the lowest incomes. Where customers on prepayment meters have 
switched supplier as a result of a doorstep sale, almost as many have switched to a 
worse as to a better tariff. For those off the gas grid, either in rural areas or in tower 
blocks, energy costs are substantially higher than for others. 
Current modelling of fuel poverty assumes that households pay average tariffs for 
their region and payment method. If low-income households in fact face worse 
tariffs, this would understate fuel poverty, although a maximum effect would be 
around 7 per cent at 2009 levels.
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% of households
Fuel Poverty Ratio
Source: Fuel poverty statistics, 2011 (DECC)
Figure 2.11: Off and on gas grid fuel poverty ratios in 
2009, England
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In addition, decisions about the taxation 
of energy (e.g. the reduced rate VAT on 
domestic energy use of 5 per cent) also 
have an impact on household energy 
bills. The following paragraphs examine 
the evidence on the impact of other 
Government policies on tariffs and on the 
thermal efficiency of buildings, focusing 
on the impact of policies on lower income 
households. 
Impact on prices
47. Energy suppliers are expected to recoup 
the costs of climate and energy policies 
through higher energy prices. Figure 2.12 
shows some estimates that were published 
by DECC alongside the 2010 Annual 
Energy Statement (AES) on the gross 
impact of the climate and energy policy 
package on domestic gas and electricity 
prices up to 2020.43 The estimates suggest 
that policies will increase both gas and 
electricity prices in the domestic sector 
43 DECC policies have been grouped into: (1) low carbon 
generation: which includes the CCS levy and EU ETS; (2) 
renewable energy: which includes RHI, RO and FITs; (3) 
supplier obligations: which includes CESP, CERT and a future 
supplier obligation (now known as ECO); and (4) other: 
which includes better billing, smart meters and energy 
security. 
and that the magnitude of that impact will 
increase as 2020 approaches. However, 
savings from energy efficiency measures 
will also grow (see paragraphs 50 and 51).
48. Since these estimates were published the 
policy landscape has evolved, which means 
that the figures are now somewhat out of 
date. For example, the Renewable Heat 
Incentive is now funded from general 
taxation rather than through energy 
bills and there are new policies that the 
Government is developing (such as the 
Green Deal and Electricity Market Reform) 
that did not form part of the 2010 analysis. 
The Government is expected to publish a 
new set of projections alongside the 2011 
AES which will correct for these issues, 
and which should therefore be available 
for our final report. However, the 2010 
analysis does give a useful indication 
of the magnitudes of DECC policies on 
energy prices and of the importance of 
distributional questions.
49. Energy suppliers probably recover the cost 
of these policies in different ways. However, 
whether they spread the costs evenly across 
each unit of consumption or through a 
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on the energy efficiency for a range of 
household products. Product policies are 
different from the other mitigation policies 
that are shown in the chart as the savings 
from product policies will occur irrespective 
of the level of gross costs that are being 
added to energy bills. It could be argued, 
therefore, that the savings from product 
policies should not be reflected in this 
analysis. For this reason, the chart shows 
the savings from product policies separately 
in the second bar. It is clear that the impact 
of the DECC policy package would look 
rather different if these savings were 
excluded. As it stands, the DECC analysis 
suggests that the net effect of the climate 
and energy policy package will increase the 
average household energy bill by 1 per cent 
(£13) in 2020. This number would increase 
to 10 per cent (£135) if the impact of 
product policies were to be excluded.44
44 It is important to note that taking the impact of product 
policies out of these estimates would mean assigning them 
to the baseline bill (i.e. the reduction in the base bill would 
offset the level of the increase in policy impact) and would 
not, therefore, change the estimate of the overall bill in 
2020. It is clear that, irrespective of where the savings are 
counted, product policies are expected to have a significant 
effect in terms of helping to offset the regressive impacts of 
the policy package. 
lump sum across each bill, the impact will 
be regressive in the sense that fuel costs 
generally make up a larger proportion 
of total expenditure for low-income 
households compared to households on 
higher incomes. 
Impact on bills
50. Some government policies, including 
those financed by the costs shown in 
Figure 2.12, put downward pressure on 
energy bills. Figure 2.13, also based on the 
analysis published by DECC alongside the 
AES 2010, sets the average energy price 
increase due to policies in 2020 against 
the impact of factors that should reduce 
energy bills. These include technological 
factors (e.g. policies such as CERT and 
FITs that improve the thermal efficiency of 
dwellings) and behavioural factors (e.g. 
smart meters and better billing policies that 
help consumers to use energy in a more 
efficient way).
51. By far the largest impact in terms of 
mitigating price impacts comes from 
products policies. These capture the impact 
of EU minimum standards and labelling 
Retail Price including VAT (£/MWh)
Figure 2.12: Estimated impact of policies on average gross 
household gas and electricity prices in real terms
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delivered across different income groups 
(e.g. CERT measures are spread across 
households in the so-called priority group 
– pensioners and households containing 
someone on one of a range of benefits – 
and a non-priority group).46 It is assumed 
that, due to the associated up-front costs, 
renewable energy measures will only be 
taken up by higher-income households. 
Estimates for both Figures 2.13 and 2.14 
do not include the impact of the Warm 
Home Discount, which came into force in 
April 2011.
54. The results suggest that, on these 
assumptions, the poor would bear the 
largest proportional losses from the 
climate and energy policy package. For 
those households that do not receive any 
measures, the policy package is expected 
to cost around an additional 2 per cent 
46 For CERT, 40 per cent of emissions reductions must be 
delivered in the priority group. 
52. Looking at average bill impacts masks very 
significant differences in the impact of 
these policies across different households. 
While all households will pay for the costs 
of policies through higher energy bills, 
only some households will receive energy 
efficiency and renewable energy measures. 
As such, the policy package creates a 
number of winners and losers.
53. DECC has estimated the impact of the 
climate and energy policy package across 
households at different points in the 
income distribution, as shown in Figure 
2.14.45 The analysis assumes that some 
households will receive insulation measures 
through supplier obligations (i.e. CERT, 
Community Energy Saving Programme 
(CESP) and a future supplier obligation 
that was assumed to deliver solid wall 
insulation) and that the policies will be 
45 As estimated using announced policy measures in August 
2010. 
Cost of bill (£)
Source: Annual Energy Statement, 2010, (DECC) Source: Annual Energy Statement, 2010, (DECC)
Figure 2.13: Estimated impact of policies on average domestic energy bill in 2020 (2009 prices)
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assumptions made in the 2010 analysis). 
This was a point that was made in the Fuel 
Poverty Advisory Group (FPAG) response to 
the call for evidence. The FPAG response 
argued that more work was needed in 
order to fully understand the implications 
for fuel poor households (who, for 
example, tend to take greater amounts of 
the potential bill savings from efficiency 
measures as comfort) of the move to a low 
carbon economy.  
57. The actual distribution of benefits resulting 
from the policies will depend on decisions 
yet to be made, in particular, how the 
resources from the new Green Deal and 
Energy Company obligation are split 
between those more directly benefiting 
the potentially fuel poor and those aimed 
more generally at carbon reduction. As well 
as threatening to increase fuel poverty, a 
failure to protect low-income households 
could, insofar as it limits public acceptability 
of policies that are funded and delivered 
through energy suppliers, become a barrier 
to the achievement of climate and energy 
objectives. Given the significance of these 
of income for the lowest income group 
(which is around an additional £140 per 
year) and around 0.3 per cent of income 
for households in the top income group 
(around £180 per year). These estimates 
include the effect of the products policies 
discussed above – the estimated bill 
impacts of the policy package would be 
significantly larger if these estimates were 
to be stripped out.  
55. Allowing for the assumed distribution of 
benefits from the measures financed by 
the package, the net impact is an average 
loss of around 0.8 per cent of income 
for the poorest fifth of households, but 
approximately break-even for the richest 
fifth of households. 
56. This discussion highlights the distributional 
impacts that can result from policy design. 
It is important that these impacts are 
well understood and quantified as, in the 
absence of mitigating action, the DECC 
analysis suggests the costs of meeting 
climate and energy goals could have a 
negative impact on fuel poverty (under the 
Change in bill as a result of policy in 2020 as % of income
Source: DIMPSA model (CSE and DECC).
Note: See text for the assumed basis for the distribution of benefits of measures.
Figure 2.14:  Estimated impact of policies on an average 
domestic energy bill as a share of income in 2020, UK
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the potentially regressive effects shown 
in Figure 2.14 avoided. This is particularly 
the case given that this type of household 
is unlikely to be able to afford to fund 
improvements without assistance. 
objectives, it is important that policies are 
designed in such a way as to ensure that 
improvements to the energy efficiency and 
heating needs of dwellings of those on 
the lowest incomes can be supported, and 
Government policies both increase and decrease potential energy bills and these 
factors impact on income groups in different ways. Products policies should reduce 
energy costs for all households, having the greatest proportionate effect on low 
income households. By contrast, the impact of higher prices resulting from the 
Government’s energy and climate change policies will be regressive. The net effect 
will depend on how the benefits of those policies are distributed. DECC analysis 
on one set of assumptions for this suggests a net cost equivalent to 0.8 percent 
of income for the poorest fifth of households, but break-even for the richest fifth. 
Whether this regressive outcome – which would tend to increase fuel poverty – 
occurs depends on decisions yet to be taken.
2.5 Energy use relative 
to need 
58. We have seen what factors impact on 
the ability of households to heat their 
homes. We now turn to energy use 
behaviour, examining the extent to 
which observed behaviours of energy use 
amongst households conform to their 
notional energy needs (i.e. the amount of 
energy that a household would require in 
order to heat their home to an adequate 
standard as described by the fuel poverty 
methodology.)47 First, we examine all 
household energy use (including energy for 
heating and non-heating). Then we discuss 
the evidence on internal temperatures. 
Heating and non-heating uses 
of energy 
59. Aggregate energy consumption in the 
domestic sector has increased by about 
a third since 1970. This has been largely 
47 Further detail of the fuel poverty methodology – including 
discussion of the assumed heating regimes – can be found in 
Chapter 5.
driven by an increase in population, 
household numbers, real incomes and 
ownership of electrical appliances. 
However, as a result of improvements in the 
average SAP rating of dwellings and in the 
energy efficiency of appliances, the average 
energy use per household has been more 
or less static since 1970 (as is shown in 
Figure 2.15).
60. Table 2.3 uses 2009 data from two 
sources to examine how patterns of actual 
energy use compare to energy need as 
produced by the fuel poverty model. The 
data show that, on average, the poorest 
tenth of households consume only around 
two-thirds of their notional requirement. 
While the extent of the difference falls as 
household incomes rise, it is striking that 
even households in the top half of the 
income distribution, who are relatively 
unconstrained in terms of energy use, 
appear to be consuming significantly 
less than the level implied by the model 
underlying the fuel poverty definition. 
This suggests that the current modelling 
overstates energy requirements compared 
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– not just low income – households heat 
their houses to lower temperatures than 
the modelling assumes.
to contemporary behaviour, even of 
those who are relatively well-off. As the 
modelling is based on actual spending for 
non-heating costs, this implies that typical 
0
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Source: Energy Consumption in the UK, 2011 (DECC)
Figure 2.15: Average household energy consumption per 
person and per household, 1970 – 2010, UK 
Table 2.3: Household energy use by gross income groups (unequivalised) – 
notional versus actual, 2009, England
Income 
group
Average annual 
household energy 
requirement (£)
Average annual 
household energy bill 
(£)
Ratio of actual 
expenditure to energy 
requirement (%)
Bottom 1,278 847 66
2 1,262 933 74
3 1,334 984 74
4 1,379 1,067 77
5 1,437 1,116 77
6 1,465 1,148 78
7 1,501 1,220 81
8 1,583 1,279 81
9 1,663 1,388 83
Top 1,900 1,559 82
Source: Fuel poverty data, 2009 (DECC), Living Cost and Food Survey, 2009 (ONS)
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Internal temperatures
62. Figures published by DECC of modelled 
24-hour average internal temperatures49 
suggest that dwellings – even though still 
cooler than assumed by the modelling – 
are kept warmer today than in the 1970s 
(see Figure 2.17). The estimates suggest 
that the average internal temperature in 
centrally heated houses increased from 
around 14°C in 1970 to around 17°C in 
2009. 
49 Estimates of the average internal temperature is based 
on a 24 hour average over eight winter months (October 
to May inclusive). These data are not measured but are 
obtained from the Cambridge Housing Model, which is 
based on SAP2009/BREDEM and which estimates achieved 
internal temperature as a function of detailed descriptions 
of insulation and heating systems from the English Housing 
Survey, known energy use from Digest of UK Energy 
Statistics, and heat gains from the sun and internal gains.
61. A focus on average energy use and 
requirements does, however, hide a very 
significant level of variability within income 
groups. One study found that energy 
consumption varied by as much as six  
times within the lowest income group.48 It 
is clear from Figure 2.16 that, within each 
group, there are some high-use households 
that are likely to be consuming energy 
at a level that is closer to, or even above, 
the level prescribed by the fuel poverty 
definition. 
48 Those at the 80th percentile of energy consumption in the 
lowest (equivalent income) decile group consume nearly six 
times as much energy as the 20th percentile of the group. 
See Ekins, P & Dresner, S. (2004). Green Taxes & Charges: 
Reducing their impact on low income households. York: 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Available at: http://www.jrf.
org.uk/sites/files/jrf/1859352472.pdf
Energy Consumption KWH(000s) 
Source:  DIMPSA 2010 (CSE and DECC).
Note: The upper and lower boundaries in this chart show the 95% confidence interval 
for this data. In other words, when the energy consumption of every household is 
taken into account, we would expect 95% of the households to lie within the upper 
and lower bounds shown.
Figure 2.16:  Actual energy consumption by income group, 
2010, UK
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Top98765432Bottom
Mean energy bill
Upper boundary (95% confidence interval)
Lower boundary (95% confidence interval)
58
CHAPTER 2 CAUSES OF FUEL POVERTY
64.  The survey suggested that, on average, 
households were not heating their homes 
to the levels that are set out in the SAP and 
fuel poverty definitions (i.e. 21°C in the 
living room and 18°C in other occupied 
rooms). Average reported daytime 
temperatures were 19.1°C in the living 
room and 17.9°C in the hall. However, 
there was a degree of variability around 
these average figures, with a number 
of households heating their homes to 
much higher and lower temperatures 
(the distributions of living room and hall 
temperatures are shown in Figures 2.18 
and 2.19).
63. There is, unfortunately, limited evidence 
on actual internal temperatures. Data on 
thermal conditions within households were 
previously collected as part of the English 
Household Conditions Survey (EHCS). 
The 1996 EHCS was the last occasion 
when the survey included data on internal 
temperatures (EHCS interviewers measured 
temperatures in the living room and hall, 
as well as external temperature readings, 
during the winter months). It is unhelpful 
for policy-making in this area that this 
important indicator is now 15 years out 
of date.50
50  For this reason we strongly welcome the ongoing Energy 
Follow Up Survey. See http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/
cms/about/science/activities/reductions/reductions.aspx 
Temperature (ºC)
Source: Domestic Energy Fact File, analysis by BRE and Cambridge Architectural 
Research. 
Figure 2.17:  Modelled 24 hour average indoor and 
outdoor winter temperatures, 1970 - 2009, UK
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living room temperatures for dwellings 
with a SAP below 30 was 1.1°C lower than 
dwellings with a SAP above 60). 
66. The temperature data also suggest that 
employment status and household income 
had an impact on internal temperatures. 
Household temperatures tended to be 
lower in households where no adult is 
employed. Living room temperatures in 
households in the top income band were 
on average 0.5°C higher than households 
in the bottom income band. 
65. Reports of the temperature data collected 
under the EHCS have also investigated the 
relationship between dwelling/household 
characteristics and internal temperatures. 
Some of the key results for 1991, published 
in 1996, are presented in Tables 2.4 and 
2.5. The data suggest that average internal 
temperatures tended to decrease with the 
age of the dwelling (average living room 
temperatures were around 1°C lower 
in pre-1919 dwellings than post-1980 
dwellings) and increased with the energy 
efficiency rating of the home (average 
% of households
Source: English House Condition Survey, 1996 (DCLG)
Figure 2.18: Distribution of living room temperatures, 
1996, England
0
5
10
15
20
Living room temperature (ºC)
25201510
% of households
Source: English House Condition Survey, 1996 (DCLG)
Figure 2.19: Distribution of hall temperatures, 1996, 
England
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67. A further 2001 study – Cold Comfort51 
– found low incomes, age of the home, 
presence of central heating, and heating 
costs to be significant determinants 
of how warm a home is, even when 
other possible influences are taken into 
account. As Table 2.6 shows the age of the 
building itself was found to be the most 
significant individual factor with post-
1964 dwellings around 1°C warmer than 
pre-1960 dwellings. While factors relating 
to the thermal performance of the home 
were found to have a greater effect on 
internal temperatures than income, again a 
quarter of homes with the lowest heating 
costs were 1°C warmer.52 One surprising 
result was the lack of correlation between 
cold homes and socio-economic group53 
although income itself was a significant 
predictor of low indoor temperatures. 
68. Another more recent study, based on 
households that received measures under 
the Government’s Warm Front Scheme, 
collected living room and bedroom 
temperature data from households during 
the winters of 2001/02 and 2002/0354 
This study highlighted the importance 
of the thermal efficiency on decisions 
about internal temperature. The data 
show that internal temperatures were 
strongly related to household SAP rating 
and that households tended to ‘take-
back’ some efficiency savings through 
higher temperatures rather than realising 
bill savings. The Warm Front study found 
that, on average, households that received 
energy efficiency and heating measures 
through the scheme increased living room 
temperatures from around 17.9°C to 
51 Wilkinson et al. (2001).
52 Energy efficiency, measured by SAP, was not a significant 
predictor of indoor temperature when included alongside 
the age of the house, but was individually significant.
53 Socio-economic group was defined by professional status.
54  Households eligible for the Warm front scheme in England.
Table 2.4: Average living room and hall temperatures by 
dwelling characteristics, 1991, England
Average living room 
temperature °C
Average hall 
temperature °C
Dwelling	age
Pre-1919 18.7 17.2
1919-1944 18.9 17.3
1945-1964 19.1 17.8
1965-1980 19.5 18.5
Post-1980 19.7 19.0
SAP	rating
Less than 30 18.4 16.6
30-40 18.9 17.7
40-50 19.3 18.1
50-60 19.2 18.2
Over 60 19.5 18.4
Source: English Housing Condition Survey, 1996 (DCLG)
Table 2.5: Average living room and hall temperatures by 
household characteristics, 1991, England
Average living room 
temperature °C
Average hall 
temperature °C
Employment	of	head	
of	household
Working full time 19.2 18.0
Working part time 18.4 16.8
Unemployed 18.4 16.9
Retired 19.4 18.0
Full time education 18.2 17.5
Other inactive 19.0 17.6
Net	income	of	household  
Under £4,500   18.8 17.2
£4,500 - £8,500 19.1 17.5
£8,500 - £13,500 19.0 17.7
£13,500 - £19,500 19.3 18.0
Over £19,500 19.3 18.4
Source: English Housing Condition Survey, 1996 (DCLG)
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19.6°C (and increased average bedroom 
temperature from around 15.9°C to 
around 18.3°C). 
How do people cope with 
the difficulties of achieving 
a reasonable standard of 
thermal comfort?
69. Whether people are heating their homes 
to the temperature standard set out in the 
fuel poverty methodology or not, we know 
that high fuel costs mean that households 
are faced with difficult trade-offs. 
70. Households are faced with a choice:
•	 To heat their home to their preferred 
level, and forgo other expenditure in 
order to do so, or go into debt. There is 
some evidence of a ‘heat or eat’ trade-
off, but only for the lowest income 
households. Work by the Institute for 
Fiscal Studies tested the extent to which 
there is a ‘Heat or Eat’ trade-off in the 
UK.55 It looked at expenditure data 
for pensioner households to see how 
spending on food and energy responded 
to unexpected temperature shocks. It 
found that, on average, households 
in all income groups responded to 
cold snaps by increasing expenditure 
on fuel. However, it also found that a 
reduction in food spending was only 
observed during the most severe cold 
weather and amongst the poorest, 
older households. The reduction in food 
expenditure is evident only among the 
poorest quarter of older households 
when the temperature is more than 2°C 
colder than would be expected for that 
time of year.  It concluded that the lack 
of a stronger heat versus eat trade-off 
55 Beatty, T., Blow, L & Crossley, T. (2011). Is there a heat or eat 
trade off in the UK? Institute of Fiscal Studies. Available at: 
http://www.ifs.org.uk/wps/wp1109.pdf
Table 2.6: Selected significant predictors of 
indoor temperature
Increase in hall 
temperature 
(°C) relative 
to baseline group
Net	household	income
Lowest quarter of 
households
0
2nd quarter 0.08
3rd quarter 0.07
Highest quarter 0.25
Age	of	building
Pre - 1900 0
1900 - 44 -0.06
1945 - 64 0.15
1965 - 80 1.08
Post - 1980 1.2
Central	heating
Yes 0
No -1.13
Minimum	standard	heating	costs
Quarter of households 
with lowest costs
0
2nd quarter -0.57
3rd quarter -0.72
Quarter of households 
with highest costs
-1.1
Source: Wilkinson et al. (2001). Based on EHCS, 1996 (DCLG)
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may have been down to the fact that 
food and fuel budgets have fallen as a 
share of expenditure over time (which 
gives households more scope to absorb 
an energy price shock) and greater use 
of direct debit to pay for energy (which 
tends to smooth energy expenditure 
over time). 
•	 To turn down or (in extreme cases) 
turn off their heating. The Centre for 
Sustainable Energy report You just have 
to get by58 illustrated these choices 
which included: heating only one room, 
turning the heating on for fewer hours 
than they would have liked, putting on 
more clothes and in some cases turning 
the heating off altogether.
71. Chapter 3 considers the impacts of such 
trade-offs. 
58  Anderson, W., White, V. and Finney, A. (2010.) You Just 
Have To Get By. Bristol: Centre for Sustainable Energy. 
Available at: http://www.cse.org.uk/downloads/file/you_just_
have_to_get_by.pdf
Table 2.7: Standardised indoor temperatures 
by property and household characteristics
Household 
characteristic
Change in 
living room 
temperature 
relative to 
baseline 
group (°C)
Change in 
bedroom 
temperature 
relative to 
baseline 
group (°C)
Required	energy	
consumption56
Low 0 0
Medium -0.36 -0.31
High -1.37 -1.55
SAP	rating	
(quartile)
≤41 (least 
efficient)
0 0
42-56 1.27 1.60
57-69 1.59 2.19
≥70 (most 
efficient)
2.24 2.56
Difficulty	paying	
bills
No 0 0
Fairly or very 
difficult
-0.67 -0.52
Source: Adapted from Oreszczyn et al. (2006)57
56 Defined as the amount of energy required to keep indoor temperatures constant for 
a 1ºC drop in temperature. ‘Low’ is defined as 250 Watts, ‘Medium’ as 250 – 499 
Watts, and ‘High’ as more than 500 Watts.
57 Oreszczyn, T., Ridley, I., Hong, S &Wilkinson, W. Warm Front Study Group (2006). 
Determinants of Winter Indoor Temperatures in Low Income Households in England. 
Energy and Buildings, 38; 245-252.
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Data on actual household energy use suggest that the modelling underlying the fuel poverty 
definition overstates energy requirements compared to contemporary behaviour, even of those 
who are relatively well off. Households with the top half of incomes consume a fifth less than the 
predicted amount. However the shortfall for the poorest tenth of households is a third, suggesting 
that lack of income is leading to lower temperatures than contemporary norms. It is unhelpful for 
policy-making that data on actual temperatures inside homes are now 15 years old. That 1991 
data showed that those in older dwellings and poorly insulated ones were living at temperatures 
1°C cooler than in more recently built and better insulated ones. Households in the poorest income 
band were living at temperatures 0.5°C below those in the top income band. The poorest pensioner 
households have been found to reduce food spending during the coldest weather.
Chapter	2	summary
This Chapter has looked at the underlying causes of fuel poverty and who they most affect, as well 
as energy use. The main findings, summarised in more detail after each section, are:
•	 Poorer households live in smaller dwellings, reducing potential energy bills. Social housing is also 
more energy efficient than private housing. Being off the gas grid is a major factor increasing 
energy costs. Within tenures, energy efficiency (SAP rating) is not strongly linked to income. 
•	 Those on low incomes are least likely to be on the cheapest, direct debit, tariffs. Where customers 
with prepayment meters have switched supplier following a doorstep sale, almost as many 
switched to a worse as to a better deal. 
•	 The net effect of government policies on different income groups will depend on how the 
interventions financed by some of those policies are distributed. On assumptions made by DECC 
in 2010, the net effect would be a loss on average for low-income households, tending to 
increase fuel poverty. Whether this actually occurs depends on decisions yet to be taken. 
•	 We do not know what temperatures households are now living at. Data on actual energy use 
suggest that even better-off households do not live at the temperatures assumed in modelling fuel 
poverty. However, the poorest tenth of households appear to be living at lower temperatures than 
contemporary norms.
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1. We have seen that, as a reflection of 
their income and energy costs, different 
households are faced with different 
decisions or trade-offs to make. For some, 
there is considerable flexibility in exercising 
this choice. For others, circumstances 
dictate. In the context of fuel poverty, there 
are two outcomes of concern: either a low 
income household may have to reduce 
its energy spending and does not keep 
adequately warm, or it prioritises energy 
spending but reduces spending elsewhere, 
potentially causing other kinds of 
deprivation. This chapter examines each of 
these broad impacts in turn. At this stage 
we examine only the evidence relating 
to the existence of impacts, rather than 
impacts of possible interventions aimed at 
alleviating them. We will consider possible 
interventions to tackle fuel poverty in our 
final report.
3.1 Health impacts
2. The vast majority of the evidence of health 
impacts linked to fuel poverty relates to 
living at low temperatures. This is not the 
same as direct health consequences of 
the interaction between low income and 
high heating costs, but there is compelling 
evidence that the drivers of fuel poverty are 
strongly linked to living in low temperatures. 
3. The Marmot Review Team’s recent 
review of the health impacts of living in 
cold homes provides a comprehensive 
overview of the evidence linking fuel 
poverty-related factors to poor physical 
and mental health, as well as the effect of 
interventions to mitigate them, at both a 
national and regional level.59 The following 
three sections focus only on national level 
research on the health implications of low 
temperatures. Where fuel poverty-related 
factors give rise to health impacts that are 
not related to temperature, we summarise 
the evidence within those sections rather 
than here.
4. Health outcomes relating to temperature 
are broad, ranging from readily observable 
effects, such as mortality, to less 
immediately discernible mental health 
problems. Low temperatures create 
conditions which increase the likelihood 
of cardiovascular events, resulting in 
59 Marmot Review Team. (2011). The Health Impacts of 
Cold Homes and Fuel Poverty. London: Friends of the 
Earth and the Marmot Review Team. Available at: http://
www.marmotreview.org/AssetLibrary/the%20health%20
impacts%20of%20cold%20homes%20and%20fuel%20
poverty%20-%20marmot%20team%20foe%20-%20
may%202011.pdf
Impacts of 
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CHAPTER 3 
Fuel Poverty: the problem and its measurement 65
poor physical health and in some cases 
death, particularly for older people60. 
In conjunction with other factors, cold 
exacerbates the risk of respiratory disease, 
with similar physical health consequences. 
Physical discomfort resulting from cold, in 
addition to anxiety and stress relating to 
the cost of keeping warm, results in stress 
that can in turn create mental health issues 
relating to anxiety and depression.
5. As we saw in Chapter 2 there is a clear 
link between the drivers of fuel poverty 
and temperature-related health impacts. 
Low incomes, high heating costs and 
poor energy efficiency are strongly 
associated with cold homes, and low 
indoor temperatures have a strong effect 
on the risk of poor health outcomes, 
particularly mortality. However, low indoor 
temperatures are not the only reason 
behind these outcomes. Other housing 
related factors, such as ventilation, and 
their interaction with temperature are 
significant, as are individual attitudes 
to heating indoors and wrapping up 
outdoors in winter, and the role of seasonal 
infections such as influenza. The drivers of 
fuel poverty are important for only some 
of these cold-related health impacts and 
they do not fully explain why these health 
outcomes occur. However, the evidence is 
clear that for a number of health impacts 
fuel poverty has a significant influence on 
the scale of the problem.
3.2 Cold related 
morbidity
6. Concern around the links between 
living at low temperatures and poor 
physical health has existed for some time, 
60  The evidence we review largely relates to low temperatures. 
As exceptionally hot weather becomes more common, heat-
related health problems – and people’s ability to avoid them 
– will become a growing problem.
particularly in relation to vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups. In conjunction with 
concerns around housing standards more 
broadly, the temperature-health link has 
influenced Government policy, in particular 
the introduction of the Decent Homes 
Standard under the previous Government, 
which includes provision of a “reasonable 
degree of comfort”61 and, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, the Warm Front Scheme. 
Links between low 
temperatures and poor health
7. The evidence indicates that the direct 
relationship between low temperatures 
and physical morbidity is complex. Indeed, 
it is often in conjunction with other 
compounding factors, such as humidity 
and levels of clothing insulation, that 
temperature-related health impacts occur. 
Nevertheless, there is a body of persuasive 
evidence that links low temperatures 
with a number of health impacts, ranging 
from minor infections to serious medical 
conditions that can ultimately prove fatal. 
8. The strongest evidence relates to perhaps 
the most serious conditions: cardiovascular 
and respiratory illnesses. The occurrence of 
these conditions in relation to temperature 
is widely quoted as:
•	 below 16°C – respiratory problems;
•	 below 12°C – circulatory problems; and
•	 below 5°C-6°C – risk of hypothermia.62
61 Department for Communities and Local Government. 
(2006). A Decent Home: Definition and Guidance for 
Implementation. London: Department of Communities and 
Local Government. Available at: http://www.communities.
gov.uk/documents/housing/pdf/138355.pdf
62 For example see: The Marmot Review Team. (2011).
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are not at optimum levels.66 Humidity is 
thought to cause a number of different 
physiological responses detrimental to 
human health. For example, high humidity 
may increase the spread of droplet 
infection and may also be detrimental 
because of the cooling effect of damp 
clothing and footwear experienced in 
colder temperatures. For its part, low 
humidity may reduce resistance to 
infections such as colds, by drying out 
protective oral and nasal mucosa.67 It would 
appear, therefore, that it is the interaction 
between lower temperatures and humidity 
that increases the risk of respiratory 
problems.
12. The WHO report also suggests that the 
effect of low temperatures alone on 
reducing resistance to infections such as 
colds and influenza is not clear cut, and 
that “objective data are lacking of a causal 
relationship between body chilling and 
subsequent respiratory illness.” Again, 
humidity levels were found to have a 
significant impact. 
13. The view that it may be the interaction 
between cold temperatures and other 
environmental factors that causes 
respiratory disease is supported by a 2001 
study on linking housing characteristics 
to excess winter deaths.68 This study 
found a clearer correlation between 
low temperatures and mortality related 
to cardiovascular disease than low 
temperatures and mortality related to 
respiratory disease. However, sub-zero 
outdoor temperatures can impair the 
66 According to the WHO (1987) report, 20-70% relative 
humidity levels are “compatible with health.”
67 WHO. (1987).
68 Wilkinson, P., Landon, M., Armstrong, B., Stevenson, 
S., Pattenden, S., McKee, M. & Fletcher, T. (2001). Cold 
Comfort: The Social and environmental determinants of 
excess winter deaths in England, 1986-96. Bristol: The Policy 
Press.
9. The basis for these thresholds appears 
to be a comprehensive 1987 World 
Health Organisation (WHO) report on low 
temperatures and health, which refers 
to studies on the physiological effects of 
low temperatures.63 The study compared 
the blood pressure of subjects at different 
indoor temperatures between 6°C-23°C 
and found significant increases in the 
blood pressure of elderly people at indoor 
temperatures of 6°C, 9°C and 12°C (but 
not 15°C).
10. Another study64 found an increase in 
coronary event rates across Europe 
corresponding to falls in temperature, 
though these rates tend to be higher 
in warmer countries (we explore this 
further in section 3.3 on excess winter 
deaths). This is supported by several more 
recent studies that also found that lower 
temperatures can lead to thickening of the 
blood,65 which, as with increased blood 
pressure, increases risk of cardiovascular 
problems.
11. The evidence reviewed in the WHO report 
on respiratory problems experienced 
in cold temperatures is less clear cut. 
Whilst there is evidence suggesting that 
respiratory problems may begin to occur 
at temperatures below 16°C, it seems 
that this is only thought to be a significant 
problem where levels of relative humidity 
63 Word Health Organisation. (WHO) (1987). Health Impact 
of Low Indoor Temperatures: Report on a WHO meeting. 
Copenhagen: World Health Organization. Available at: 
http://tinyurl.com/3ghblbm  
64 Barnett,A.G., Dobson, A.J., McElduff, P. Salomaa, V., 
Kuulasmaa, K. and Sans, S. (2005). Cold periods and 
coronary events: an analysis of population worldwide. 
Journal of Epidemiology of Community Health. 59, 551-557.
65 For example see: Stout, R.W., Crawford, V.L.S., McDermott, 
M.J., Rocks, M.J & Morris, T.C.M. (1996). Seasonal Changes 
in Haemostatic Factors in Young and Elderly Subjects. Age 
and Ageing, 25, 256-258; Keatinge, W.R., Coleshaw, S.R.K., 
Cotter, F., Mattock, M., Murphy, M. & Chelliah, R. (1984). 
Increases in platelet and red cell counts, blood viscosity, 
and arterial pressure during mild surface cooling: factors in 
mortality from coronary and cerebral thrombosis in winter. 
British Medical Journal, 289, 1405-1408.
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17.  A number of medical studies71 show that 
elderly people are at higher risk of raised 
blood pressure and blood coagulation, 
both of which, we have seen, can be 
exacerbated by low temperatures and 
may lead to cardiovascular events. Further, 
elderly people tend to lead more sedentary 
lifestyles and spend more time in the 
home than younger members of the 
population. In addition, elderly people may 
not feel discomfort until temperatures are 
particularly low because of a deterioration 
of peripheral temperature perception, 
which could mean that they sit for longer 
periods of time in lower temperatures 
than other adults simply because they are 
not aware of how cold it is.72 As with the 
elderly, those suffering from long term 
illness or disability are likely to spend more 
time in the home and lead more sedentary 
lifestyles. A number of responses to the 
call for evidence, including from Macmillan 
Cancer Support, suggested that those 
suffering long term illness or disability may 
be at greater risk because of pre-existing 
conditions (see Box 3.1).
18. In addition to these groups, there is some 
evidence to suggest that children could be 
at a higher risk than the general population 
of detrimental health impacts from living in 
cold homes. In general, younger children 
tend to have weaker immune systems 
than adults and therefore may be more 
likely to pick up infections and be more 
susceptible to respiratory problems such as 
asthma. While the direct influence of cold 
temperatures on such health impacts is not 
entirely clear, a 2008 study by the National 
Centre for Social Research (NatCen) looking 
at the health and social impacts of three 
self-reported types of poor housing  
71 Stout et al. (1996), Keatinge et al. (1984).
72 WHO. (1987)
functioning of the respiratory system and 
can exacerbate respiratory illnesses such as 
bronchitis and exercise-induced asthma in 
children.69
14. A smaller body of evidence suggests that 
low indoor temperatures are believed to 
increase the likelihood of accidents in the 
home, such as trips and falls, as a result 
of loss of dexterity due to cold-induced 
muscles seizures. Additionally, cold indoor 
temperatures are thought to exacerbate 
pain experienced by arthritis sufferers.70 
However, there appears to be limited 
clinical evidence available to support a 
direct causal relationship between low 
indoor temperatures and these impacts.
15. This review has found limited evidence 
concerning the specific length of exposure 
to low temperatures that leads to negative 
health impacts, aside from that which 
relates to excess winter deaths, which is 
explored later in this chapter.
Who is vulnerable to cold 
related morbidity?
16. In general, the evidence suggests that there 
are three main groups of people who are 
most vulnerable to the health impacts of 
cold homes:
•	 elderly people;
•	 very young children; and
•	 people with a long term sickness or 
disability.
69 WHO. (1987).
70 Gilbertson, J., Stevens, M., Stiell, B. & Thorogood, N. (2006). 
Home is where the hearth is: Grant recipients’ views of 
England’s Home Energy Efficiency Scheme (Warm Front). 
Social Science and Medicine, 63, 946-956.
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asthma or bronchitis as those who did not live 
in bad housing.75 
19. However, further analysis of the same 
data looking at independent relationships 
between aspects of bad housing and 
respiratory health problems found no 
75 Barnes, M., Butt, S. & Tomaszewski, W. (2008). The 
Dynamics of Bad Housing: The impacts of bad housing on 
the living standards on children. London: National Centre for 
Social Research.
73
on children74 found that those persistently 
living in inadequately heated housing or 
housing in a state of poor repair (including 
housing with damp or mould) were more than 
twice as likely to suffer from chest problems, 
73  Macmillan Cancer Support, Survey of Health and Social Care 
Professionals. (2009). Available at: http://www.macmillan.
org.uk/Documents/Aboutus/newsroom/factsheets2011/
Fuelpoverty.pdf 
74 Inadequately heated accommodation, accommodation in 
poor state of repair (including the presence of damp or 
mould) and overcrowded accommodation.
Box	3.1	Vulnerability
Different groups of people are vulnerable to different impacts of fuel poverty. The elderly are particularly 
vulnerable to health impacts, including excess winter deaths; adolescents may be vulnerable to adverse 
social impacts, such as anti-social behaviour or relatively poor educational attainment.
People with pre-existing health conditions such as cancer may also be particularly vulnerable to 
the impacts of low temperatures. Although evidence on this type of vulnerability is more sparse, 
Macmillan Cancer Support told us that 85 per cent of health care professionals who took part in a 
survey believed that feeling cold can affect a cancer patient’s recovery. Furthermore, the same survey 
showed that 77 per cent of health workers reported evidence of patients experiencing pain as a 
result of low temperatures.73
As well as being particularly vulnerable to the impacts of fuel poverty, the elderly and those living 
with long term illness or disability may also be particularly vulnerable to being fuel poor in the 
first place. This is because they are more likely to have low incomes, and may have greater energy 
requirements associated with their condition, or because they lead more sedentary lifestyles or spend 
more time in the home.
We have also heard from a number of stakeholders about the particular vulnerability of rural 
households to fuel poverty. This is because many rural areas may be off the gas grid and households 
may live in hard to reach properties which tend to be older and less efficient or hard to treat. 
Additionally, average incomes tend to be lower, the nature of work available may be seasonal and high 
travel costs may be incurred as a result of living in a rural area. Some stakeholders commented that 
the rural fuel poor are more hidden than in other areas because the income domain of the multiple 
deprivation index captures the proportion of households in receipt of means-tested benefits and the 
diverse nature of the incomes within rural areas may mask this.
Vulnerability is therefore an issue which cuts across population groups and income groups. This 
poses a policy delivery dilemma: policies targeted at the vulnerable may suffer reduced effectiveness 
in terms of tackling fuel poverty; policies targeted at the fuel poor may mean that some vulnerable 
people are left without support. We expect to consider this issue further in our final report.
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events, via low indoor temperatures. The 
extent to which certain health impacts 
can be attributed to the drivers of fuel 
poverty requires further research, but there 
is currently sufficient evidence to suggest 
that there is a causal relationship to 
some degree.
22.  The interaction of low temperatures with 
high humidity levels may also encourage 
mould and dust mite growth, which can 
lead to or exacerbate respiratory illnesses 
such as asthma. The presence of mould 
is generally more prevalent in less energy 
efficient homes, with around a quarter 
of all homes with a SAP rating below 20 
reporting some level of mould growth 
(Figure 3.1). Among Warm Front eligible 
households, the presence of mould in the 
dwellings of low-income households was 
found to be significantly correlated with 
low energy efficiency, older buildings, 
self-reported difficulty in paying bills, 
and relative dissatisfaction with the 
dwelling’s heating system.77 The quarter 
of households living in the least energy 
efficient homes were twice as likely to 
report mould growth as those living in 
the most efficient quarter. Similarly, the 
proportion of households that reported the 
presence of mould and difficultly in paying 
their bills was twice that of households 
reporting the presence of mould and no 
difficulty in paying bills. This pattern was 
also found in households dissatisfied with 
their heating system when compared to 
those that were satisfied, and in those 
living in homes built pre-1930 when 
compared to those built after 1966.
77 Oreszczyn, T., Ridley, I., Hong, S. H., Wilkinson, P. and Warm 
Front Study Group. (2006). Mould and winter relative indoor 
humidity in low income households in England. Indoor and 
Built Environment, 15 (2), 125-135.
specific relationship with self-reported 
inadequate heating.76 It is not clear 
whether this is because of a disconnect 
between self-reported inadequate heating 
and actual indoor temperatures, or 
whether temperature alone does not cause 
respiratory illness. Children who had been 
exposed to housing in a poor state of repair 
(including mould or damp) were found 
to be significantly more likely to report 
other kinds of poor physical health, but 
no significant relationship was found with 
chest or breathing problems. Therefore 
while children living in self-reported low 
temperatures and self-reported poor 
housing conditions are more likely to 
report respiratory health problems, there 
is insufficient evidence to attribute this 
directly to low indoor temperatures or the 
presence of damp or mould in the home. 
How do the drivers of fuel 
poverty increase the risk of 
cold related morbidity?
20. We have seen that the relationship 
between low temperatures and morbidity 
is complex and that there are important 
interactions with other factors such as 
humidity. However, it is clear that low 
temperatures are an important factor in 
determining health outcomes, in particular 
for certain groups of the population.
21. We saw in Chapter 2 (section 2.5) that 
a number of factors directly relating 
to the drivers of fuel poverty were 
found to be significant determinants of 
indoor temperatures. A plausible chain 
of causation exists therefore from the 
drivers of fuel poverty to negative health 
outcomes, in particular cardiovascular 
76 Barnes, M., Butt, S. & Tomaszewski, W. (2011). The duration 
of bad housing and children’s well-being in Britain. Housing 
Studies, 26 (1), 155-176.
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24. The number of EWDs has historically varied 
widely from year to year (Figure 3.2), but 
the trend has been slowly declining over 
recent decades and in the last 10 years 
variation between years has also reduced. 
In fact in recent years we have seen lower 
levels of EWDs than earlier decades. 
3.3 Excess winter deaths
23. The impact of fuel poverty that has raised 
the greatest concern is the association 
with winter deaths. In fact, the association 
of increased mortality with lower external 
temperatures has long been established 
and is officially measured in the form of 
‘excess winter deaths’ (EWDs).78 
78 The official Office for National Statistics formula for 
calculating excess winter deaths compares the number of 
deaths in winter (November to March) with non-winter 
periods (preceding August to November; following April 
to July).
Figure 3.1: Percentage of households with mould, by 
energy efficiency rating, 1996, England
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The relationship between low temperatures and physical health impacts is complex, but there 
is a body of evidence that shows a clear link between the two, while the drivers of fuel poverty 
are significant factors in determining the temperatures at which individuals live. Exposure to cold 
temperatures can have negative impacts on health, primarily for older people and the very young. 
Health impacts caused by exposure to cold tends to relate to cardiovascular and respiratory problems 
at temperatures below 12°C and 16°C respectively, though respiratory problems occur with other 
contributory factors, such as where humidity levels are above or below optimum. Low temperatures 
are also associated with diminished resistance to infections and the incidence of damp and mould in 
the home, which are associated with respiratory problems. The drivers of fuel poverty are associated 
with both living at lower temperatures and the presence of mould in the home.
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26. Compared to other western European 
countries, the UK has a high rate of excess 
winter mortality. From 1988-1997, on 
average 18 per cent of the UK’s winter 
deaths were excess, compared to the  
10-12 per cent observed in typically 
colder countries such as Finland, Sweden 
and Norway (Figure 3.3). In England 
specifically, the average percentage of 
winter deaths classed as excess in the 
10 years to 2009-2010 remained relatively 
25. Although the average number of EWDs in 
England and Wales has fallen from around 
40,000 per year in the 1970s to around 
27,000 per year in the years since 2000, 
the latter figure remains significant – more 
than ten times the number of deaths 
recorded from transport accidents in 
2009.79
79 Office for National Statistics. (2010a). Death registrations 
summary tables (Table 1). Available: http://www.
ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.
html?edition=tcm%3A77-39659. The number of deaths 
recorded as being caused by transport accidents in 2009 
was 2,333. 
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Figure 3.2: Excess winter deaths and average winter 
temperatures, 1970/71 – 2009/10, England and Wales
Figure 3.3: Average proportion of winter deaths that are 
excess, 1988-1997, selected European countries
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28. The largest single group affected by EWDs 
are the over 65s (Figure 3.4), who have 
accounted for over 90 per cent of excess 
deaths in each of the last 20 years.83 In 
particular, the over 85s are worst affected, 
accounting for the largest proportion of 
EWDs regardless of the primary cause.
29. The evidence suggests that the risk of 
death in winter is increased due to two 
main compounding factors: influenza and 
temperature. The links between lower 
temperatures and increased susceptibility to 
circulatory and respiratory illnesses in lower 
temperatures were outlined in section 3.2, 
where it was shown that temperature can 
increase the risk of physical health impacts 
that can result in EWDs. However, the 
temperature-mortality relationship is not 
straightforward and EWDs are not purely 
a result of low temperatures. In years with 
low average winter temperatures there is 
not always the rise in EWDs that might be 
83 Own calculations based on Office for National Statistics. 
(2010b).
high at 16.6 per cent.80 If similar rates were 
achieved in England as in neighbouring 
Northern European countries in the 1990s, 
EWDs in 2009-2010 would have been 
reduced by 7,000-10,000 cases. 
What causes EWDs and who 
is vulnerable?
27. The primary direct causes of EWDs are 
circulatory and respiratory diseases.81 In 
2008-2009 (the most recent year for which 
statistics by cause of EWDs are available) 
these factors accounted for 73 per cent of 
cases.82 Deaths relating to hypothermia, the 
cause of death directly attributable to cold, 
are typically low.
80 Own calculations based on Office for National Statistics. 
(2010b). Excess winter mortality by Age and Region. 
Available: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-
reference-tables.html?edition=tcm%3A77-47566 
81 This is suggested by a number of studies, including 
Wilkinson et al. (2001; 2004), Aylin et al. (2003), and Hajat 
et al. (2006).
82 Own calculations based on Office for National Statistics. 
(2010c). Excess winter mortality in England and Wales, 
2009/10 (provisional) and 2008/09 (final). Available:  
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/deaths1110.pdf 
Figure 3.4: Number of excess winter deaths by cause and 
age group 2008/09, England and Wales
Source: Office for National Statistics, 2010
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32. The independent effect of temperature 
on cardiovascular-related excess winter 
deaths is evident: cardiovascular deaths 
begin to rise as maximum daily outdoor 
temperatures drop below 20ºC, with 
higher than expected deaths occurring 
at lower temperatures (Figure 3.5). The 
direct link between temperature and EWDs 
from respiratory illness is less clear. This 
suggests that the winter rise in respiratory 
death is more a consequence of respiratory 
infection being affected indirectly, rather 
than directly, by temperature.86
33.  While we can be clear that temperature 
appears to be the most significant single 
factor influencing the number of EWDs, the 
relative importance of indoor temperatures, 
outdoor temperatures and how households 
behave, are more difficult to establish. It 
has been estimated that mortality increases 
by around 2 per cent for every 1ºC fall in 
outdoor temperature below 19 ºC.87 The 
Eurowinter Group, combining information 
on characteristics of both dwellings and 
household behaviour (both indoors and 
outdoors), found that for every 1ºC fall 
in living room temperature the number 
of deaths increased by 0.3 per cent when 
outdoor temperatures were 7ºC.88 They 
also found significant effects independently 
for the level of heating in the home, the 
thermal properties of clothing worn and 
type of activity undertaken when outdoors 
in cold temperatures. This suggests that 
while indoor temperatures are a significant 
factor in determining the level of excess 
winter death, they are only part of the 
explanation and behaviour out of the home 
is also important. Wearing items such as 
hats, anoraks and gloves and undertaking 
86 Wilkinson et al. (2001).
87 Wilkinson et al. (2001).
88 The Eurowinter Group. (1997).
expected. Indeed the opposite is also true 
for a number of years with mild winters 
without significant falls in EWDs. 
30. Part of the reason for this is that EWDs 
appear to be related more to the number 
of very cold days people are exposed 
to, rather than the average temperature 
throughout the winter period. The 
Eurowinter Group compared two regions 
with similar average winter temperatures 
– London and a group of cities in Northern 
Italy – and observed that from 1988-1992 
London experienced over 115 days below 
18ºC more than Northern Italy.84 London 
also experienced four times as many EWDs 
on days where the temperature dropped 
below 18ºC over the same time period. 
This indicates that despite having similar 
average winter temperatures, London 
had a higher number of cold days, and 
more EWDs for each of those cold days 
experienced.
31. The other reason for this apparent lack of 
correlation between average temperatures 
and EWDs is the role of influenza. For 
older people, the risk of death varies from 
month to month throughout each year, 
but when the role of influenza is taken into 
account, this monthly variation in death 
risk is reduced by around 25 per cent.85 
When low temperatures are also taken into 
account, the reduction in risk of seasonal 
mortality is even greater at around 70 per 
cent. This implies that most of the seasonal 
changes in death risk seem to be related to 
cold, with influenza and other risk factors 
bearing a smaller influence.
84 The Eurowinter Group (1997). Cold exposure and winter 
mortality from ischaemic heart disease, cerebrovascular 
disease, respiratory disease, and all causes in Warm and Cold 
regions of Europe. The lancet, 349, 1341-46.
85 Wilkinson, P., Pattenden, S., Armstrong, B., Fletcher, A., 
Kovats, S. R., Mangtani, P. & McMichael, A. J. (2004). 
Vulnerability to winter mortality in elderly people in Britain: 
population based study. British Medical Journal, 329 (7467), 
647-653.
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mortality, which is consistent with a 
broader consensus established at a WHO 
expert meeting in 2006.90 It does however 
remain difficult to assess the precise extent 
to which excess deaths are attributable to 
outdoor and indoor temperatures.
36. There is surprisingly little evidence to 
suggest that the existence of pre-existing 
medical conditions increases the risk 
of winter mortality. To our knowledge 
only one study has examined their role 
and this was able to investigate only a 
limited number of pre-existing illnesses. 
Existing respiratory conditions were 
found to increase the risk of death from 
cardiovascular illness, although the 
physiological link between the two was 
unclear. No link was found between EWDs 
and pre-existing cardiovascular conditions, 
smoking and frailty.91
90 WHO Office for Europe. (2006). Housing, Energy and 
Thermal Comfort. Available: http://www.euro.who.int/__
data/assets/pdf_file/0008/97091/E89887.pdf 
91 Wilkinson et al. (2004).
outdoor exercise may significantly reduce 
mortality risk too. 
34. The relative importance of indoor 
and outdoor temperatures is further 
complicated by correlations between 
behaviours that reduce the risk of winter 
mortality both inside and outside the 
home. The Eurowinter Group found that: 
•	 households with warm living rooms were 
also more likely to have warm bedrooms; 
and
•	 people living in warmer households 
were also more likely to wear warm 
clothing when going outdoors in low 
temperatures.
35. Expert opinion submitted to the review89 
has suggested that it is reasonable 
to assume that internal and external 
temperatures each account for around 
half of temperature related excess winter 
89 Professor Paul Wilkinson speaking at the academic 
symposium on 24 May 2011 and Professor Christine Liddell 
speaking at the stakeholder workshop held on 18 July 2011.
Source: Wilkinson et al (2001)
Note: The red dots represent the risk of death at maximum daily outdoor 
temperatures relative to the annual average.
Figure 3.5: The relationship between daily maximum 
temperatures and risk of mortality in England, 1986 – 
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coldest quarter of homes to be attributed 
around a fifth of all EWDs would suggest 
that the coldest homes are responsible for 
a disproportionately high number of excess 
winter deaths. Not all of these deaths will 
be a result of the drivers of fuel poverty as 
some homes will be cold for other reasons. 
But even if only half of them were fuel 
poverty related, that would mean a tenth 
of all excess winter deaths. At the rates of 
the last ten years, that would mean 2,700 
or more deaths a year, more than the 
number of transport-related deaths.
38. Further to this, as explored earlier in this 
chapter, beyond each premature death 
there will be many more health-related 
incidents and associated costs to the NHS. 
For example, Christine Liddell estimates 
that for every £1 spent on energy efficiency 
measures, the NHS makes a saving of 42p.94
94 Liddell, C. (2008). The Impact of Fuel Poverty on Children. 
Belfast: Save the Children.
How do the drivers of fuel 
poverty increase the risk of 
cold-related deaths?
37. Chapter 2 set out the drivers of fuel 
poverty found by Wilkinson and others92 
to be significant predictors of low indoor 
temperatures. The same study also found 
that the coldest 25 per cent of homes 
have a notably higher risk of death than 
the warmest 25 per cent of homes (Figure 
3.6), establishing a potentially causal 
pathway from the drivers of fuel poverty 
(low income, high fuel costs and poor 
energy efficiency), to low temperatures, 
and to a significant proportion of excess 
winter deaths in England. Further, analysis 
recently undertaken by the Marmot 
Review Team based on this data attributed 
about a fifth (21.5 per cent) of the total 
number of EWDs to the coldest quarter of 
housing from 1986 -1996.93 Given that the 
evidence suggests that not all EWDs are 
a result of low indoor temperatures (i.e. 
related to housing) – a figure of around 
50 per cent has been suggested – for the 
92 Wilkinson et al. (2001).
93 The Marmot Review Team. (2011). This is the number 
of EWDs observed in the coldest quarter of homes, over 
and above the number observed in the warmest quarter, 
expressed as a proportion of all EWDs.
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40. The majority of the studies reviewed 
here rely on surveys that do not 
contain temperature records or energy 
bill information for the homes of the 
respondents. As a result, most of the 
findings are based on links between 
subjective measures of whether a home 
is inadequately heated or costly to heat 
and indicators of mental health status 
3.4 Mental health 
impacts
39. The health impacts of living in cold 
homes are not confined to physical ones. 
A number of recent studies make a 
convincing case for a link between living 
at low temperatures and mental well-being 
in adults.
Coldest 25% of homes
Warmest 25%
of  homes
Source: Wilkinson et al (2001)
Figure 3.6: Seasonal fluctuation in mortality in cold and 
warm homes in England, 1986 – 1996
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The UK has a higher rate of excess winter deaths than other countries with colder climates such 
as Finland, Sweden and Norway. While the average number of excess winter deaths per winter in 
England and Wales has fallen from around 40,000 in the 1970s to around 27,000 in the last decade, 
this remains a significant number – comparable to more than ten times the number of transport-
related deaths in 2009. A number of factors can influence the risk of death in winter, influenza in 
particular, but the evidence suggests that low temperatures are the biggest single cause of excess 
deaths. There is clear evidence of an increased risk of cardiovascular-related death following days 
when the maximum outdoor temperature falls below 20ºC (the average temperatures on these days 
will have been lower). Low indoor temperatures appear to be only part of the explanation, however. 
Behaviour and the warmth of clothing worn when outside in low temperatures also have an effect. 
Expert opinion suggests that around half of excess winter deaths may be attributable to indoor 
temperatures and half to outdoor temperatures. Recent analysis attributes about a fifth of excess 
winter deaths to living in cold homes. Even if only half of this in 2009 is due to fuel poverty, that 
would still mean 2,700 deaths – more than die on the roads – every year. Each of these deaths will 
be associated with a much greater number of non-fatal health conditions and subsequent demands 
on the NHS.
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•	 Indirect mental health impacts relating  
to social problems – inadequately  
heated homes can give rise to a range  
of issues associated with negative  
social consequences for children, such  
as poor educational attainment and 
truancy, which may have potential 
knock-on effects for mental health. 
Given this overlap with wider social 
consequences, these issues are reviewed 
in the next section.
42. Whilst there is strong evidence of a 
direct link between poor mental health 
and living in a cold home for adults, we 
have not seen evidence in relation to the 
mental health of children specifically. This 
is unsurprising as the data used in the 
studies reviewed are typically based on 
household surveys, where the respondent 
is almost exclusively an adult. Within this 
adult group the data do not allow us to 
compare outcomes across household 
types. This is not to say that children do 
not suffer mental health impacts relating 
to cold homes, but emphasises gaps in 
survey data. 
43. The evaluation of Warm Front in England 
found that high stress levels were 
significantly correlated with low levels 
of thermal comfort in the home (Figure 
3.7).96 This was found to still be the case 
for those reporting that their home was 
“much too cool”, even when a range 
of household characteristics that might 
affect temperature perception, such as 
age, tenure, area and whether the survey 
was taken in winter, were taken into 
account. Households who reported that 
their bedroom and/or living room were  
“much too cool” were almost twice as 
96 Green, G. & Gilbertson, J. (2008). Warm Front, Better 
Health: Health Impact Evaluation of the Warm Front 
Scheme. Sheffield: Centre for Regional, Economic and Social 
Research. Available at: http://www.shu.ac.uk/_assets/pdf/
cresr-WF_final+Nav(2).pdf 
(see Chapter 6 for an illustration of the 
difference between subjective measures 
of fuel poverty and the current definition). 
While this may mean that the conclusions 
drawn here are not necessarily directly 
comparable with the temperature-related 
physical health impacts reviewed in the 
previous two sections, it can be argued 
that a householder’s perception of how 
cold their home may be is the appropriate 
measure when it relates to the effect it has 
on their mental well-being.
What types of mental health 
issues are related to living in 
cold homes? Who is affected?
41. The most convincing evidence links issues 
associated with living in cold homes 
with three broad mental health-related 
outcomes, two direct and one indirect:
•	 Discomfort and stress – living at low 
levels of thermal comfort causes 
householders physical discomfort 
directly, which can be emotionally 
distressing, reducing the level of the 
household’s well-being and potentially 
leading to wider mental health issues;
•	 Common mental disorders (CMD)95 – 
factors related to cold temperatures 
could, in part, directly contribute to the 
occurrence of common mental disorders. 
Further, households where a mental 
disorder was diagnosed may also be 
more exposed to risks related to physical 
health impacts, including mould and low 
indoor temperatures; and
95 The term common mental disorder encompasses a 
number of conditions relating linked mainly to anxiety and 
depression. For an overview see Harris, J., Hall, J., Meltzer, 
H., Jenkins, R., Oreszczyn, T. & McManus, S. (2010). Health, 
mental health and housing conditions in England. p. 44 
London: National Centre for Social Research. Available: 
http://www.natcen.ac.uk/media/660077/health-mental-
health-and-housing-conditions-in-england.pdf 
78
CHAPTER 3 IMPACTS OF FUEL POVERTY
45. The incidence of self-reported cold homes 
has been shown to be more than twice 
as prevalent in households where an 
occupant suffers from a common mental 
disorder than in homes where no disorder 
is reported (Figure 3.8(a)). This indicates a 
clear association between under-heated 
homes and mental disorders. The same 
study found that households in which an 
occupant suffered from a common mental 
disorder were also around twice as likely 
to report the presence of mould in their 
homes (Figure 3.8 (b)), which can increase 
the risk of respiratory illness and further 
compound the risk of negative health 
consequences from living in a cold home 
(see section 3.2 above on cold-related 
morbidity).
likely to self-report high or moderate stress 
levels. The association between stress 
and recorded temperatures was found to 
be less strong than that between stress 
and self-reported comfort levels, which 
suggests that perception of cold may be 
more important than actual temperatures 
in terms of mental health effects.
44. Stress was also found to be the strongest 
predictor of poor mental health. Compared 
to households reporting “no stress”, those 
with high stress levels (resulting from all 
possible factors, not just cold) were around 
25 times more likely to report suffering 
from anxiety or depression and around  
21 times more likely to report psychological 
distress.
Figure 3.7: The relationship between perceived low 
temperatures and reported stress in Warm Front eligible 
households, 2001/02–2002/03, England
Source: Green and Gilbertson (2008)
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low indoor temperatures was established 
in Chapter 2. While a causal chain from 
the drivers of fuel poverty to poor mental 
health outcomes cannot be directly 
established on the current evidence, their 
strong association is clear. 
49. Difficulty in paying household energy 
bills is one possible effect of the overlap 
between the drivers of fuel poverty and 
has been found to be correlated with stress 
and anxiety or depression. Warm Front-
eligible households struggling to pay their 
fuel bills were found to be around 2.5 
times more likely to report moderate or 
high stress levels than those who reported 
being able to pay without difficulty (Figure 
3.10(a)). An even greater difference was 
found between the same groups in terms 
of how likely they were to report anxiety 
or depression (Figure 3.10(b)). Further, 
the prevalence of being unable to meet 
the desired level of heating fuel use was 
observed to be twice as great in homes 
where a common mental disorder has been 
reported than those households without 
(Figure 3.11).
46. When a number of other factors that may 
affect the occurrence of mental problems 
were accounted for, cold homes and 
the presence of mould were found to 
be significant influences on whether an 
individual suffers from a common mental 
disorder (Figure 3.9), suggesting a direct 
relationship between the presence of 
mental health issues and cold or damp 
homes.
47. While there is clearly an independent 
relationship between self-reported cold 
homes and mental health problems, it is 
not definitively clear whether low indoor 
temperatures cause an increased risk of 
common mental disorder, as it is also 
possible that having a mental disorder may 
directly or indirectly increase the risk of 
living in a cold home.
How are the drivers of fuel 
poverty related to poor 
mental health outcomes?
48. The significance of characteristics such 
as income, age, energy efficiency of a 
dwelling and heating costs in predicting 
Figure 3.8: Association of common mental disorders (CMD) with (a) self-reported cold 
homes, and (b) presence of mould in the home, 2007, England
(a) (b)
Source: Harris et al (2010)
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The health impacts of cold homes and their 
underlying causes therefore go beyond cold 
related morbidity and mortality, and mental 
health impacts should be considered a 
separate problem relating to the drivers of 
fuel poverty.
50. The link between low temperatures and 
mental health indicators reviewed in this 
section suggests that there is a strong 
relationship between the drivers of fuel 
poverty and poor mental health outcomes. 
Figure 3.9: Relationships between cold homes, presence of 
mould and level of fuel use with the occurrence of common 
mental disorders (CMD), 2007, England
Times more likely than person with no CMD
Source: Harris et al (2010)
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Figure 3.10: The relationship between difficulty in paying fuel bills with (a) self-reported 
stress levels, and (b) self-reported anxiety or depression, 2007, England
Likelihood of reporting moderate or high stress Likelihood of reporting anxiety or depression (EQ5D)
Source: Green and Gilbertson (2008)
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52. As with the relationship between cold 
homes and mental health, the evidence 
collected by this review in relation to social 
impacts relies on subjective data. This 
means perceived experience of adverse 
impacts and living at low temperatures 
is self-reported. While this may be 
appropriate, given that a number of 
social outcomes such as social isolation 
are subjective by nature, the findings 
may not be directly comparable to the 
objective findings in relation to physical 
health impacts. In addition, it is difficult 
to establish a causal relationship between 
low indoor temperatures and perceived 
social impacts in a number of instances 
where results are reported for generally 
low income households. This is because 
the impacts as a result of low temperatures 
are not isolated from other factors that 
3.5 Social impacts
51. Concern around the impacts of fuel 
poverty extends beyond those related to 
physical and mental health. The 2001 
UK Fuel Poverty Strategy97 identified 
a number of wider social impacts that 
living in a cold home may cause for both 
adults and children. Such impacts were 
also highlighted in some responses to the 
review’s call for evidence. Few studies have 
investigated this relationship, particularly 
at a national level, but those that have, do 
indeed suggest a link, although the extent 
to which cold homes cause negative social 
outcomes remains unclear.
97 Department for Trade and Industry and Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. (2001). The UK Fuel 
Poverty Strategy. Available at: http://www.decc.gov.uk/
assets/decc/what%20we%20do/supporting%20consumers/
addressing%20fuel%20poverty/strategy/file16495.pdf
Figure 3.11: The proportion of households reporting less 
than required fuel use in households with and without the 
presence of a common mental disorder, 2007, England
Source: Harris et al (2010)
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There is clear evidence of a link between low temperatures and poor mental health outcomes. Those 
households that report living at low temperatures are more likely to be stressed, and high stress 
levels increase the risk of anxiety and depression. Living at low temperatures has been shown to 
have an independent and significant relationship with the prevalence of common mental disorders.  
Self-reported under-consumption of heating fuel and the prevalence of mould have also been found 
to have independent relationships with poor mental health outcomes. Overall this indicates that low 
temperatures and the underlying drivers of fuel poverty are directly linked to mental health, although 
the direction of causation is unclear.
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of Bristol found evidence of a significant 
number of low-income households 
resorting to methods of coping with 
low temperatures that restricted social 
interaction. However, one limitation with 
regard to this evidence (in addition to those 
around measuring subjective judgements), 
is that those interviewed were income poor 
rather than necessarily fuel poor, which 
makes it more difficult to separate out 
impacts of fuel poverty and those related 
to income poverty.
55. Households interviewed reported that in 
the winter they would try to avoid leaving 
the house and getting cold, because 
they knew they would find it difficult to 
warm up again once they returned home. 
However, this does not appear to lead to 
social activities occurring within the home 
instead: 26 per cent of those reporting 
that their home was “much colder” than 
desired also reported that they did not 
feel able to invite friends or family to their 
home.100 Conversely, other households 
tried to avoid spending time in the home 
if it was cold, with 15 per cent of those 
living in a home that was “a bit colder” 
or “much colder” than they would like 
reporting that they spent as much time as 
possible away from home.101
100 Anderson et al. (2010)
101 Anderson et al. (2010)
could affect social outcomes, which makes 
it difficult to establish whether the impacts 
are due to living in cold homes or, rather, 
are symptomatic of income poverty more 
generally. 98
53. The UK Fuel Poverty Strategy highlighted 
social isolation (for example, the fuel poor 
may not be able to afford to socialise or 
may be reluctant to invite friends or family 
to their homes) as a core social impact 
associated with cold homes. Indeed, in its 
response to the review’s call for evidence, 
Age UK highlighted the impact of social 
isolation and exclusion on the elderly, 
which diminishes the “quality of life and 
self-confidence of our older population”. 
One may naturally associate social 
isolation with poverty more widely, in that 
those who lack the means to undertake 
certain social activities may suffer adverse 
consequences as a result. There are, 
however, some persuasive arguments as 
to why social isolation could be related 
to cold homes rather than solely to a lack 
of money.
54. A study99 carried out by the Centre for 
Sustainable Energy (CSE) and the University 
98 Macmillan Cancer Support, Survey of Health and Social Care 
Professionals.  (2009). Available at: http://www.macmillan.
org.uk/Documents/Aboutus/newsroom/factsheets2011/
Fuelpoverty.pdf
99 Anderson, W., Finney, A. and White, V. (2010). “You just 
have to get by”: Coping with low incomes and cold homes. 
Bristol: Centre for Sustainable Energy. Available at:  
http://www.cse.org.uk/downloads/file/you_just_have_to_
get_by.pdf 
Box	3.2:	Excerpt	from	interview
“I suffer with low blood pressure. So at the moment because I am cold and I don’t feel too good 
anyway, I tend to sort of dip further and further into it, further and further down, and I get to the 
point where I just turn off the buzzer for downstairs for people to get in, so if they come round – ah, 
forget it I don’t want anyone to come round. So I shut myself away.”
Source: Anderson et al (2010) 
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59.  However, as with mental health impacts 
of self-reported inadequate heating, 
when further analysis was undertaken to 
assess the independent relationships with 
adverse social outcomes, no significant 
relationships of interest were found.104 
It is not clear whether this is because of 
a disconnect between self-reported and 
actual indoor temperatures, or whether 
low temperatures alone are not enough to 
cause these impacts.
60. There is therefore some suggestion of 
an association between inadequate 
heating and adverse social outcomes for 
children, but, we are unable to observe 
the relationship with actual indoor 
temperatures. Further, the current absence 
of appropriate longitudinal studies means 
that it is not possible to assess the long 
term impact on children’s lives from 
negative social outcomes as a youngster, 
which may be wide ranging and vary in 
degrees of severity in adulthood.
104 Barnes et al. (2011).
56. As well as this, households cutting back 
on energy use in order to make ends 
meet employed other means by which 
to preserve warmth in their homes, such 
as going to bed early or closing curtains 
during the day.102 
57. While this review has found some evidence 
around social impacts on adults, it does 
not disaggregate between different social 
groups and so we cannot make a reliable 
judgement about which groups are most at 
risk. On the other hand, there is evidence 
to suggest some specific impacts on 
children and adolescents.
58. There is evidence of an association 
between a number of adverse social 
impacts on adolescents and inadequate 
levels of heating. A NatCen study found 
that 13 per cent of secondary school 
children who had lived in persistently 
inadequately heated homes had been 
truant from school in the past year, 
compared to 3 per cent of children who 
did not live in bad housing.103 10 per cent 
had no quiet place to do their homework, 
compared to 4 per cent who did not live 
in bad housing, and 10 per cent had 
been expelled or suspended from school, 
compared to 3 percent of the children who 
did not live in bad housing. 
102 Anderson et al. (2010)
103 Barnes et al. (2008).
Measurement of adverse social outcomes of living in cold homes is complex due to the subjective 
nature of the experience of these impacts in comparison to more objective health impacts. There is 
evidence of an association between cold homes and negative social impacts such as social isolation 
amongst adults and certain problems for adolescents, although there is currently insufficient 
evidence to link these directly to cold homes or the drivers of fuel poverty.
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depending on the amount of time spent in 
the home.
63. Many, including amongst those submitting 
evidence to the review, believe that these 
temperature standards have been laid 
down by the World Health Organisation 
(WHO). In fact, they draw on the results 
of a comprehensive 1987 WHO report on 
low temperatures and health, which did 
not recommend an ideal temperature at 
which the general population would suffer 
no detrimental health impact. Rather, 
the report concluded that the evidence 
suggests that there is “no demonstrable 
risk of harm” within a temperature range 
of 18°C-24°C, but that infants, the elderly, 
sick and disabled may be particularly 
affected by low temperatures. As such, 
the report said that the homes of people 
within these groups should be heated 
(or be capable of being heated) 2°C-3°C 
higher than those of healthy adults.106 It 
went on to state that evidence relating 
106 WHO. (1987). Health Impact of Low Indoor Temperatures. 
Available at: http://www.theclaymoreproject.com/uploads/
associate/365/file/Health%20Documents/WHO%20
-%20health%20impact%20of%20low%20indoor%20
temperatures%20(WHO,%201985).pdf 
3.6 How warm should 
our homes be?
61. The analysis of fuel poverty impacts in this 
chapter so far highlights a demonstrable 
link between low temperatures – often 
combined with other factors such as 
humidity and behaviour – and a range of 
negative health and social consequences. 
As a principle, ensuring that internal 
temperatures do not drop below given 
temperature thresholds is desirable in 
order to reduce or even eliminate adverse 
consequences linked to cold. A key issue is 
determining what the level of this threshold 
should be.
62. The 2001 UK Fuel Poverty Strategy105 
set out a standard of adequate thermal 
comfort based on internal temperatures at 
which it is considered that most people will 
not be at risk of suffering adverse health 
impacts. These were specified as 21°C in 
one main living area and 18°C in all other 
areas of the home for 9 or 16 hours a day, 
105 DTI and Defra. (2001). 
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5°C 
WHO ‘safe’ temperature range 
Increased risk of respiratory disease 
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Increased risk of cardiovascular disease 
Risk of hypothermia 
Source: Compiled by the Review using various sources, (see preceding section on cold 
related morbidity)
Figure 3.12: Suggested temperatures at which detrimental 
health impacts occur
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67. Considering actual household behaviour 
rather than recommended temperatures, 
we saw in Chapter 2 that on average 
people in England tend to heat their homes 
to temperatures towards the lower end 
of the WHO range. Indoor temperatures 
have not been surveyed on a nationally 
representative scale since 1996. However, 
data from the 1980s and 1990s show 
that when outdoor temperatures are 5°C, 
households tended to heat their homes 
to 17°C-19°C , on average.109 This was 
found to be true even for those who 
would not be expected to be constrained 
by income or by energy efficiency levels of 
their homes. This finding re-emphasises 
the suggestion highlighted in Table 2.3 
in Chapter 2 on actual compared to 
notional spend by income decile group 
that households that are not financially 
constrained on average do not choose 
to achieve the temperature standards 
set out in the current fuel poverty 
methodology. The same appears to be 
true for low-income households even in 
thermally efficient homes. Households 
that had received packages of heating 
and insulation measures under Warm 
Front in England were observed to heat 
living rooms to 19.6°C and bedrooms 
to 18.3°C on average.110 These same 
households reported comfortable living 
room temperatures of 19.2°C on average, 
although there was a wide range of 
variation around this figure.
68. The evidence reviewed earlier in this 
chapter indicates that significant risks to 
physical health for the general population 
tend to occur at temperatures below 
16°C, at which point the risk of respiratory 
illness is thought to increase, with a further 
increase in risk of circulatory illness at 
109 Wilkinson et al. (2001).
110 Green & Gilbertson. (2008). 
to an optimum indoor temperature for 
the general population proved largely 
inconclusive and noted the interactions 
between temperature and humidity in 
determining safe internal environments. 
64. Evidence linking housing, temperature 
and thermal comfort was revisited by the 
WHO in 2007.107 The review ultimately 
drew broadly similar conclusions and 
recommended that it would be beneficial 
to undertake further work on the scientific 
validity of the existing temperature 
recommendations and exposure to cold, 
particularly for specific rooms in the home.
65. In conclusion, it has not been possible to 
identify from the evidence collected during 
the review the specific source or rationale 
for selecting what is often referred to 
as the optimum indoor temperature of 
21°C, although its origin may well be that 
it is the midpoint of the WHO’s range of 
safe temperatures. 
66. The evidence is also inconclusive in relation 
to a minimum indoor temperature standard, 
which is reflected in differences between 
temperature standards in recommendations 
used by different organisations for different 
purposes. For instance the Health and 
Safety Executive’s Approved Code of 
Practice recommends that 16°C should 
be the minimum indoor temperature in 
places of work, where the nature of the 
work is sedentary.108 This is the temperature 
at which evidence explored earlier in this 
chapter indicates that risks to health can 
begin to increase in combination with other 
environmental factors.
107 WHO. (2007). Housing, Energy and Thermal Comfort: 
A review of 10 countries within the WHO European Region. 
Available at: http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_
file/0008/97091/E89887.pdf 
108 Health and Safety Executive website:  
http://www.hse.gov.uk/contact/faqs/temperature.htm 
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and other factors that can affect health 
and social outcomes and the variation in 
potential thresholds for different impacts 
makes setting a single threshold highly 
complex. As such, it seems reasonable 
to conclude that the WHO’s range was 
intended to be used as a guideline rather 
than a firm recommendation.
70. In Chapter 2 we suggested that typical 
households with relatively unconstrained 
budgets appear to heat their homes to 
lower temperatures than those underlying 
the current fuel poverty indicator, while 
the basis for the precise temperatures used 
within the methodology is less clear-cut 
than many suppose. At the same time, 
the evidence we have examined suggests 
that different people will find different 
temperatures comfortable and necessary 
for health, depending on age and a range 
of other factors. We examine the sensitivity 
of the current fuel poverty indicator to the 
temperature assumptions it is based on in 
Chapter 5. 
temperatures below 12°C. As set out earlier 
in this chapter, while the evidence is strong 
in some areas on temperature thresholds 
and physical health, in particular the 
relationship between temperature and risk 
of seasonal mortality as maximum outdoor 
temperatures drop below 20°C, the wider 
evidence linking specific temperatures to 
mental health and broader social impacts 
is less clear. This makes it challenging to 
identify specific temperature thresholds at 
which households experience no adverse 
effects from the cold and suggests that to 
do so would require further research into 
these linkages. This view has also been 
expressed in submissions to this review. 
The UK Public Health Association noted 
in its evidence that “we are still well short 
of properly understanding the full links 
between health and fuel poverty.”
69. In sum, the evidence indicates that the 
relationship between health and thermal 
comfort is more complicated than setting 
a minimum temperature threshold. It is 
the interaction between low temperatures 
The UK Fuel Poverty Strategy sets minimum temperature thresholds at 21°C in the main living 
room of a household and 18°C in all other rooms. It is often said that these are the minimum 
temperatures to which houses should be heated, to avoid negative health impacts, and that they 
are laid down by the World Health Organisation. In fact both the health evidence and the WHO’s 
findings are less clear-cut. We also find that those with average and higher incomes do not appear 
to heat their homes to the official thresholds. Given this we discuss later in the report the extent to 
which the current fuel poverty measure is sensitive to these assumptions.
3.7 Impacts of forgoing 
other essentials in order 
to keep warm 
71. The alternative for a fuel poor household to 
forgoing warmth and living in a cold home 
is heating the home adequately but cutting 
back on other household expenditure.
72. The evidence reviewed here suggests 
that there are three main strategies for 
households that seek to cut back on other 
forms of household expenditure, which 
are:
•	 reduce expenditure on other essential 
goods, e.g. food and suffer potential 
health consequences;
Fuel Poverty: the problem and its measurement 87
CHAPTER 3 IMPACTS OF FUEL POVERTY
•	 reduce expenditure on other goods such 
as socialising or new clothes and suffer 
social exclusion; or
•	 incur debt as a result of spending more 
than the household can afford to pay 
without cutting back on other goods, 
including energy.
73. We have found only limited clear evidence 
on the scale of possible negative effects of 
cutting on household expenditure in these 
ways. Where studies exist, their link to the 
drivers of fuel poverty is typically in relation 
to low income only. Further, it is not clear if 
households that experience these negative 
impacts do so as a consequence of keeping 
their homes warm and having to make 
trade-offs as a result, or whether they also 
forgo some level of warmth and still make 
these trade-offs.
74. Evidence from the USA111 suggests that 
poor nutritional outcomes are linked 
the ‘heat or eat’ trade-off described in 
Chapter 2, while there is also evidence 
of links between debt and poor mental 
health in Britain. We have, however, found 
no nationally representative evidence of 
negative consequences arising directly as 
a consequence of cutting back on goods 
such as clothes or socialising. This is not to 
say that there are no negative impacts that 
result from cutting back in this way, but 
more that there is insufficient evidence to 
link specific impacts to trading off heating 
with these items. 
111 Bhattacharya, J., DeLeirre, T., Haider, S. and Currie, J. (2003). 
Heat or eat? Cold weather shocks and nutrition in poor 
American families. American Journal of Public Health, 93 
(7), 1149-1154, and Frank, D.A., Neault, N.B., Skalicky, A., 
Cook, J.T., Wilson, J.D., Levenson, S., Meyers, A.F., Heeren, 
T., Cutts, D. B., Casey, P.H., Black, M.M. and Berkowitz, C. 
2006. Heat or eat: the low income home energy assistance 
programme and nutritional health risks among children less 
than three years of age. Pediatrics, 118 (5), 1293-1302.
Heat or eat?
75. Chapter 2 outlined evidence suggesting 
that some low income households cut back 
on other essential goods in order to pay for 
higher energy bills. For example, one study 
reported that 35 per cent of low-income 
households indicated that they had cut 
back on food in the last 12 months in order 
to make ends meet, a similar proportion 
to those who reported having cut back on 
their heating for the same reasons.112
76. Low-income households may find it is 
easier to reduce their spending on food 
than to reduce energy costs or to fund 
improvements to their homes that would 
reduce the costs of energy bills. However, 
reducing either the amount or quality of 
food can, of course, be detrimental to 
health.
77. A study on the nutritional status of poor 
families conducted in the USA113 found that 
household spending on food decreased 
during cold months for poor families, 
but not richer families. The study found 
a strong correlation between seasonal 
nutritional outcomes and expenditure 
patterns for poor families.
78. The study found that the calorie intake of 
a number of low-income household types 
was reduced by around 10 per cent during 
winter months, including for children in 
low income households. It has further been 
suggested elsewhere that given that the 
period in which the body goes through the 
most rapid growth is between the ages of 
0-3 years, it is possible that scarcity of food 
between these ages may be particularly 
detrimental for children in low income 
households.114
112 Anderson et al. (2010).
113 Bhattacharya et al. (2003).
114 Frank et al. (2006).
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79. A further study115 conducted in the United 
States by the Children’s Sentinel Nutrition 
Assessment Project found further evidence 
of negative nutritional outcomes for low 
income families which may have high 
heating costs. Once other factors such as 
age, employment status and receipt of 
other state benefits had been controlled for, 
children under three years of age in low-
income households that received an energy 
subsidy were less likely to be malnourished 
and were also less likely to be hospitalised 
following a visit to Accident and Emergency. 
Debt
80. For households facing high fuel costs with 
constrained budgets, the choice is in many 
cases to cut back on expenditure or incur 
debts if they wish to maintain adequate 
levels of warmth. 
81. This could mean building up debt with 
their energy supplier or using credit 
elsewhere in order to cover their fuel 
costs, with the order in which debts accrue 
varying from case to case. A recent small 
scale study, conducted by the University of 
Loughborough and funded by the Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation, of household debt 
amongst low-income families suggested 
that half of the participants were in arrears 
with their household bills and indeed 
this was the most common form of debt 
amongst participants.116
115 Frank et al. (2006). 
116 Dearden, C., Goode, J., Whitfield, C. and Cox, L. (2010). 
Credit and debt in low income families. York: Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation. Available at: http://www.jrf.org.uk/
sites/files/jrf/credit-debt-low-incomes-full.pdf
82. Apart from the financial impacts of 
unsustainable debt (such as inability to 
access credit due to poor credit rating), 
there is some evidence to suggest that 
debt can also have a detrimental effect 
on mental and emotional well being, with 
potential knock-on effects (see Section 3.4 
above). 
83. A recent small scale survey conducted by 
the Consumer Credit Counselling Service 
of 372 of its clients, found that 45 per cent 
of those surveyed reported that debt had 
a “very negative impact” on their health, 
a third reported that debt had negatively 
impacted on their relationship with their 
partner, while two-thirds indicated that 
worry about debt affected their ability to 
carry out their work duties.117
84. These findings, based on a small sample, 
allude to predominantly mental health 
outcomes relating to debt. At a national 
level, there is evidence to suggest a 
clear association between indebtedness 
and mental health, even though the 
causal chain is difficult to prove. A study 
conducted by the University of Warwick 
found a strong association between 
debt, including fuel debt, and mental 
health.118 While the prevalence of a range 
of mental health conditions was found 
to be associated with both debt and low 
income, the link with debt remained strong 
when low income was taken into account, 
while the association with low income was 
reduced when debt was controlled for. This 
117 Consumer Credit Counselling Service. (2010). Survey into the 
human impact of debt problems. Available at: http://www.
cccs.co.uk/Portals/0/Documents/media/pressreleases/Human-
impact-of-debt-survey-press-release.pdf
118 Jenkins, R., Bhugra, D., Bebbington, P., Brugha, T., Farrell, 
M., Coid, J., Fryers, T., Welch, S., Singleton, N. and Meltzer, 
H. (2008). Debt, income and mental disorder in the general 
population. Psychological Medicine. 38, 1485-1493.
Fuel Poverty: the problem and its measurement 89
CHAPTER 3 IMPACTS OF FUEL POVERTY
Households that face severe financial constraints are forced to make trade-offs between other 
expenditure in order to heat their homes adequately or incur debts. Debt can be a problem in practical 
terms by impinging on credit ratings and costs of financial services thus limiting a household’s 
borrowing capacity. It can also lead to stress and anxiety. Likewise, there are negative impacts 
associated with decreasing other household expenditures in order to fund fuel bills. For example, 
decreasing expenditure on food can lead to worse diets and subsequent health consequences.
Chapter	3	summary
The main findings of this chapter are:
•	 Exposure to cold temperatures can have negative health impacts, particularly for the very young 
and the elderly.
•	 Those health impacts most commonly associated with the cold are cardiovascular problems, which 
tend to occur at temperatures below 12°C and respiratory problems, at temperatures below 16°C 
in conjunction with other environmental factors. 
•	 The adverse health impacts suffered by those exposed to cold temperatures can be fatal. There 
have been on average around 27,000 excess winter deaths in England and Wales each year since 
2000. Not all of these are a result of cold homes or the drivers of fuel poverty, but it is clear that 
these are important factors. If only a tenth of them are attributable to fuel poverty, that would still 
be more than the number who die on the roads each year. 
•	 In addition to the physical impacts, there is a body of evidence to suggest that cold homes are 
directly related to mental health problems.
•	 The social problems associated with cold homes seem to be different for older and younger 
people, with older people facing more issues around social isolation and exclusion and adolescents 
potentially facing problems relating to education and anti-social behaviour. 
•	 The basis for the precise temperature thresholds underlying the current fuel poverty measure – 
21°C in living rooms and 18°C elsewhere – is less clear-cut than often supposed. 
•	 Households choosing to heat their homes to a comfortable and healthy level may need to make 
other trade-offs, for example cutting expenditure on food which can lead to a worse diet and 
have health consequences, or they may fall in to debt, which is associated with higher increased 
likelihood of mental illness.
indicates that the chain of causation could 
potentially be from income (not exclusively 
low income), to debt, to poor mental 
health, with debt the more influential 
factor on mental health outcomes.
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1. Having examined the context behind fuel 
poverty and its causes and impacts, we 
now turn to the question of measuring fuel 
poverty which is central to the terms of 
reference for our review. 
4.1 Perspectives on fuel 
poverty as a distinct 
problem
2. Our analysis of the causes and impacts of 
fuel poverty suggests that fuel poverty is – 
and should be – a concern within different 
policy debates. Different perspectives 
can be seen in the debate on measuring 
fuel poverty, reflecting people’s starting 
positions, over-riding concerns and desired 
outcomes. This section briefly considers 
these different perspectives and what they 
imply for measuring fuel poverty.
The poverty perspective
3. The review was asked to consider whether 
fuel poverty is distinct from income poverty. 
It is clear that there is considerable overlap 
between those in fuel poverty and those in 
income poverty. Indeed some stakeholders 
argue that fuel poverty is not distinct: “No-
one who is otherwise well off has problems 
meeting their fuel bill.”119 Having analysed 
119 Milton Keynes Council, submission to the Call for Evidence.
the evidence in the round our view is that 
poverty and fuel poverty are not the same, 
although disentangling the two is not by 
any means straightforward. 
4. Chapter 2 looked at the drivers of fuel 
poverty and found that while low income 
was a key predictor of fuel poverty, other 
factors such as energy efficiency and 
size of a home also played a role. These 
factors produce variations in homes which 
“mean households have an unequal ability 
to turn convert income into heat”120 for 
households who might otherwise have very 
similar incomes and composition. 
5. We have shown how variations in the 
characteristics of dwellings, households 
and fuel markets mean spending to achieve 
a given level of warmth varies considerably. 
In terms of one of the most influential 
approaches to understanding poverty and 
inequality – Amartya Sen’s ‘capability’ 
theory – what we are fundamentally 
interested in is what important things 
people are able to do or to be, rather 
than just their cash income. In this case 
the ‘capability’ is the ability to live at an 
acceptable level of warmth. As we have 
seen, there are wide variations in the 
incomes people need to achieve this. Not 
120 Consumer Focus, submission to the Call for Evidence.
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only do households face very different 
costs, but they are more likely to be locked 
into those variations in costs than for 
other goods and services, where accessing 
alternatives is more straightforward 
for most (though not all) households. 
Addressing these variations requires a level 
of capital investment that will often be 
beyond what is affordable for those on the 
lowest incomes.
6. In these circumstances, it is easy to see why 
many would approach fuel poverty from 
a perspective of concern about poverty in 
general. Those concerned about poverty 
therefore may want to allow for cost 
variations in comparing the positions of 
different households. In other words, there 
is a clear interest in establishing whether 
some households have a lower standard 
of living because of high heating costs and 
may even be pushed into poverty by them. 
The problem is similar to that caused by 
high housing costs, where official indicators 
of poverty look at income both before and 
after housing costs. From a measurement 
perspective, one might similarly adjust the 
way in which incomes are measured to 
allow for necessary fuel costs. In effect, 
one might measure residual income – 
after fuel costs income – compared to an 
income standard such as the poverty line. 
Another approach would be to measure 
what necessities people go without, or the 
difficulties they have in paying their bills, if 
they have high heating costs – that is, to 
look at at the deprivation levels in other 
respects associated with high heating costs.
7. A further reason for concern from a 
poverty perspective is the effect of fuel 
price inflation on those with low incomes. 
In measuring changes to real incomes, 
the Retail Price Index (RPI) is traditionally 
used as the index, while the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) is now used to adjust 
benefit levels. However fuel constitutes a 
larger proportion of income for those on 
low incomes, so the impact of fuel price 
changes will be greater for them. At times 
of rapid fuel price increases, changes 
in the cost of living for the poor will be 
understated by both the RPI and CPI.121 
Looking at changes in incomes after fuel 
costs would be one way of avoiding this 
problem.
8. As a corollary of these measurement issues, 
in terms of practical policy, the problem 
of low thermal efficiency of the housing 
occupied by some households on low 
incomes means that there may be cost-
effective and long-term ways of improving 
their standard of living through investment 
in energy efficiency. Increasing incomes 
can make dealing with high bills more 
manageable, but improving the energy 
efficiency of a home can also provide a 
permanent and sustainable solution to 
prevent unreasonable costs:
With fuel poverty the real differentiating 
cause is the energy efficiency of the 
home as a result of insufficient capital 
expenditure improving the calibre of the 
home.122
9. From some perspectives, giving such 
assistance ‘in kind’ is also politically more 
acceptable than simply increasing cash 
transfers through improving benefits or tax 
credits. The final report of the review will 
look at the evidence on the benefits of past 
interventions which have tried to achieve 
this. The implication of this kind of concern 
is that interventions should be targeted on 
households that have both low incomes 
and energy inefficient homes.
121 Levell, P. and Oldfield, Z. (2011). The Spending Patterns and 
Inflation Experience of Low-Income Households over the Past 
Decade. London: Institute of Fiscal Studies. 
122 Boardman, B. (2010). Fixing Fuel Poverty: challenges and 
solutions. London: Earthscan. 
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they do not only affect people on low 
incomes.
The carbon reduction and 
energy saving perspective
14. Especially since the adoption of the Climate 
Change Act 2008, the national priority of 
reducing carbon emissions and increasing 
energy efficiency has been an important 
reason for concern about fuel poverty. 
Greenhouse gas emissions from domestic 
fuel consumption are currently 26 per 
cent of the national total (on an end-
user basis).123 Improving domestic energy 
efficiency is one of the most promising 
contributors towards the 34 per cent 
carbon emissions reduction established 
in the Act for 2020 and for the targets 
beyond. As a result:
•	 it is important to understand the 
distributional consequences of carbon 
mitigation policies since exacerbating 
fuel poverty could be one result, 
unless this is offset in other ways (see 
Section 2.4);
•	 the adverse effects on those with 
low incomes could be a barrier to 
implementation of policies that have 
overall benefits;
•	 improving domestic energy efficiency 
is an important part of overall carbon 
reduction but those on low incomes are 
unlikely to be able to afford or achieve 
this without assistance.
15. All of this suggests that a corollary of 
climate change mitigation policies must be 
123 Carbon emissions can be measured by source and by 
end-user. For the purpose of carbon budgets, emissions 
are defined by source. However, it is more appropriate 
here to consider end-user emissions since this covers the 
impact of all energy use in the home, including electricity. 
See: http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/Statistics/climate_
change/1515-statrelease-ghg-emissions-31032011.pdf 
The health and well-being 
perspective
10. Much of the original anxiety about fuel 
poverty stemmed from health concerns 
about those living at low temperatures. 
We reviewed some of the most persuasive 
evidence for this in Chapter 3, which 
looked at the specific and immediate 
health impacts. 
11. A large proportion of the evidence of 
health impacts relates to living in cold 
homes, rather than directly to fuel poverty. 
However, as we saw in Chapter 2, those 
with low incomes, and those in the least 
energy-efficient properties do live on 
average at lower temperatures than others, 
with energy efficiency having the larger 
effects. Living in cold homes exposes 
inhabitants to a greater risk of cold-related 
morbidity and mortality, suggesting that 
risk of death is higher in homes where is is 
more difficult to turn income into warmth. 
12. The level of excess winter deaths which 
may be attributable to fuel poverty is 
in itself a major health issue. But this is 
only the most visible element of concerns 
relating to health and to demands on 
the NHS. There are therefore very good 
reasons, from a health perspective, for 
trying to ensure that people can and do 
keep warm. 
13. The implications for measurement of the 
problem suggest a focus on establishing 
who is actually living at too low a 
temperature, on actual spending on energy 
being below the amount required to keep 
warm enough and on outcomes such 
as excess winter deaths or cold-related 
health problems. The overlap between low 
incomes and high heating costs which lies 
at the core of fuel poverty is one of the 
drivers of this. But there are others – and 
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across the country. From the point of view 
of measuring fuel poverty, the carbon 
perspective implies a focus on measuring 
energy efficiency levels, together with a 
lack of ability to self-finance investments to 
improve them.
a focus on those with low incomes with 
high fuel spending and on those living 
in energy inefficient homes in particular. 
This will be examined further in our final 
report. For some the emphasis is on energy 
efficiency, regardless of income, and 
therefore on improvements to SAP levels 
This brief discussion of the perspectives involved – and the evidence reviewed in detail in earlier 
chapters – explains why fuel poverty is an issue for several policy spheres. Its causes, impacts and 
solutions make fuel poverty a distinct problem and are all reasons why it is important to think about 
fuel poverty as a separate issue requiring a separate approach. Fuel poverty comes at the overlap 
of different concerns, some with poverty in general, others with health, and others with domestic 
energy efficiency. Tackling it therefore offers potential benefits in each and all of these agendas.
A corollary of this is that the distinct problem that needs to be measured from all of these 
perspectives is in some form the overlap between low incomes and high required fuel spending. 
In this light, the wording of the Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act (WHECA) is entirely 
appropriate: we are concerned with individuals in households “living on a lower income in a home 
which cannot be kept warm at reasonable cost.” The implications of this for assessing the current 
definition and modifications or alternatives to it are discussed in later chapters .
4.2 Principles for 
measuring fuel poverty
Why measuring matters
16. Given the different perspectives that can 
be brought to the measurement of fuel 
poverty – and given the likely difficulties 
in finding a single indicator that will 
satisfactorily capture all the issues– it is 
important to examine why it matters that 
fuel poverty is accurately measured.
17. We are clear, for the reasons given below, 
that the definition of fuel poverty matters. 
However, not everyone shares this view. 
Certainly, some evidence was received 
during the course of the review suggesting 
that a focus on measuring, as opposed 
to tackling, fuel poverty was irrelevant: 
“the urgent priority is to review existing 
policies and programmes.”124 There were 
124 National Energy Action, submission to the Call for Evidence. 
two main reasons given for this. First, that 
fuel poverty is a real problem affecting real 
people – giving assistance to those in need 
should come before an academic exercise 
looking at how to define the problem. In 
other words, worrying about measuring 
fuel poverty is a distraction from the action 
needed to eradicate the problem. Second, 
that there is no need to measure fuel 
poverty in any detail because sufficiently 
ambitious policies to improve the housing 
stock in England (and the UK) would offer 
all households a degree of additional 
protection from the risk of being in fuel 
poverty – in this context, knowing who the 
fuel poor are and where they live would 
not be important. Given the divergence 
of views, it is important to set out why 
measuring fuel poverty reliably matters.
18. First, there is a statutory target: to ensure 
that no-one lives in fuel poverty as far 
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20. We would go one stage further: 
there should be a link between the 
implementation programmes delivered 
on the ground and the definition itself, 
in the form of measurement. With an 
effective definition, we would expect 
that programmes with an impact on the 
underlying causes of fuel poverty would 
lead to a reduction in fuel poverty as 
measured. This is not necessarily the case 
at present. 
How indicators can help and 
hinder
21. Having set out why we believe an effective 
indicator of fuel poverty is important it is 
necessary to consider the specific ways in 
which indicators can contribute. For any 
social problem of this kind there are several 
ways in which measurement can help:
•	 it can measure trends;
•	 it can indicate what is happening to a 
problem’s extent, depth and persistence;
•	 it can help identify the kinds of people 
affected;
•	 it can support policy design and delivery.
as reasonably practicable by 2016. The 
question of how fuel poverty is defined is 
fundamental to fulfilment of this target: 
without a definition, how will anyone 
know whether the target has been met? 
Beyond this, if the definition is to give a 
reliable indication of whether or not the 
target has been met, the definition itself 
must be reliable. Whether or not the 
current indicator of fuel poverty achieves 
these goals, or indeed whether any 
indicator of fuel poverty could do so, is the 
subject of Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
19. One serious difficulty at present is the 
disconnect between the definition of 
fuel poverty and the policies being taken 
forward to reduce it. Professor Christine 
Liddell, in her review of fuel poverty for 
Northern Ireland,125 uses the scheme shown 
in Figure 4.1 to show the ideal relationship 
between the definition of a problem, a 
strategy to address it, the development of 
policies to deliver the strategy and delivery 
of these policies on the ground. 
125 Liddell, C, Morris, C, McKenzie, Paul and Rae, Gordon. 
(2011) .Defining Fuel Poverty in Northern Ireland: 
A preliminary review. Belfast: DSDNI. Available at:  
http://eprints.ulster.ac.uk/19994/1/FuelPovertyReport(WEB)-
5Sept2011.pdf 
Definition of fuel poverty
UK Fuel Poverty Strategy
Policies to support UK FP Strategy
Implementation Programmes
Figure 4.1: Relationship between definition, strategy, policy 
and implementation
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and ‘poverty gap’ indicators showing how 
far below that line people fall. It would, for 
instance, be judged by most people to be 
an improvement if those who were poor 
moved much closer to the poverty line, 
even if few of them crossed it. As explained 
in Chapter 1, the Energy Act 2010 sets out 
the concept of the depth of fuel poverty 
faced by households, insofar as it defines 
a reduction in the difference between the 
cost of keeping a home warm and what 
would be a reasonable cost for doing so as 
a reduction in fuel poverty.
25. It is also likely to be of interest how long 
people are affected by a problem – is the 
problem persistent, or are many people 
affected over time, but only intermittently? 
This should be possible in theory for most 
indicators. However, in practice to do 
so requires longitudinal data, which are 
generally not captured at present.126 
Identifying the people 
affected and supporting 
policy design and delivery
26. In terms of designing interventions to 
tackle a problem and then implementing 
them, indicators are needed which allow 
us to:
•	 identify the kinds of people affected, 
so that they can be targeted by 
interventions and/or offered appropriate 
assistance and support, both in terms 
of overall policy design and for finding 
them on the ground;
•	 judge the effectiveness of alternative 
interventions for particular groups 
126 See Sefton, T. (2004). Aiming High – An evaluation of the 
potential contribution of Warm Front towards meeting the 
Government’s fuel poverty target. CASE Report 28, London: 
LSE. This used longitudinal data from EHCS for 1991 to 1996 
on the dynamics of fuel poverty based on need to spend. For 
later years longitudinal data were only available for spending 
on fuel, not on need to spend. 
Measuring trends, extent, 
depth and persistence
22. As far as trends are concerned, it is 
important for a definition to allow an 
assessment of the evolution of an issue i.e. 
to answer the question, is it getting better 
or worse over time? More specifically, 
one would expect changes in an indicator 
to reflect the scale of changes in the 
underlying drivers of the core problem. 
So in this case, one would expect a fuel 
poverty indicator to improve if:
•	 there were fewer people in poverty;
•	 the energy needs of households 
– especially those on low income – 
improved; and
•	 the cost of fuel – especially for those at 
risk of fuel poverty – fell.
23. At the same time, in order for an indicator 
to be helpful in demonstrating trends, it 
must paint an accurate picture of what 
is actually happening. Any indicator 
must therefore not be inappropriately 
sensitive to the scale of changes in the 
underlying drivers because this could lead 
to distortions. An indicator that paints too 
rosy a picture could lead to complacency 
amongst policy makers. An indicator that 
paints too gloomy a picture could lead to 
what are, in fact, effective policies being 
undervalued. 
24. Linked to the question of the overall 
trends demonstrated by an indicator is the 
question of distinction between showing 
the extent of a problem – how many 
people it affects – and its depth – how 
badly those people are affected. With 
general poverty measurement, a distinction 
is made between ‘headcount’ indicators of 
the numbers of people below a poverty line 
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extent by anybody trying on the ground to 
deliver adequate warmth at an affordable 
cost for all. However, far from suggesting 
the definition of fuel poverty is therefore 
irrelevant, this could suggest there is a 
weakness in the way the current indicator 
is constructed. 
28. The next three chapters examine a range 
of possible definitions of fuel poverty, 
starting with an examination of the current 
definition. 
in advance, in order to choose the 
most effective policy mix for people in 
different circumstances; and
•	 measure their impacts afterwards.
27. From this perspective, the definition 
of fuel poverty is intrinsic to successful 
policy making and policy delivery to fulfil 
WHECA and eradicate fuel poverty as far as 
reasonably practicable. It may be, as some 
suggested to us, that the current definition 
of fuel poverty is not used to any great 
Chapter	4	summary
This chapter has looked at the different perspectives on fuel poverty, why measuring matters and 
what qualities any indicator of fuel poverty should exhibit. The main conclusions are:
•	 Fuel poverty is indeed a distinct problem for several different policy spheres, including dealing with 
poverty, health concerns, and the reduction of carbon emissions. 
•	 It is the overlap between low incomes and higher required fuel spending where these concerns 
come together.
•	 Accurate measurement of the problem is important for the successful design and delivery of policy 
and for assessing progress. 
In understanding the problem an effective indicator can contribute by: 
•	 helping to monitor trends accurately, reflecting changes in the underlying factors driving it;
•	 indicating the depth and extent (and possibly the persistence) of the issue;
•	 helping to identify those affected;
•	 judging the design of alternative interventions both at the design stage and after implementation.
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The current definition – the 
fuel poverty ratio
1. As set out in Chapter 1, a household is 
currently officially deemed to be facing 
fuel poverty if it would need to spend 
more than 10 per cent of its income on 
maintaining a satisfactory heating regime. 
This represents the fuel poverty ratio:
 Required fuel costs
Fuel poverty ratio = (i.e. required usage
 x price)
 Income
2. The 10 per cent threshold means that 
households with a ratio in excess of 0.1 are 
classed as fuel poor. This section explains 
the technical methodology behind this 
definition. 
3. The main source of data used in estimating 
fuel poverty in England is the annual 
English Housing Survey (EHS), compiled 
by the Department for Communities and 
Local Government (DCLG).127 The EHS 
involves an interview survey with the 
people that live in each dwelling included 
in the survey, and a physical survey of 
the dwelling itself. In 2010-2011, the 
127 The EHS was formed in 2008 from by combining the old 
Survey of English Housing (SEH) and the English House 
Condition Survey (EHCS).
sample size was approximately 16,000 
householders for the interview survey. Half 
of their dwellings were the subject of the 
physical survey. In presenting the results, 
the survey is weighted to be representative 
of England, with each household assigned 
a weighting that, when combined with all 
other households, sums to the number of 
households in England.
4. The combined interview and physical 
surveys record a comprehensive range 
of information about the dwelling 
and householders. This includes the 
predominant structure of the dwelling, type 
of walls, insulation features, fuels used, 
the householder’s lifestyle (in particular 
the amount of time spent at home) and 
the income of each person within the 
household.
5. The BREDEM128 model is used to estimate 
required household energy consumption. 
The modelled bill for each household is 
produced by combining this figure with an 
average tariff for that household.
128 BRE’s Domestic Energy Model (since 1997, the former 
Building Research Establishment has been known simply as 
‘BRE’). The model produces annual modelled consumption 
for space heating, lights and appliance usage, water heating 
and cooking.
The current  
definition of 
fuel poverty
CHAPTER 5 
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6. In terms of modelling energy consumption, 
the key task is to generate the level of 
consumption needed to reach a particular 
indoor temperature and other standards of 
energy use. The dwelling and household 
characteristics obtained through the EHS 
are the basis for this. The core of the 
calculation is the use of a detailed model 
to estimate the energy required to achieve 
a standard of warmth given factors such as 
the size, insulation standards, construction 
material and heating system of the house. 
This is currently specified as a temperature 
of 21°C in the main living area and 18°C in 
all other areas of the home. 
7. The amount of time a household needs to 
heat their home for, defined as a ‘heating 
pattern’, is estimated and assigned to each 
household dependent on the amount of 
time householders spend in the home. 
The patterns are summarised in Table 5.1 
below. Households whose members are 
all fully employed and households that 
are empty during the day are assigned a 
partial heating regime (i.e. it is assumed 
that the dwelling does not need to be 
heated during the daytime in the week). 
A household with unemployed members, 
pensioners or others that may be at home 
during the day is assumed to need to heat 
their dwelling throughout the day. Similarly, 
dwellings that are ‘under-occupied’ (for 
example a four bedroom house that 
contains a single adult) are assumed to not 
need to heat all rooms.129 The modelled 
space heating for these households 
assumes that about half the home is 
heated.
8. In addition to space heating, the energy 
consumption requirement also includes 
modelled consumption of energy used 
for heating water, powering lights and 
appliances and cooking. While space 
129 The same is not the case in Scotland, where the equivalent 
modelling does not reduce energy need to reflect under-
occupancy. The arguments given for this different approach 
are two-fold: first, that it is often not possible to turn off 
the heating in some rooms but not others; second, that the 
condition of the house may suffer (e.g. from damp) if some 
parts are under-heated. 
CHAPTER 5 
Table 5.1: Heating standards
Standard Full Partial	Standard Partial	Full
Heating	
pattern
Weekday 9 hours 16 hours 9 hours 16 hours
Weekend 16 hours 16 hours 16 hours 16 hours
Heating	extent Whole house Whole house Half house Half house
Demand	
temperature
Primary living 
area
21°C 21°C 21°C 21°C
Secondary 
living area
18°C 18°C 18°C 18°C
Example Employed couple 
living in a 
two-bedroom 
flat
Pensioner living 
in a one-bedroom 
bungalow
Employed couple 
with one child, 
living in a 
three-bedroom 
home
Unemployed single 
person living in 
a large 
two-bedroom 
home
Source: Fuel poverty heating standards (DECC)
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11. Income is calculated from the interview 
survey, using a range of questions 
addressed to the household reference 
person132 about his or her income and 
that of others living in the household. 
The current indicator uses a ‘full income’ 
definition, which counts all sources 
of income the household members 
receive, including benefits and savings. 
It is calculated net of income tax and 
National Insurance contributions; it is not 
adjusted for housing costs or the size and 
composition of the household. 
12. The income data collected in the English 
Housing Survey, in common with other 
income surveys, are subject to potential 
misreporting. We know that the very lowest 
incomes reported to surveys can reflect 
both genuinely extremely low incomes 
(people who are, at least for a time, living 
in extreme poverty) and misreporting. For 
instance, analysis of reported incomes 
for families with children to the Family 
Resources Survey (FRS) found that in other 
respects, those with reported incomes 
below about £50 per week actually had 
standards of living comparable to those 
with incomes of between £250-£500 per 
week.133 This suggests that some of those in 
the bottom 3 per cent or so of the reported 
income distribution may be misreporting 
their incomes.134 
13. These generic concerns are more acute 
for the English Housing Survey given the 
survey size and the fact it is not focused 
on income measurement in the same way 
as, for instance, the FRS. To deal with this, 
132 The highest income householder.
133 Brewer, M, O’Dea, C., Paull, G. and Sibieta, L. (2009). The 
living standards of families with children reporting low 
income. DWP research report 577. London: DWP. The data 
analysed were for 2004-05 to 2006-07.
134 Hills, J (chair) et al. (2010). An Anatomy of Economic 
Inequality in the UK: Report of the National Equality Panel 
London: Government Equalities Office/CASE, p 48. Available 
at: http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/case/cr/CASEreport60.pdf 
heating is modelled according to need, 
consumption of energy for other uses is 
based on an average actual consumption. 
For example, the method used to model 
the amount of energy required for lights 
and appliances is based solely on the 
number of people in the household and 
the floor area of the property. For its part, 
the hot water requirement is based on 
an average value based on household 
occupants that is then inflated, on the basis 
of a 2005 report130, by 20 per cent. All of 
the technical details of the methodology 
are set out, with references, in a handbook 
developed by DECC/BRE.131
9. To establish household costs, the modelled 
consumption data must be combined with 
price and tariff data. Prices and tariffs for gas 
and electricity are collected from all suppliers 
by DECC and subsequently averaged 
across each region and payment type (e.g. 
prepayment meter, direct debit etc). The 
appropriate modelled tariff is then assigned 
to each household in the EHS. For other fuels 
(such as oil and solid fuels), regional prices are 
provided by the Office for National Statistics 
(ONS). The same price data are used by ONS 
when compiling the Consumer Prices Index 
and Retail Prices Index.
10. Within BREDEM, a tariff is assigned based 
on the type of fuel used, the region in 
which the household is located and the 
payment method used (as reflected in the 
EHS). Section 2.3 of Chapter 2 discussed 
the extent to which the problems of fuel 
poverty may be exacerbated by low income 
households having less favourable tariffs 
than the model assumes. 
130 BRE on behalf of Defra and DTI. (2005). Estimates of hot 
water consumption from the 1998 EFUS. Implications for 
the modelling of fuel poverty. London: Defra/DTI. Available at:  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.berr.
gov.uk/files/file16568.pdf
131 DECC. (2010). Fuel Poverty Methodology Handbook. 
London: DECC. Available at: http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/
decc/Statistics/fuelpoverty/614-fuel-poverty-methodology-
handbook.pdf 
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Current composition
16. Under the current definition, single 
pensioner households account for the 
largest proportion of fuel poor households, 
in both 2004 and 2009 (see figures B.4 
and B.5 in Annex B). Single working age 
households represent the next biggest 
proportion of households identified by this 
measure. Taken together, families with 
dependent children comprise 12 per cent 
of the fuel poor in 2004 and 18 per cent 
in 2009. Couples without children account 
for 20 per cent of the fuel poor in 2004 
and 26 per cent in 2009. Finally, pensioner 
households accounted for 48 per cent of 
fuel poor households in 2004 and 49 per 
cent in 2009.
17. In terms of regional breakdown, this 
indicator is rather stable (Figures B6 and 
B7). The North West region accounts for 
around 15 per cent of fuel poor households 
in both years. By contrast, in 2009 the 
North East accounted for only 7 per cent 
of fuel poor households. Annex B provides 
more information on the composition of 
the fuel poor under this indicator and the 
alternatives set out in Chapters 6 and 7.
under the methodology used some of 
the very lowest (and negative) reported 
incomes are set to Income Support levels 
for modelling fuel poverty. This is not an 
unreasonable approach but still leaves a 
question mark over some of the lowest 
incomes used in the modelling. 
14. Table 5.2 shows the average modelled 
fuel bill in England in 2009 using the EHS 
and BREDEM. Note that space heating, 
the main focus of most discussion of fuel 
poverty, is only 56 per cent of the average 
modelled fuel bill. 
15. The methodology set out above is 
regularly monitored by the Fuel Poverty 
Methodology Group.135 In April 2005, 
the results of a peer review of the 
methodology were published.136 The 
review, written by Tom Sefton and John 
Chesshire, was restricted to considering 
the methodology within the existing 
definition of fuel poverty. The review was 
comprehensive and led to a number of 
technical recommendations. These related, 
for example, to the need to improve the 
imputation of incomes where income 
data are missing, how to handle certain 
benefits in terms of income measurement, 
and whether to apply an uplift to the hot 
water calculation in the methodology. The 
methodology now in use was modified to 
reflect the majority of the peer review’s 
recommendations. The peer review also 
commented on options for improving the 
methodology in more fundamental ways. 
This included, for example, suggesting an 
examination of the case for measuring 
incomes after housing costs. This is covered 
below in Chapter 6, Section 6.1. 
135 The role of the Group is set out in the handbook to the 
methodology referred to above.
136 Sefton, T and Cheshire, J. (2005). Peer review of the 
methodology for calculating the number of households in 
fuel poverty in England: final report to DTI and Defra. London. 
Available at: http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/statistics/fuel
poverty/1_20100319143215_e_@@_file16566.pdf 
Table 5.2: Average modelled fuel bill, 2009, England
Average 
modelled bill
% of average 
modelled bill
Total £1,342 100%
Of which
Space heating £748 56%
Water heating £139 10%
Lighting and appliances £394 29%
Cooking £61 5%
Source: DECC
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well as on its composition. For example, 
incomes are not adjusted for household 
size and composition (i.e. income data are 
‘unequivalised’), and income is measured 
before, rather than after, housing costs. 
Changing either (or both) of these facets 
of the definition would mean identifying 
different numbers and types of fuel poor 
households and where they are found to 
be geographically located. Such details 
make for a definition that is in reality not so 
simple, although this does not necessarily 
mean that it is flawed.
21. Objectivity is a characteristic of the current 
definition that is frequently welcomed.  It 
is certainly the case that, being based on 
modelled energy needs rather than actual 
energy spending, the indicator offers an 
important degree of objectivity. It has long 
been contended that, since actual spending 
may be distorted by financial constraint 
(i.e. some people cut back on heating to 
make ends meet) – or its reverse, profligacy 
– measuring fuel poverty on such a basis 
would be inappropriate. Although this 
review has not conducted an exhaustive 
empirical assessment of the accuracy of 
this assessment, there is sufficient evidence 
in Chapters 2 and 3 above to suggest 
this is likely to be the case. Furthermore, 
the review has not found any evidence 
suggesting that actual spending is a reliable 
measure of need.
22. DECC is currently exploring the possibility 
of matching data from the EHS with actual 
household energy consumption data 
through a pilot study which may provide 
the sort of empirical evidence needed to 
test the contention. We acknowledge 
that findings from this pilot may not be 
available for our final report. They should 
be explored further once available to 
understand the relationship between actual 
and modelled consumption.
Strengths of the current 
indicator
18. As the call for evidence showed, the 
current definition of fuel poverty is 
considered by many to be a reasonable 
and effective indicator.137 A number of 
respondents expressed a strong view that 
it should not be changed. Among the 
reasons for this was marked support for 
certain of its characteristics, including 
its straightforwardness (i.e. it is easy to 
understand), its objectivity (i.e. the indicator 
is based on need not actual behaviour) and 
its responsiveness to major drivers of fuel 
poverty (i.e. income, fuel prices and energy 
efficiency).
19. On the face of it, the current definition 
of fuel poverty is easy to understand and 
explain. However, it should be noted that 
its simplicity is somewhat superficial. It 
is clear from the 50-page handbook to 
the calculation used under the current 
methodology that many assumptions 
have to be made to generate the required 
outputs. Indeed, assumptions are made 
at every stage of the calculation.138 While 
the result is far from fatally compromised – 
the fuel poverty annual statistics have the 
status of Official National Statistics because 
of their quality and accessibility – the reality 
of the calculation is far more complex than 
a brief description of the indicator hints at.  
20. What is more, while a complex technical 
model lies behind the calculation, further 
decisions are taken that have an impact 
on the reported scale of fuel poverty as 
137 As far as possible, we use the word ‘indicator’ to describe 
a way of measuring fuel poverty, since the word ‘measure’ 
may also denote an intervention.
138 Income measurement, energy required for space heating, 
energy required for water, energy required for lighting and 
appliances, energy required for cooking, heating standards, 
temperatures achieved, effectiveness of energy efficiency 
measures and so on.
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household spent 5 per cent of its net 
income on fuel (see Chapter 1) and that 
twice this ratio might be taken as being 
‘unreasonable’. The fact that the poorest 
30 per cent of households also spent 
10 per cent of their income on domestic 
energy in 1988 was taken as corroboration 
of the 10 per cent figure.
27. However, the choice of doubling median 
spending would appear to be an essentially 
arbitrary choice and the 5 per cent figure 
has become fixed, rather than being 
adjusted in line with changing spending. 
Actual spending on domestic energy by the 
median household has varied substantially 
in the period since 1988, yet the 10 per 
cent threshold has remained fixed since 
2001 (and is used in calculations for fuel 
poverty for earlier dates). Indeed some 
of those giving evidence suggested that 
a relative indicator adjusted in line with 
the contemporary median would be more 
appropriate. We investigate this suggestion 
further in Section 6.2 in the next chapter.
28. There may be no avoiding an arbitrary 
judgement when it comes to fixing such 
thresholds. What matters is the impact 
of the judgement made. The choice of 
threshold affects the number and type of 
households found to be fuel poor. The same 
applies to decisions on technical aspects 
of the calculation, such as measuring 
income before or after housing costs, or 
equivalising income, or, for that matter, 
imputing incomes for those households 
reporting zero or negative incomes. 
However, the form of the current indicator 
makes it highly sensitive to the precise 
placement of the threshold. Essentially 
what the indicator shows is the ‘tail’ of the 
distribution of costs in relation to income 
(see Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1). This makes 
the number of households counted as fuel 
poor very sensitive to whether the threshold 
23. The reasons behind the focus on required 
rather than actual spending remain 
powerful, so we believe that a needs-
based approach should be retained for the 
measurement of fuel poverty.
24. As for responsiveness to the key drivers 
of fuel poverty, it is clear that the current 
definition does to different degrees reflect 
changes in household income, energy prices 
and energy efficiency. Indeed, the annual 
National Statistics publication produced by 
DECC shows how much of the change in 
the reported fuel poverty numbers from one 
year to the next can be accounted for by 
each of these factors. It is clearly desirable 
to understand the impact on the ground of 
changes in these factors (and, potentially, 
others such as property size/occupancy 
levels). It would not be tenable to propose an 
indicator of fuel poverty that was impervious 
to these factors. The question is whether the 
current indicator responds appropriately to 
these factors.
Weaknesses of the current 
indicator
25. Following in-depth analysis conducted 
during the review we believe that the 
current definition is open to a number 
of criticisms. Some of these relate to the 
precise way the indicator is calculated and 
others to the indicator’s fundamental form, 
being based on the ratio between required 
spending and income.
The fixed threshold
26. A key feature of the current definition 
is the fixed threshold of 10 per cent for 
the share of income taken by required 
fuel costs. The review has found no clear 
rationale for this particular threshold. 
It appears to derive from an original 
calculation that in 1988 the median 
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energy efficiency ratings (E, F and G); third, 
it shows fuel and light prices. In terms of 
income, the overall number of households 
in poverty in England was more or less flat 
throughout the period in question, ranging 
from 3.6 million households in 1996 to 
a maximum of 4.1 million households 
throughout the rest of the period.139 The 
number of low income and low energy- 
efficient households fell noticeably, from 
4.5 million in 1996 to 3.0 million in 2009 
– a fall of one third. If these had been the 
only changes to take place in this time, one 
might expect that fuel poverty would have 
fallen fairly steadily over this period. The 
explanation of the ‘V’ shape reported by 
the current indicator lies in the evolution 
in real fuel prices, which fell from their 
1996 levels until 2004 but which have 
risen sharply since then, being 44 per cent 
higher in 2010 than 2005. In other words, 
under the current definition, fuel prices 
dominate. While increasing fuel prices 
make the severity of fuel poverty worse 
139 As we saw in Figure 2.1, in percentage terms there was a 
small fall in the number of individuals in relative poverty 
across the UK as a whole over the period, but a rapid fall 
against an absolute standard.
is cutting off the tail or cuts through a 
denser part of the distribution.
Sensitivity to price changes
29. As fuel prices change, the distribution of 
spending moves in relation to this fixed 
threshold and the number of households 
counted as fuel poor can change very 
rapidly. This can be seen in Figure 5.1. 
30. This figure gives us immediate pause for 
thought: did the underlying problem of 
fuel poverty really improve by nearly four-
fifths in just seven years? If so, this would 
make Government programmes to address 
this problem some of the most successful 
social policies ever delivered. Equally, have 
things deteriorated quite so fast in the last 
six years to suggest that the problem has 
more than trebled?
31. The chart also shows the three key 
drivers of fuel poverty. First, it shows 
the number of households in poverty 
(before housing costs, as reported by 
DWP); second, it shows the number of 
low income households with the lowest 
Number of households (millions) Index of fuel prices (2005 = 100) 
Figure 5.1: Fuel poverty, income poverty, energy efficiency 
and fuel prices, selected years 1996 – 2010, England 
(except prices – UK data)
Source: Fuel Poverty Statistics (DECC), Fuel & light Index Statistics ONS (scaled to real 
terms) HBAI statistics (DWP
Note: there have been some changes in the methodology used to calculate fuel poverty 
statistics from year to year, which affect all the time series presented here. See Annex B 
for details of these changes.
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rising prices and rising numbers of fuel 
poor households. As prices increase and 
more and more households are counted as 
fuel poor, those within the group include 
both those who are severely and those 
who are marginally affected. Although in 
practical terms it would be desirable to 
reduce the depth of fuel poverty, because 
any improvement in a household’s situation 
is  welcome, under the current indicator 
there may be no credit for doing so.  This 
is because what counts is whether a 
household crosses the threshold in or out 
of fuel poverty; the policies that may be 
incentivised are therefore those that impact 
on the households on the margins of fuel 
poverty, rather than those with the most 
severe problems. 
35. An ideal definition of fuel poverty would 
therefore capture how deep in fuel poverty 
households are alongside the headcount 
number of households in fuel poverty. A 
problem with the existing indicator may be 
that it is, in effect, trying to encapsulate 
both of these dimensions in one number. 
36. Alongside the issue of the dilution of the 
problem when prices are high, there is 
the issue of underestimating the scale of 
the core problem when fuel prices are 
low. Government progress reports on 
fuel poverty throughout the first half of 
the 2000s indicate an expectation that 
fuel poverty would be eradicated by the 
programmes in place at the time to boost 
incomes and reduce domestic energy 
inefficiency. However, such expectations 
were not just based on expected outcomes 
from policies delivered on the ground: they 
were also based on what proved to be a 
highly optimistic assessment of the likely 
evolution of fuel prices. Had the energy price 
predictions used at the time of publication 
of the UK Fuel Poverty Strategy in 2001 
been correct, our calculations suggest that 
the level of fuel poverty under the current 
(and have an affordability impact for every 
household), it is necessary to consider 
whether it is appropriate for the indicator 
of the extent of fuel poverty to be so 
responsive to fuel price changes.
32. The picture shown in Figure 5.1 highlights 
the way that the current indicator may 
mask the impact of changes to the energy 
efficiency of the housing stock and to 
income levels. Chapter 2 and Figure 5.1 
show there has been a real and marked 
improvement to average SAP levels in the 
UK over recent decades as well as a small 
reduction in poverty rates. However, the 
extent of improvement in domestic energy 
efficiency is only really discernible under 
the current indicator for households close 
to the 10 per cent fuel poverty threshold 
in each year. For example, the impact of 
measures to improve household energy 
efficiency which reduce a household’s very 
high fuel poverty ratio will not show up 
in the headline measurement under the 
current indicator. 
33. In terms of considering what could be 
done about the problem, this can be a 
major concern. Any assessment of the 
effectiveness of policies is affected by the 
operation of the definition. Under the 
current indicator, a policy designed to 
improve energy efficiency in lower income 
and severely fuel poor households can 
appear mis-targeted if it does not have 
a discernible impact on the headline fuel 
poverty levels.140
Depth and extent
34. An additional concern, given the sensitivity 
of the indicator to fuel prices, is that the 
core problem of fuel poverty is diluted by 
140 In the final report we will examine the extent to which earlier 
assessments of the impact of Warm Front were affected by 
this problem.
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way the ratio at the heart of the current 
indicator means there is an asymmetry 
between the factors having an effect on 
fuel poverty numbers. The ratio at the heart 
of the current indicator means, in effect, 
that reducing someone’s fuel bill by £10 
has the same effect as increasing income 
by £100 at least for those households on 
the margins of fuel poverty. This is because 
fuel bills are at the top of the fraction 
(numerator) rather than the bottom 
(denominator). Conversely, each £10 
increase in fuel bills leads to a requirement 
to increase income by £100 to avoid that 
household falling into fuel poverty.
40. It follows that the use of the ratio may 
have important implications for policy- 
making.141 It can be noted here that this 
situation provides an incentive for policies 
focused on reducing bills rather than 
increasing incomes. From the outside, 
the design of the new Warm Home 
Discount142 seems to reflect this, in that it 
directly reduces the fuel bills of qualifying 
households (by £120-£140) thereby having 
a greater effect on measured fuel poverty 
than an equivalent increase in benefits 
would have. 
Sensitivity to low reported incomes
41. The question of income measurement 
discussed above in describing the current 
methodology is significant. Mis-reporting 
of incomes may seem a technical issue, but 
for an indicator based on a ratio, where 
very low incomes imply a very high ratio, 
this has potentially serious effects. For 
some of those with the very highest ratios 
141 Assessment of policy effectiveness will be the subject of our 
final report. 
142 The Warm Home Discount is a four-year scheme that runs 
from April 2011 to March 2015 to help low income and 
vulnerable households with energy costs. It will be worth up 
to £1.1 billion over the next four years and DECC expects 
it to assist around 2 million low income and vulnerable 
households each year.
indicator would have been in the range 
1.0 milion–1.6 million households in England 
in 2010 compared to the projected figure of 
4.0 million published by DECC in July 2011. 
This suggests that the reported figures may 
have masked the true nature and scale of the 
fundamental problem and changes in it.
High incomes
37. An additional problem with the current 
indicator is that it does not include a cut 
off for households with high incomes. 
There are therefore significant numbers of 
households with relatively high incomes 
found to be fuel poor under the current 
indicator (reflecting the high modelled 
costs of heating their sometimes large 
homes). However, this is not in line with 
the terms of WHECA, which states that a 
household should have “lower income” if 
it is to be classified as fuel poor. Nor does it 
reflect the views of those who are tackling 
the problem, such as National Energy 
Action (NEA), who in their evidence to us 
described fuel poverty and low incomes as 
“inextricably linked.”
Policy assessment and the ratio 
basis of the indicator
38. Another concern about the operation of 
the ratio basis of the current definition is 
that it leads to more emphasis being put 
on fuel bill changes. In his submission to 
the review, Dr Richard Moore gives a useful 
example. A household with an annual 
fuel bill of £1,000 and income of £10,500 
would not be fuel poor (fuel poverty ratio 
of 0.095). However, the same household, 
following a bill rise of £200 and an 
income rise of £1,000 would be counted 
as fuel poor (fuel poverty ratio of 0.104), 
despite having £800 of additional income 
remaining after paying the bigger bill. 
39. Several of those who submitted evidence 
(such as British Gas) also pointed to the 
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Energy suggested in its evidence that the 
accepted definition of fuel poverty before 
the publication of the 2001 UK Fuel Poverty 
Strategy had in fact measured income after 
housing costs and that the shift to a before 
housing costs basis had been a “deception.”
45. The argument put forward is that the 
emphasis put on necessary fuel costs as 
a share of full income in the presentation 
of fuel poverty statistics understates the 
problem of paying for fuel for those with 
high housing costs. The disposable income 
out of which they can pay for fuel will be 
that left after they have paid their rent, 
for instance. Because of the interest in 
this approach, we consider this option in 
Section 6.1 below. 
Consistency with policy on the 
ground
46. As a final consideration, it is worth 
considering the use of the definition 
by practitioners in the field. It has been 
suggested to us that the current definition 
of fuel poverty cannot be used in practice 
to identify the fuel poor on their doorstep. 
For the reasons we discussed in Chapter 4, 
this is a potential barrier to effective policy 
delivery. To be sure, it is not particularly 
straight-forward for any indicator of a 
problem such as fuel poverty to be used 
to identify specific individuals or individual 
households affected. This is why those 
delivering policy have developed proxies 
for finding those affected. But in the case 
of the current indicator, it is not clear how 
proxies – such as SAP rating to act for 
energy needs or benefit eligibility to act for 
income levels – can be related to the ratio 
and the 10 per cent fixed threshold. 
47. The next chapter therefore examines 
options for building on the strengths of 
the current definition and addressing its 
weaknesses. 
– apparently the deepest in fuel poverty – 
their position could be the result of mis-
measurement. This problem is exacerbated 
if the income measure used is after housing 
costs or if the ratio approach is used to 
identify the depth of fuel poverty (see 
sections 6.1 and 6.3 in the next chapter).
Sensitivity to temperature 
standards
42. Another sensitivity within the current 
definition – again caused by its ratio 
approach and use of a fixed threshold 
– relates to temperature standards. We 
have set out above the four archetypes for 
heating patterns used in the calculation 
methodology (Table 5.1). Each of these 
presupposes a ‘target’ temperature of 
21°C in the main living room and 18°C 
elsewhere. Calculations undertaken for 
the review suggest that each reduction in 
the target temperature for the main living 
room of 1°C would reduce the extent of 
fuel poverty by 300,000 households in 
2009.143 Increasing target temperatures 
would conversely increase the extent of 
the problem.
43. As we saw in section 3.6, the basis of the 
temperatures used in the modelling is less 
clear-cut than often supposed in terms 
of health risks and they do not appear to 
match contemporary behaviour. Being so 
sensitive to the assumption is therefore a 
weakness. 
Treatment of housing costs 
44. Measuring income after housing costs was 
a priority for many stakeholders in their 
response to the call for evidence. Some 
argued this was the sole change required 
to the current definition. For its part, 
the Association for the Conservation of 
143 Our calculations show that reducing the temperature 
standard for the main living room would have reduced 
the number of households in fuel poverty in 2009 from 
4.0 million (21°C) to 3.7 million (20°C), 3.4 million (19°C) or 
3.1 million (18°C).
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Chapter	5	summary
The key findings of this chapter in relation to the way the current definition is calculated are:
•	 The main source of data for the current definition of fuel poverty is the English Housing Survey 
(EHS), whose outputs are used with the BREDEM model to generate the fuel poverty numbers.
•	 This models the amount of energy required to achieve a given temperature standard and 
combines this with an assessment of needs for water heating, lighting and appliance use and 
cooking. In 2009 space heating accounted for 56 per cent of the mean modelled bill and water 
heating for 10 per cent.
•	 This calculation also allows for different occupancy patterns and for the average prices paid 
depending on region and payment method. 
•	 For each household a fuel poverty ratio is calculated by dividing modelled fuel bills by household 
income reported to the EHS. A ratio greater than 0.1 means a household is deemed to be in 
fuel poverty.
The discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of the current definition can be summarised as 
follows:
•	 The most important strength of the current definition is its focus on modelled needs, rather than 
actual spending.  It takes account of the key drivers of fuel prices, energy efficiency and household 
income levels.
•	 However the definition suffers from a number of potential weaknesses. First, central to it is the 
use of a fixed threshold for required spending on fuel as a proportion of income. This is 10 per 
cent, derived from the fact that this was twice actual median spending in 1988. It does not 
adjust to reflect contemporary behaviour. The form of the definition makes it very sensitive to the 
threshold chosen. 
•	 Movements in recorded fuel poverty over time are dominated by changes in fuel prices. As a result 
it fell dramatically in the early 2000s and then rose equally rapidly after 2004. If the assumptions 
made about fuel prices in the 2001 strategy had been correct, fuel poverty would have been  
1.0 million–1.6 million in 2010, not the projected figure of 4.0 million. Price effects mask the 
improvements in energy efficiency and tackling poverty. At times of low prices it can make some 
policies appear mis-directed.
•	 The current definition focuses on the extent of fuel poverty, rather than also on its depth. In the 
next chapter we examine how well it could be supplemented by an indicator of the depth of 
fuel poverty (Section 6.3). 
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Chapter	5	summary	(continued)
•	 In contrast to the focus of the 2000 Act, some households with high (above average) incomes can 
be counted as fuel poor. 
•	 The use of a ratio means that to escape fuel poverty reducing someone’s bill by £10 can have as 
much effect as increasing their incomes by £100. This may affect policy choices. 
•	 The ratio measure is highly sensitive to low reported incomes. Even surveys focused on income 
recording suffer from some mis-reporting of very low incomes, but this is a more serious problem 
for those with wider scope such as the EHS. 
•	 The indicator is also very sensitive to assumptions used in calculating energy needs. These 
include the temperature thresholds used. For instance, using a living room temperature of 18°C, 
not 21°C, would reduce the number by nearly 1 million in 2009. Increasing the temperature 
standards, for example by adopting Scottish standards for pensioners, would increase the number 
of fuel poor households. 
•	 The major weakness identified by stakeholders was the use of income before deducting housing 
costs. We investigate in the next chapter the impact of focussing on household’s income after 
housing costs. 
•	 The current definition does not necessarily match the proxy indicators used by those delivering 
policy on the ground. 
No indicator of this kind is immune from criticism. The next chapter therefore examines some 
modifications of alternatives to the current definition to see whether they would be any more robust.
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1. In the light of some of the issues raised in 
the last chapter, this chapter examines a 
range of different options for measuring fuel 
poverty. Some of these have been suggested 
by those giving evidence to the review and 
others follow from our own analysis. 
2. We consider amendments to the current 
fuel poverty definition: 
•	 changing the measurement of incomes 
so that it takes into account housing 
costs (option A);
•	 providing a dynamic threshold for fuel 
poverty (option B);
•	 a supplementary fuel poverty gap 
indicator (option C). 
3. We then consider more fundamental 
changes to the way of measuring fuel 
poverty: 
•	 an after fuel costs indicator of poverty 
(option D);
•	 the overlap of low income and low SAP 
(option E); 
•	 subjective measurement (option F).
4. This chapter examines each indicator 
individually, setting out how each would 
work, modelling the number of households 
that each would identify as fuel poor, and 
assessing the advantages and weaknesses 
of each. 
6.1 Option A: A fuel 
poverty ratio with 
income measured after 
housing costs
5. A common proposal made in the course 
of the review was to retain the current 
definition but to measure income After 
Housing Costs (AHC). Some respondents 
to our call for evidence suggested this was 
the only change required. In essence, it is 
argued that measuring income in this way 
would give a truer picture of a household’s 
disposable income and therefore the 
affordability of fuel bills, given that housing 
costs are usually effectively met first, before 
other consumption. 
How it works
6. This indicator shares all the features of 
the current methodology for calculating 
Options for 
measuring fuel 
poverty
CHAPTER 6 
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fuel poverty, save for the way it measures 
income. The overall effect is to give 
a national picture of the level of fuel 
poverty once housing costs have been 
accounted for.
7. Data on housing costs are available from 
the English Housing Survey (EHS). For the 
purpose of the review, housing costs have 
been simplified to mortgage payments 
and rent. In practice, they go beyond this. 
We do not include in our analysis water 
rates, community or council water charges 
structural insurance premiums or gound 
rent and service charges.144 
8. In calculating net incomes, mortgage 
payments should in principle be restricted 
to interest payments on the mortgage loan 
only, rather than the capital repayment, 
which can be seen as a form of investment. 
However, we have not been able in our 
calculations to make the split, since the 
EHS does not separate the two. As a result 
of this, housing costs will be exaggerated 
(and income lower) for some households 
paying off a mortgage.
144 The data required to do so are not contained within the 
English Housing Survey.
9. Compared to a BHC approach, measuring 
income on an AHC basis reduces household 
income for all households that do not own 
their home outright – for those that do, 
income remains unchanged.  Therefore, 
adopting the 10 per cent ratio with an AHC 
income variable will lead to a rise in fuel 
poverty compared to Before Housing Costs 
(BHC). One could argue, however, that it 
would be better to adopt the original logic of 
the definition and so to base the threshold 
on twice median spend as a share of AHC 
income in the base year (1988). Doing so 
would give a higher threshold (13.6 per cent) 
and lead to a different effect on the numbers 
counted as fuel poor. 
Modelling the indicator
10. This discussion leads to two possible 
options for an AHC indicator and we have 
modelled the results for both of them: 
(a) retain a 10 per cent fuel poverty 
threshold but with income measured AHC; 
(b) calculate a new fuel poverty threshold 
based on twice the median spend on 
energy as a proportion of income measured 
CHAPTER 6 
Figure 6.1: Number of households in fuel poverty, using 
before and after housing costs income, 1996, 2003 – 2009, 
England
Source: Fuel Poverty Dataset, 1996 and 2003 to 2009, (DECC), Living Costs and 
Food Survey, 1996 and 2003 to 2009, (ONS)
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Pros and cons
13. We agree with the view expressed by 
many responding to the call for evidence 
that there is a good case for measuring 
income after housing costs. The income 
needed to cover housing costs cannot be 
spent on heating and powering the home 
and it is fair to reflect this. Even more than 
fuel costs, many households find it hard 
to adjust their housing costs, which is why 
DWP presents poverty statistics both before 
and after housing costs. 
14. As an adjustment of the current indicator 
– albeit one that goes beyond a mere 
technical adjustment – this approach shows 
the same qualities as the current definition, 
set out in Chapter 5, and therefore many 
of the same advantages and disadvantages. 
As the chart shows, if the same 10 per 
cent threshold is applied to after housing 
costs income, this indicator counts more 
households as being fuel poor than the 
current indicator, but with similar trends 
over time. However if the spirit of the 
original definition is followed, logic 
suggests that the threshold should be 
based on median spending as a share of 
AHC income in 1988 (13.6 per cent) as 
well. This implies slightly lower numbers 
than the current indicator in 2009. 
15. However, as set out and in Annex B, even 
if the aggregate numbers are similar, the 
composition of who is classed as fuel poor 
changes – more households in London 
are brought into fuel poverty under the 
after housing costs approach, and fewer 
households that own their property 
outright are classed as fuel poor.
AHC from the 1988 Family Expenditure 
Survey.
Figure 6.1 shows the number of households 
captured under each of these approaches, 
alongside the number of households 
captured by the current indicator of fuel 
poverty (10 per cent of income before 
housing costs).
Composition
11. Detailed information about the breakdown 
by household type and region under this 
indicator are provided in Annex B. In 
2004, compared to the current definition, 
this indicator sees a fall in the proportion 
of single pensioners (lower under this 
indicator) and also in that of single working 
age adults. There are also more families 
with children (couples and lone parents) 
identified by this indicator than the current 
one. These changes probably reflect the 
fact that housing costs are higher on 
average for working age households 
compared to pensioner households. The 
pattern, but not the scale, of difference 
between the two indicators is similar in 
2009. This effect is due to the operation 
of the fixed threshold which reflects the 
density of certain household types in the 
overall distribution of households.
12. In terms of English regions, this indicator 
sees an increase, compared to the current 
indicator, in the proportion of households 
captured that are in London. This reflects 
higher housing costs in these regions. 
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produces even more very low – indeed 
negative – reported incomes. It therefore 
generates even more extreme – even 
undefined – fuel poverty ratios. This is an 
added limitation.
16. The indicator requires accurate recording 
of housing costs. Models would need to be 
constructed to convert data recorded in the 
EHS to allow a more refined calculation. 
It should also be noted that this approach 
Using after housing costs income arguably gives a better picture of disposable income and therefore 
of the true affordability of fuel bills. This is shown in the composition breakdown, including the shift 
in regional emphasis to London. Logically, the threshold used should also be adjusted to be based 
on AHC income. This means aggregate trends are little changed, but there is a good case that the 
composition would be more appropriate. Apart from this, however, the indicator would have much 
the same advantages and disadvantages as the current definition, but with an added limitation in 
terms of the treatment of very low and negative incomes.
6.2 Option B: A fuel 
poverty ratio with a 
dynamic threshold 
based on twice median 
spending
17. We described in Chapter 5 how the 
original intention behind choosing a fuel 
poverty threshold of 10 per cent under 
the current definition was to measure 
unreasonable fuel costs relative to average 
energy bills and income at the same time. 
This threshold was intended to be relative 
to both the energy bill and income of the 
median household (it also happened to 
match the average across the poorest 30 
per cent of households).145 
18. In practice, the fuel poverty threshold has 
been constant at 10 per cent, which in 
1988 was twice the median spend on fuel 
as a proportion of income. This means 
that in each year for which numbers have 
been estimated, whether a household is 
fuel poor or not has been dependent on its 
required fuel costs and income compared 
145 See Annex D of the UK Fuel Poverty Strategy 2001. See also 
Boardman, B. (2010). Fixing Fuel Poverty: Challenges and 
Solutions. London: Earthscan.
to averages in 1988, rather than being 
relative to the circumstances and behaviour 
of contemporary households.
How it works
19. It was noted by some giving evidence to 
the review that the measurement of fuel 
poverty is currently absolute not relative, 
but the latter could be considered. Taking 
this approach the intention would be to 
capture those who needed to spend a lot – 
had ‘unreasonable costs’ – relative to actual 
spending by typical households at the time. 
This would mean recalculating the fuel 
poverty threshold in each year. This could 
be done by calculating, on an annual basis, 
twice the median proportion of income 
spent on fuel by the average household. 
Box 6.1 describes why we do not think it 
would be helpful to use a relative threshold 
based on the actual spending of the 
poorest 30 per cent. 
20. To set a fuel poverty threshold each year 
based on twice the median energy bill 
as a proportion of income, individual 
household actual fuel bills would first be 
expressed as a proportion of their income. 
The average (median) proportion of income 
spent on energy, before housing costs 
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are considered, would then be selected 
and doubled to establish the fuel poverty 
threshold for that year (Table 6.1). This 
threshold would then be used, as under 
the current definition, to determine which 
households were in fuel poverty based on 
their income and required energy bill which 
is calculated, as now, from the English 
Housing Survey. 146147 
Modelling the indicator
21. This twice median spend indicator makes 
only a small change to the practicalities 
of the existing approach to fuel poverty 
modelling. It generates a more stable 
indicator of fuel poverty over time (Figure 
6.2), because the fuel poverty threshold 
is recalculated in line with changes in the 
fuel spending behaviour of and energy 
prices faced by the median household. For 
146 For example, see White, V., Roberts, S. and Preston, I. (2011). 
Understanding ‘High Use Low Income’ Energy Consumers. 
Bristol: Centre for Sustainable Energy.  Available at: http://
www.ofgem.gov.uk/Sustainability/Cp/CF/Documents1/
High%20use%20low%20income%20energy%20
consumers_Final%20Report%20Nov%2010.pdf
147 Boardman. (2010).
Box	6.1:	Making	the	current	definition	dynamic:	average	energy	spend	of	the	
poorest	30	per	cent	of	households
Setting a fuel poverty threshold relative to the average income and energy bill of the poorest 30 per 
cent of households would imply that how much income this group spends on energy on average is 
‘reasonable’. This is contentious, as low income is correlated with low energy use.146 The question 
has previously been raised whether the average actual energy bills of a group of households likely to 
be heating their homes to a less than desirable level should be used as a benchmark.147
Further, this approach would be conceptually out of step with other official relative indicators, such 
as income poverty, which assess whether a household has an adequate level of income relative to 
the average (median) household, not whether a household has sufficient income relative to the 
poorest households.
The questionable rationale for setting a threshold in this way and its inconsistency with the wider 
consensus on developing relative indicators led us to the decision to not consider this approach further.
Table 6.1: Fuel poverty threshold based on 
twice median fuel spend as a percentage of 
income, 1995-1996 to 2009, England
Year Spend on fuel as 
a proportion of 
income (%)
Twice fuel spend 
as a proportion 
of income (%)
1995/96 4.8 9.5
2000/01 3.4 6.7
2002/03 3.1 6.1
2003/04 3.1 6.2
2004/05 3.1 6.3
2006 3.7 7.4
2007 3.8 7.6
2008 4.1 8.1
2009 4.5 9.0
Source: Living Costs and Food Survey, 1996–2009 (ONS).
Note: The predecessor survey to the LCFS, the Expenditure and 
Food Survey, changed from collecting data on a financial year 
basis to calendar year basis from 2006.
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actual median fuel spend would result 
in a lower fuel poverty threshold than if 
modelled fuel bills were used instead. As a 
result, we would expect more households 
to be classed as fuel poor under this 
approach than if the threshold were set 
on twice the median modelled fuel bill as 
a percentage of income. On a consistency 
basis, one could argue that it would be 
appropriate to use twice the median 
modelled fuel bill to set the threshold. 
However, given that the current definition 
of fuel poverty set the threshold based on 
actual spending, we retain this approach 
in this dynamic version. Similarly, we retain 
the use of before housing costs income in 
modelling this option. Income could equally 
be measured after housing costs. 
Composition
23. See Annex B for full details of the 
household type and regional composition 
of this indicator. In summary, in 2004, 
the proportion of couples with child(ren) 
captured by this indicator is nearly twice 
that of the current definition – similar to 
the AHC indicator – while the proportion 
that are lone parent households increases 
instance, if all household behaviour stayed 
the same and all energy prices halved, 
the same number and composition of 
households would be fuel poor as before 
the price change because of the relative 
nature of the measurement. For the 
number of fuel poor households to change, 
the income, energy bill, or actual behaviour 
of some households compared to the 
median household would have to change. 
Based on this relative twice median fuel 
poverty threshold, an estimated 4.8 million 
households would be in fuel poverty in 
2009, compared to nearly 4 million under 
the current definition. The big difference is 
the numbers reported for 2003 and 2004: 
the dramatic reduction seen under the 
current definition is greatly attenuated. 
22. Setting a threshold calculated using twice 
actual median fuel spending against 
modelled required fuel bills (as a proportion 
of income) raises a question of consistency 
(which also applies to the current 
definition). We saw in Chapter 2 that on 
average actual household fuel spending 
is lower than modelled fuel bills suggest 
they should be to reach a certain level of 
warmth. This means that using twice the 
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Figure 6.2:  Number of households in fuel poverty under 
the current indicator (fixed threshold) and relative indicator 
(twice median spend), 1996 and 2003 – 2009, England
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as fuel poor. 149 This would mean that the 
composition of who is measured as being 
fuel poor would not tend to change as 
significantly year on year as it does under 
the current approach, potentially making 
it easier to identify which groups of 
households are affected and should be the 
focus of policy. 
26. The relative nature of the twice median 
indicator has a further advantage in that 
it would reflect widening inequalities in 
incomes and/or energy efficiency of the 
housing stock. This means that if the 
energy efficiency of some sections of the 
housing stock improved, but for others 
it did not, this would be at least partially 
reflected in the indicator. Similarly, if the 
incomes of some groups of households 
increased at a faster rate than others, 
this would also be captured. This means 
that significant reductions in fuel poverty 
would have to be as a result of improved 
thermal efficiency or major cuts to prices 
and/or increases in income, at a faster than 
average rate, for those households with 
high fuel costs relative to their incomes.
27. Further, one might argue that since the 
10 per cent threshold was based on a 
relative comparison to begin with, it should 
have always been a relative indicator. This 
would make the ‘twice median spend’ 
approach a more consistent application of 
the logic underlying the current definition. 
28. The stability in fuel poverty numbers 
that results from this approach could be 
considered a strength. Compared to the 
149 This could also better capture the persistence of fuel poverty, 
as those groups of households who remain on low incomes 
and is significantly less energy efficient homes than the 
average are likely to be classed as fuel poor even if overall 
energy prices fell significantly. It would not currently be 
possible to track whether the same specific households 
remain in fuel poverty, as the longitudinal data do not exist. 
However, it would be possible to see to what extent broad 
groups of households (for example, older people or young 
families) are classed as being fuel poor year to year.
to a slightly lesser degree. Pensioner 
couples are higher as a proportion of 
the total households identified, while 
the proportion that are single pensioners 
falls but by considerably less than was 
the case under the after housing costs 
approach. A much smaller proportion are 
single people under 60 –  around a third 
lower than under the current definition. By 
2009 the picture painted by this indicator 
has changed little, with the composition 
being very similar to the situation under 
the current approach. This is entirely to be 
expected: in 2009 the twice median value 
was rather similar to the fixed threshold 
under the current definition of 10 per cent.
Pros and cons
24. This approach requires only a small 
adjustment to the existing calculations, 
although it leads to rather different results. 
Some additional data collection would 
be required to model it, as actual energy 
bills and income are required to determine 
the fuel poverty threshold, whereas the 
current definition only requires modelled 
bills and income. These spending data are 
currently available from the Living Costs 
and Food Survey. 
25. This option retains the focus of the current 
definition on the key drivers of fuel poverty 
– income, prices and (indirectly) energy 
efficiency, but the relative nature of the 
approach means that it is less sensitive to 
large shifts in energy prices.148 It means 
that when prices fall for all households, 
those that face high costs relative to 
others are still captured as being in fuel 
poverty. Similarly, when prices rise for all 
households, those who have relatively 
low costs at that time will not be classed 
148 In fact, it may be affected very little by fuel prices. 
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First, it is based on a relatively arbitrary 
judgement that more than twice rather 
than, say, three times or one and a half 
times the average proportion of income 
spent on fuel is unreasonable – although 
it is true that all thresholds that determine 
what is reasonable require a degree 
of subjective judgement. It remains a 
headcount indicator, and does not by itself 
reflect the depth of fuel poverty. While 
the greater stability in who is classed as 
fuel poor may help in identifying them on 
the ground, it would still require detailed 
assessment of incomes and costs to do so 
accurately. The policy incentives relating 
to the ratio of energy bill to income under 
the current definition are also retained. 
This means that interventions that seek to 
reduce fuel bills affect the indicator more 
than increases in income of the same 
value. Finally, the indicator also retains the 
possibility of classing some high income 
households as fuel poor, which does not 
closely reflect the Warm Home and Energy 
Conservation Act (WHECA) definition of a 
fuel poor household.
major variations in fuel poverty in the last 
decade under the current approach, this 
option would seem to paint a more reliable 
picture of the underlying issues that lead to 
fuel poverty. However, not everyone would 
agree this is a strength. For example, in his 
evidence to the review Dr Richard Moore 
contends that the stability of this indicator 
is a weakness, insofar as it “masks the 
fact that a great many more households 
will have had genuine difficulty in meeting 
their fuel costs” in years of high fuel prices. 
He also argues that a relative approach 
might be appropriate for measuring 
income poverty, but cannot be taken as 
automatically appropriate for fuel poverty, 
given the volatility of fuel prices (compared 
to the relatively more modest fluctuations 
in income levels). One approach to dealing 
with this objection, in part at least, would 
be additionally to focus on the depth of 
fuel poverty. We consider this in the next 
section. 
29. What is clear is that the approach still 
has many of the other weaknesses of the 
current definition outlined in Chapter 5.  
Using a threshold that changed over time would remove the extreme sensitivity of the current 
definition to fuel prices, which is one of its major weaknesses. However, one objection could be that 
it would be inappropriate to remove all sensitivity to price levels. As a ratio indicator, it would remain 
affected by many of the other problems that this causes with the current definition.
6.3 Option C: Using 
the fuel poverty ratio to 
measure a fuel poverty 
gap
30. One problem with the current definition 
(and with the modifications as discussed 
in Sections 6.1 and 6.2) is that it does 
not attempt to measure the depth of fuel 
poverty as a distinct issue (although it is 
possible to argue that the current approach 
attempts to measure depth and extent 
simultaneously). Perhaps for this reason, it 
has been suggested that a supplementary 
indicator giving a specific and separate 
sense of the depth of fuel poverty could be 
useful in helping to identify and prioritise 
particular groups. One way of doing this 
is to look at a ‘fuel poverty gap’. This is 
similar to the US ‘energy affordability gap’ 
approach described in Box 6.2. 
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population. Under this calculation, any 
household with a reported zero or negative 
income would have a default fuel poverty 
gap set equal to their modelled fuel costs. 
The data needed for this calculation are 
available from the current fuel poverty 
dataset. 
Modelling the indicator
33. As shown in Table 6.2 we have modelled 
the median, mean and aggregate fuel 
poverty gap for England for the period 
1996 to 2010 using the current definition. 
The median fuel poverty gap measured 
this way would have nearly halved in 
real terms from £292 in 1996 to £164 in 
2004, but then increased to above £300 
after 2007. This is in line with what one 
might expect from price changes. However 
the aggregate gap moves much more 
How it works
31. The ‘fuel poverty gap’ is effectively the 
difference between what modelled bills 
are and what they should be to avoid fuel 
poverty. The Energy Act 2010 describes 
closing this gap as one way of “reducing 
fuel poverty” and refers back, at the 
same time, to WHECA and the notion of 
reasonable costs. Using this terminology, 
one could take reasonable costs to be 
10 per cent of income. One way of 
measuring the fuel poverty gap is therefore 
to measure the difference between a 
household’s modelled energy bill and a bill 
representing 10 per cent of income (where 
the former is greater).
32. A fuel poverty gap can be calculated 
per household and then summed to 
give an aggregate gap per group of the 
Box	6.2:	The	Energy	Affordability	Gap
The Energy Affordability Gap (EAG) is an approach that was developed by the US consulting firm 
Fisher, Sheehan and Colton. The approach calculates the gap between ‘affordable’ energy bills and 
actual bills. 
The EAG is calculated according to the following formula:
Energy Affordability Gap = Actual Home Energy Bill – Affordable Home Energy Bill
Where:
‘Actual Home Energy Bill’ is a modelled bill where household energy costs are calculated as a 
function of energy use intensity, tenure, house size, household size and type of heating fuel; and
‘Affordable Home Energy Bill’ is set at 6 per cent of gross household income.
The EAG gives an indication of the extent to which households are over-extending themselves with 
respect to energy costs. The indicator is used both at a household and aggregate level.
This is a relatively simple and intuitive indicator that gives a sense of the depth of the energy 
affordability problem. The key limitation of this sort of approach is that it is based on actual energy 
consumption and, as such, it registers a reduction in actual energy consumption as an improvement 
in the affordability of energy. There are some situations where this would be correct (e.g. a reduction 
in energy consumption that results from the installation of an improvement in the efficiency of a 
dwelling). In other situations (e.g. where a household is self-rationing energy use due to reasons of 
hardship) this would be incorrect, for the reasons discussed in Chapters 1 and 2.
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First, at the individual level the use of 
an average fuel poverty gap puts more 
weight on those with the highest ratios. 
These will include very low reported or 
even misreported incomes. It could give 
weight to some observations in which we 
do not have confidence. This can partly 
be avoided by using the median gap. 
However construction of an aggregate gap 
is vulnerable to this problem and it also 
effectively double counts the impact of 
price changes. The headcount indicator is 
already dominated by fuel prices, leading 
to rapid fluctuations in the number of 
fuel poor. Since the fuel poverty gap then 
shows the impact of price changes too, this 
driver of fuel poverty is given even more 
weight. That is why the aggregate gap, 
measured in this way, increased more than 
five fold from 2004 to 2009 in Table 6.2.
dramatically – the effect of fuel prices 
on numbers compounding the effect on 
the gap – from £300 million in 2004 to 
£1.9 billion in 2009. 
Pros and cons
34. The great advantage of this approach is 
that it gives a specific impression of the 
depth of fuel poverty and how this changes 
over time. The fuel poverty gap helps to 
put a figure in pounds and pence on how 
households are affected by fuel poverty. 
It can do this in terms of a single number 
per household, per population group or for 
England as a whole. The indicator is highly 
reactive to changes in fuel prices, painting 
a picture of dramatically deepening fuel 
poverty since 2004. It could meet the 
requirements of the 2010 Energy Act to 
look at the depth as well as the extent of 
fuel poverty. 
35. What is more, the fuel poverty gap shows 
the impact of energy efficiency measures: 
all things being equal, energy efficiency 
improvements act to reduce the fuel 
poverty gap. The effect of such measures 
may be, in practice, offset by price 
increases (or reinforced by falling prices), 
but it is theoretically possible to isolate the 
impact of both energy efficiency and price 
factors and present them separately in 
pounds and pence under this approach.
36. For these reasons, a fuel poverty 
gap approach offers the potential to 
understand fuel poverty better. Fuel 
poverty gap information might also help 
with targeting, in the sense that policies 
could be directed at those groups of the 
population with the highest gaps. 
37. However, basing a fuel poverty gap 
indicator on the current ratio-based 
definition has two substantial problems. 
Table 6.2: The fuel poverty gap 1996 to 2009, England
Year Number of 
households in 
fuel poverty 
(millions, 
current 
measure)
Aggregate 
fuel poverty 
gap £billion 
(2009  
prices)
Mean fuel 
poverty 
gap per 
household  
£ (2009 
prices)
Median 
fuel poverty 
gap per 
household  
£ (2009 
prices)
1996 5.1 1.3 252 292
2001 1.7 0.6 335 218
2003 1.2 0.3 256 170
2004 1.2 0.3 265 164
2005 1.5 0.5 318 205
2006 2.4 1.0 417 276
2007 2.8 1.3 444 307
2008 3.3 1.5 451 311
2009 4.0 1.9 490 335
Source:Fuel poverty data 1996, 2001, 2003-2009, (DECC)
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Some of those working with this approach 
have suggested that it might offer a way of 
capturing those who face high fuel costs 
while being on low incomes. Instead of 
using a standard figure for fuel costs, the 
number used could reflect the households 
needs and energy efficiency of the 
property. 
41. Using this ‘Minimum Income Standards’ 
approach (see Box 6.3) would be a major 
departure for official poverty indicators. 
However one could use the same idea 
within the current official approach 
to poverty measurement. Just as DWP 
calculates poverty after housing costs, 
so one could calculate ‘after fuel costs’ 
poverty, allowing for fuel spending needs 
calculated in the same way as they are 
for the current definition. This would be 
justified on the basis of the analysis in 
Chapter 2 in particular: fuel costs can be 
outside the control of individual households 
and prices vary by area (particularly where 
choice is restricted to off-grid fuels).
How it works
42. To implement this approach, we need data 
on household income and on the thermal 
performance of dwellings in order to model 
the amount of energy the household 
requires. These are the same data as 
needed for the current definition. There is a 
choice of sources for income data, but the 
only survey where income data is available 
in combination with house condition 
6.4 Option D: After Fuel 
Costs Poverty
38. One of the problems identified in Chapter 
5 relating to the current fuel poverty 
definition is that, while it may capture a 
number of households with high energy 
requirements, not all of these households 
have low incomes. Some of the households 
captured could be expected to be able to 
absorb the cost of higher bills within their 
relatively high absolute levels of income. By 
contrast, for households on low incomes, 
unreasonable fuel costs would have to be 
traded-off with other essential expenditure.
39. The official definition of a household 
living in income poverty is one whose 
net income (allowing for household size 
and composition) is less than 60 per cent 
of the median household income. This is 
used because it is considered that those 
living below this income will be unable to 
afford basic and essential living costs and 
more generally unable to participate in 
contemporary society.
40. An alternative way of measuring poverty is 
to calculate the minimum amount needed 
to pay for particular defined essential 
household expenditures, such as mortgage 
payments or rent and other utilities, and 
then to deduct these from households’ net 
income to see whether or not they are able 
to meet those essential expenditures.150 
150 As suggested by Richard Moore in a paper submitted to the 
review’s Call for Evidence. 
Using a fuel poverty gap could give a very helpful sense of the depth of fuel poverty measured in 
£s at household and aggregate level. It could supplement an indicator showing the extent of fuel 
poverty. Fuel poverty gap data at a household or population group level could help policy making 
and delivery. However, basing a fuel poverty gap on the current fuel poverty ratio indicator puts 
most weight on observations that may not be accurate. If used to generate an aggregate gap it 
compounds its extreme sensitivity to price changes.
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45. In modelling this indicator, we have set an 
income threshold in a similar way to the 
current official poverty definition, using 
60 per cent of the median household 
disposable income after housing and 
modelled fuel costs. We have then adjusted 
this for household size and composition 
(as with DWP’s HBAI analysis). The choice 
of threshold is essentially a matter of 
judgement, but for the comparative 
analysis below, it is most convenient to 
work with the current poverty line.
46. Because the threshold is relative to the 
median household income after housing 
and modelled fuel costs, some households 
on the margins of poverty but with high 
costs are pushed into poverty by their fuel 
bills (e.g. Household B in Figure 6.3). This 
captures one of the issues at the heart of 
concerns about fuel poverty. However, by 
the same token, some households (like 
household A in the figure) with relatively 
low required fuel costs are no longer 
counted as being poor. The majority of 
information is through the English Housing 
Survey. 151
43. Under this approach, households whose 
income falls below a certain threshold after 
housing and fuel costs are deducted are 
classified as ‘after fuel costs poor’. As well 
as capturing all those households whose 
income is below the income threshold (i.e. 
the majority of those already under that 
threshold), this would also capture those 
people who – were they to prioritise energy 
spending – would be pushed into income 
poverty because of the level of costs faced. 
This indicator might help to understand 
the depth of ‘after fuel costs poverty’ 
experienced by households. 
Modelling the indicator
44. Figure 6.3 provides a conceptual graph for 
this approach.
151 See: http://www.minimumincomestandard.org/
Box	6.3	Minimum	Income	Standards151	
Within the context of after fuel costs measurement, one variation would be to look at the total 
expenditure required in a given household for non-energy necessities and see whether the residual 
income is sufficient to meet modelled fuel costs/needs. The University of York and the Loughborough 
University Centre for Research in Social Policy in conjunction with the Joseph Rowntree Foundation 
have developed a Minimum Income Standard (MIS) which seeks to do this by setting out minimum 
expenditure for a number of different household types leading to a minimum income needed to 
meet these requirements.
One way of measuring fuel poverty would be to use the MIS in conjunction with income data 
from the EHS and the modelled fuel bill, as now, from BREDEM to see to what extent fuel bills are 
affordable once other necessary expenditure has been subtracted from income. This might also allow 
the depth of fuel poverty to be estimated e.g. the scale of other expenditure that would need to be 
foregone in order to meet the fuel bill. 
This way of estimating fuel poverty assumes all other expenditure needs have been met in full and 
relies on accurate income reporting.
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as household D in Figure 6.3). As such, 
bills will push only those on the margins of 
income poverty into or out of fuel poverty.
Composition
49. Compared to the current indicator, this 
indicator leads to stark changes in the 
composition of those identified (see 
Annex B). This is particularly apparent 
in three household types: couples with 
children; single pensioners and single 
people under 60. This is because this 
indicator uses a measure of income 
that is adjusted for household size and 
composition. ‘Equivalising’ income in 
this way shifts the distribution towards 
larger households, an effect that is likely 
to be enhanced because such households 
tend also to have relatively high housing 
costs. The 2009 figures show a similar 
households that would be classed as poor 
before adjusting for fuel costs (such as 
household C in the figure) would also be 
classed as poor after fuel costs. 
47. Figure 6.4 shows us that the numbers 
counted as after fuel costs poor under 
this indicator would have been fairly 
stable between 1996 and 2009. In fact 
the numbers would be very similar to the 
number of households classed as poor on 
conventional poverty indicators (as applied 
to this dataset). 
48. Income is the dominant factor of this 
approach, rather than fuel bills. Therefore, 
changes in income distribution will have 
a greater impact on the numbers of fuel 
poor. Theoretically, a household living in 
income poverty could have a negligible fuel 
bill but still be after fuel costs poor (such 
Increasing income 
Increasing
energy
costs
A
B
D 
C 
‘After fuel costs poverty’
Poverty threshold allowing 
for household’s required fuel 
and actual housing costs 
Poverty threshold using
median fuel costs
Figure 6.3: Conceptual graph of ‘after fuel costs poverty’
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sophisticated way of measuring the extent 
of poverty. 
52. On the other hand, whilst this approach 
successfully identifies those who would not 
ordinarily be considered as income poor but 
whose excessive fuel costs push them into 
poverty it is more sensitive to household 
income than energy efficiency of the home 
which is another key driver of fuel poverty.
53. To the extent that this indicator identifies 
nearly all households that are low income, 
regardless of fuel requirements relative to 
others, this approach does not seem to 
reflect the distinct nature of fuel poverty as a 
policy concern either as defined in WHECA or 
as emerged from the discussion in Chapter 4. 
For example, under this indicator, a 
household (such as household D in Figure 
6.3) would be classed as fuel poor even 
though it lived in a near zero carbon home 
were its income levels far enough below the 
threshold set for income. It seems more 
helpful to see such a household as being 
severely poor in the conventional sense, 
rather than specifically ‘fuel poor’. 
composition by household type. There is 
some variation in the case of pensioner 
couples with no dependent children and 
single working age households with no 
children. These results should be expected: 
at times of high prices those with relatively 
stable and modest incomes could easily fall 
the other side of the threshold.
50. Because income levels are measured net 
of housing costs under this indicator, the 
regional breakdown changes compared to 
the current definition. Specifically, higher 
housing costs in London mean that this 
region accounts for a higher proportion of 
households identified under this indicator.
Pros and cons
51. From the perspective of those concerned 
by affordability and poverty, this approach 
correctly identifies those who are most 
likely to be making trade-offs between 
essential goods. This is because it shows 
us which households are in poverty and 
those that are pushed into poverty by their 
fuel costs. It also excludes those with low 
costs that are only just below the poverty 
line. In effect, this amounts to a more 
Figure 6.4: Number of households in fuel poverty under 
current indicator and ‘after fuel costs’ poverty indicator, 
1996 and 2003 – 2009, England
Source: Fuel poverty data, 1996 and 2003 – 2009 (DECC)
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55. At the same time, this indicator would 
usefully highlight those who are effectively 
pushed into income poverty by what 
we would consider to be unreasonably 
high costs compared to what an average 
household should be spending, based on 
its size and composition. As highlighted 
in Chapter 4, this is a key issue in 
distinguishing fuel poverty from income 
poverty. 
54. This option could provide information 
to policy makers on both the number of 
people who are poor after allowing for fuel 
costs and the depth of their poverty, since 
it would capture those households with 
the lowest disposable income levels. This 
might enable better targeting of policies, 
because they could be focused on those 
who have the greatest ‘poverty gap’, or in 
other words, are experiencing the deepest 
poverty. However, this once again moves in 
the direction of considering fuel poverty to 
be, at heart, simply a poverty issue. 
There is a focus within this option on income levels and poverty, such that the distinction between 
being poor and fuel poor is virtually lost. Essentially this kind of approach is a more sophisticated 
way of measuring fuel poverty, not a specific measure of fuel poverty. However, it does have an 
advantage in terms of identifying the impact of high fuel costs for those on the margins of fuel 
poverty in that it captures those who are pushed into poverty by higher than average energy costs
6.5 Option E: Low income 
and low SAP overlap
56. This approach focuses directly on the group 
of households that have both low incomes 
and energy inefficient dwellings. As such, 
the approach would bring the definition 
of fuel poverty closer to the notion of 
fuel poverty that is set out in WHECA. It 
would also align with the way that many 
stakeholders frame the issue (the issue of 
the overlap between inefficient houses and 
low incomes was a theme that came up in 
many responses to the call for evidence). 
In addition, this sort of ‘overlap’ indicator 
would align more closely with the way in 
which support is targeted on the ground 
(where support is increasingly targeted at 
energy inefficient households that receive 
means-tested benefits).  
How it works
57. Figure 6.5 shows how this approach might 
work. Households would be classified 
as being in fuel poverty where both 
household income was low and where the 
SAP rating of the dwelling was below a 
specified threshold.
58. If used in practice, this indicator would 
require the establishment of an income 
threshold and a SAP threshold. For low 
income, this could be relatively simple. 
For example, one option would be to use 
the 60 per cent threshold of after housing 
costs (AHC) median income, as reported 
in the Households Below Average Income 
statistics. Setting a SAP threshold would 
require a judgement to be made about 
the level that could prevent higher than 
average or otherwise ‘unreasonable’ costs. 
Furthermore, this threshold could be 
relative or absolute.
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of fuel poor households since 1996. This 
reflects the small reduction in poverty and 
the improvement in the relative energy 
efficiency of the housing stock for low 
income households. By contrast, against 
a fixed SAP threshold of 55, the number 
of poor households also in very energy 
inefficient homes would have been shown 
to fall much more rapidly over the period, 
from 3.4 million to 2.0 million. 
Composition
61. One would not necessarily expect the 
composition of households under the 
low SAP low income indicator to reflect 
the current indicator especially closely 
given that it represents a very different 
interaction and does not react to price 
changes in the same way. As with some 
other alternative indicators, a pattern 
emerges in which, in 2004, those 
classed as fuel poor comprised a greater 
proportion of couples of working age with 
children and a smaller proportion of single 
Modelling the indicator
59. We have modelled this indicator using 
an income threshold set at 60 per cent 
of median equivalised AHC income and 
a SAP threshold set at the average level 
in each year for all dwellings. This shows 
how many poor households are living in 
homes that have greater energy needs than 
the contemporary median (even though 
they have much lower incomes than the 
median). We also model the numbers of 
poor households that have been living in 
homes below a fixed SAP threshold of 55 
(the median SAP in 2009).
60. Figure 6.6 shows how the number of fuel 
poor households as defined by the low 
income and low SAP indicator (based on 
the SAP and income thresholds described 
above) would have evolved since 1996. 
The estimates suggest that the indicator 
would be relatively stable and that, under 
the relative SAP thresholds, it would have 
shown modest reduction in the number 
Increasing income  
Increasing
SAP 
Fuel Poor  
Figure 6.5: Fuel poverty defined as the overlap between 
low income and SAP
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63. Central and local government action 
on fuel poverty is increasingly targeted 
at groups of low-income households or 
households that are in the overlap between 
low income and poor thermal efficiency. 
Defining the fuel poor as the overlap 
between low incomes and poor housing 
would mean that the targeting of policies 
could be more closely aligned to the group 
of households that are captured by the 
indicator. 
64. On its own, however, the low income and 
low SAP indicator would not precisely 
identify affected households on the ground 
(although SAP bands within the overlap 
could be identified). As is the case under 
the current approach, determining the fuel 
poverty status of a particular household 
would still require detailed information 
about the household circumstances and 
the thermal efficiency of the dwelling.
65. The key weakness with this approach 
is, however, that the SAP rating of a 
dwelling is an imperfect indicator of what 
pensioners (see Annex B). Lone parents 
also make up a greater proportion of the 
households captured. These results reflect 
what we know to be the pattern of income 
for these households. By 2009, there 
is a proportional decrease in pensioner 
households identified by the indicator.
Pros and cons
62. This is a simple and intuitive approach 
that reflects reasonably closely the 
original definition set out in WHECA by 
capturing low incomes and the main driver 
of unreasonable costs. Defining a SAP 
threshold as a proxy for what is meant 
by reasonable costs helps to avoid the 
problem with the after fuel costs poverty 
approach, examined in Section 6.4, where 
a large number of low-income households 
with low energy requirements would be 
captured. While these households are 
undoubtedly in poverty, their relatively 
low energy requirement makes it difficult 
to argue that they are also specifically in 
fuel poverty.
Figure 6.6: Number of households in fuel poverty under 
current indicator and low income low SAP indicator, 1996 
and 2003 – 2009, England
Source: Fuel poverty data, 1996 and 2003 – 2009 (DECC)
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(c) Just as the indicator would not reflect 
external changes in energy prices, 
it would also not show the impact of 
policies – such as the Warm Home 
Discount – that directly reduced 
energy prices or tariffs and, as such, 
might provide a disincentive to 
their use. 
66. These are precisely the reasons why the 
current definition is based on an elaborate 
calculation of need to spend, not just on 
energy efficiency. 
67. As we have modelled it the low income 
and low SAP indicator is a pure headcount 
indicator. It would capture the number 
of households that are in fuel poverty 
but would not measure the depth of 
fuel poverty. The approach would not, 
therefore, identify the worst affected fuel 
poor households. Nor would it reflect 
improvements in income or SAP that failed 
to move the household beyond either of 
the thresholds (although income schemes 
such as Winter Fuel Payments would have 
some positive impact). However, it would 
be possible to count how many poor 
households live in properties progressively 
further below the threshold. This would 
equate, in a certain sense, to the depth of 
fuel poverty and could be aggregated to 
give a national picture.
constitutes “reasonable costs” and, as a 
consequence of this, it displays a number 
of less desirable qualities. These are:
(a) The use of SAP as the proxy for 
reasonable costs would result in the 
indicator capturing some households 
that would actually have relatively 
modest energy requirements. For 
example, some low-income households 
in small, low SAP dwellings (e.g. flats) 
could be captured under this approach. 
Others might have relatively low 
needs compared to others because, 
for instance, they were out all day at 
work. It would be difficult to justify 
households with very low absolute 
energy requirements being the focus 
of fuel poverty policy. At the same 
time, others staying at home all day in 
a larger, relatively high SAP properties 
would be excluded, even though they 
might be facing high energy costs. 
(b) The SAP rating of a dwelling is a 
measure of the energy consumption 
per unit of floor space and is, therefore, 
unaffected by changes in energy 
prices. In turn, the indicator would not 
be affected at all by trends in energy 
prices on the level of fuel poverty. This 
is highlighted by Figure 6.6, where the 
trend in the number of households 
counted does not appear to reflect the 
rapid increase in energy prices.
In many ways, using a combination of low energy efficiency and low income reflects the spirit of 
the Warm Home Energy Conservation Act, and what many regard as the core issue underlying fuel 
poverty better than the other approaches examined. Although more information would be needed 
on household circumstances and the thermal efficiency of the dwelling, it would be easier to use 
proxies to target policies for this type of definition than others we examine. However the SAP rating 
of a dwelling is only an imperfect indicator of what constitutes reasonable costs. The indicator would 
not reflect changes in one of the drivers of fuel poverty – energy prices – at all. It is for this reason 
that the existing definition goes beyond energy efficiency by itself to calculate households’ needs to 
spend allowing for factors such as size of dwelling, occupancy patterns and fuel prices.
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deprivation amongst different population 
groups, are also relevant. 
71. In each case, one crucial aspect is the 
choice of questions used to garner the 
views of those surveyed. 
Modelling the indicator
72. The subjective indicator is a headcount 
measure: a certain number of fuel 
poor households will be identified and 
that number can be measured over 
time. Unfortunately, whereas for other 
alternative indicators we have been able 
to make calculations to assess what their 
levels would have been in the past to 
compare with the current definition, we 
cannot do this for a subjective indicator 
because it depends on the questions which 
happen to have been asked previously. 
Previous estimates of  
self-reported fuel poverty
73. Table 6.3 sets out information from a 
number of surveys through which self-
reported fuel poverty has been measured.
74. The data from the EHCS show that, over 
the period 2004 to 2007, the proportion 
of households that were in self-reported 
fuel poverty rose from 6.4 per cent to 7.7 
per cent. Under the current definition, fuel 
poverty rose from 5.9 per cent to 13.2 per 
cent in the same period, with a leap of 4.3 
percentage points between 2005 and 2006. 
The data for EU SILC show that the UK has 
lower levels of self-reported fuel poverty than 
the EU-15 countries. The EU SILC figures 
for the UK show a dip in 2006 and 2007, 
but then a rise to much the same level in 
2009 as in 2005. This contrasts somewhat 
with the EHCS pattern, but both are very 
different from the rapid growth under the 
current definition. 
6.6 Option F: Subjective 
measurement of fuel 
poverty
68. The current definition works on the basis 
of an objective assessment of energy need. 
There is therefore no allowance made for 
how households choose to use energy, 
reflecting tastes and preferences. While, 
as has been shown above, a significant 
minority of households have relatively little 
room for manoeuvre when it comes to 
energy management in the home, most 
households have a range of options and 
choices. It is therefore worth considering 
whether it is possible to measure fuel 
poverty on a subjective basis, that is 
looking at whether people say they have 
problems affording heating. Doing so 
would mean using an indicator whose 
characteristics are fundamentally different 
from those of the others examined in 
this chapter.
How it works
69. Under such a definition, a household 
would be deemed to be in fuel poverty if 
its occupiers reported that they could not 
keep affordably warm. Making such an 
assessment of fuel poverty would require a 
national survey to be conducted in which 
relevant questions were asked.
70. In fact, one of the predecessor surveys to 
the English Housing Survey, the English 
House Condition Survey (EHCS), included 
questions permitting an assessment of 
subjective fuel poverty to be made (see 
below). The EU Survey of Income and Living 
Standards (EU SILC) also provides an insight 
into self-reported fuel poverty. Further 
approaches to subjective measurement, 
such as the Department for Work and 
Pensions efforts to measure material 
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76. The most obvious feature of the available 
subjective data is the relative steadiness 
over a period when fuel prices, and 
therefore fuel poverty as measured by the 
current definition, changed markedly. This 
could suggest that the impact of price rises 
on households is overstated in the current 
definition and that, on balance, those 
households that could keep adequately 
warm when prices were low could also 
keep warm when prices were higher. This 
suggests that the core of the problem is 
those households that cannot keep warm 
whatever the price of fuel. However, the 
reason for the trends in self-reported fuel 
poverty cannot be clearly isolated. It could 
be that rises in incomes or energy efficiency 
improvements over this period had a 
sufficient offsetting effect on household 
perceptions, but not on the official 
statistics. 
75. In May 2011, DWP published its first 
dataset on material deprivation amongst 
the pensioner population as part of its 
annual Households Below Average Income 
publication.152 The results, which relate to 
2009-2010, are shown below in Table 6.4. 
One specific question asked was: “Is your 
home kept adequately warm?” As can be 
seen, if this question is taken to relate to 
self-reported fuel poverty, the survey found 
3 per cent of pensioners were identified, 
which is very much lower than the level 
under the current definition, under which 
26 per cent of English pensioners were 
found to be fuel poor in 2009. The results 
for other questions “Without cutting back 
on essentials are you able to pay regular 
bills like electricity, gas or Council tax?” 
and “Do you have a damp free home?” are 
similar, although slightly higher. 
152 Available at: http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/hbai/hbai2010/
pdf_files/full_hbai11.pdf 
Table 6.3: Self-reported fuel poverty from varioius sources, 2003-2009, England, UK, EU-15
Year (a) Current fuel 
poverty figure 
(%)
(b) EHCS  
self-reported  
fuel poverty 
(%)
(c) EU SILC self-reported  
fuel poverty (%)
d) Pensioner 
material 
deprivation  
self-reported  
fuel poverty 
(%)
England England UK EU-15 UK
2003 5.9 6.8 – – –
2004 5.9 6.4 – – –
2005 7.2 6.6 5.7 7.6 –
2006 11.5 7.2 4.8 7.7 –
2007 13.2 7.7 4.4 7.3 –
2008 15.6 – 6.0 7.2 –
2009 18.4 – 5.8 6.9 3.0
Source: DECC (2010) for (a); DCLG for (b) (2009); EU SILC for (c) (20111); and HBAI (DWP) for (d) (2011)
Notes: For EHCS, this is the total proportion of households who said they could not keep comfortably warm in their living room 
in winter. For EU SILC data are provided in relation to an “inability to keep adequately warm” based on an update published on 
15 September 2011.  
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Pros and cons
78. Perhaps the main advantage of this 
approach to fuel poverty measurement 
is that it focuses on the problem where 
people themselves feel it. Some might 
argue that there is no advantage in 
considering a household to be suffering 
from a problem where that household itself 
does not feel that to be the case. In the 
case of fuel poverty, it could be reasonable 
to ask what is the benefit of classifying a 
household as being fuel poor because it 
cannot meet the temperature standard 
specified without spending more than 10 
per cent of its income when that standard 
does not reflect their tastes and where 
they find a lower amount of spending is 
deemed to be acceptable.
79. On the other hand, there is a strong 
case in favour of an objective approach, 
reflecting the perspectives set out earlier in 
the chapter. In terms of carbon reduction, 
households that do not feel fuel poor may 
nevertheless be highly energy inefficient 
and there is a national interest in ensuring 
that their dwellings are improved. From 
77. Table 6.5 considers further the breakdown 
of self-reported fuel poor households and 
‘officially’ fuel poor households in 2007. 
As can be seen, the subjective indicator 
finds people who are not fuel poor under 
the official definition who self-report as 
fuel poor (5.9 per cent of all households) 
as well as people who are fuel poor under 
the official definition who do not self-
report as fuel poor (11.4 per cent). Insofar 
as some of those who self-report fuel 
poverty are, objectively, not low-income 
households, or at least not deemed to be 
in fuel poverty, this would seem to be a 
weakness. It is not unusual for there to be 
a great difference between the households 
calculated statistically as being poor and 
those who say they are in poverty, but 
there is a relatively weak correspondence in 
this case.153 
153 For instance, nearly half of those saying they were 
themselves poor were also below a low income threshold 
in 1999. (See Bradshaw, J. and Finch, N. (2003). Overlaps 
in dimensions of poverty. Journal of Social Policy, 32, 4, pp 
53-525. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.) In Table 
6.5, less than a quarter of those saying they were not able 
to keep comfortably warm were officially classed as being in 
fuel poverty. 
Table 6.4: Pensioner responses to questions potentially relating to fuel poverty, 2009-2010, UK
Income groups (net equivalised household income, BHC)
Bottom fifth 2nd fifth 3rd fifth 4th fifth 5th fifth All 
pensioners
Home kept  
adequately warm
Yes (%) 
No (%)
95 
5
96 
4
97 
3
97 
3
99 
1
97 
3
Able to pay regular 
bills without cutting 
back on essentials
Yes (%) 
No (%)
95 
5
95 
5
97 
3
98 
2
99 
1
96 
4
Damp free 
home
Yes (%) 
No (%)
94 
6
94 
6
95 
5
95 
5
97 
3
95 
5
Source: HBAI, 2011 (DWP)
Fuel Poverty: the problem and its measurement 131
CHAPTER 6 OPTIONS FOR MEASURING FUEL POVERTY
influenced by a range of factors, it is 
not clear quite how the drivers of fuel 
poverty identified in Chapter 2 would be 
reflected. While income levels might drive 
the numbers, this could easily be offset by 
cultural values. The impact of fuel prices 
might be expected to be reflected – though 
as shown above this was not especially the 
case during the last decade. It is possible 
that fears about high fuel prices might 
drive perceptions rather than amounts 
actually paid. Finally, it is also difficult to 
see how energy efficiency improvements 
within the housing stock might reliably 
feed into the results. 
84. One way of managing the risks of a 
subjective approach to measurement 
would be to invest in the construction of a 
survey that might be more robust through 
the development of a battery of relevant 
questions. Such a survey might also be able 
to tell us something about the depth of fuel 
poverty if it gave choices about how strongly 
respondents agree with a statement. A 
longitudinal survey would allow persistence 
to be measured. However, such a system 
would come at a cost, both in terms of 
survey design and survey deployment. 
85. There is one practical advantage of this 
approach: it could be used on the doorstep 
a health and well-being perspective, it is 
important to recognise the evidence that 
there are health risks of living at certain 
temperatures. Even if people feel they are 
comfortable living at low temperatures, 
there could be health implications. Older 
people have poor peripheral temperature 
perception – they may not feel their homes 
to be as cold as they actually are. There is 
also the poverty perspective: if the average 
person can afford to heat their homes to 
an objectively set standard, that option to 
meet a basic need should also be available 
to the poor, regardless of their preferences 
and tastes.
80. As set out above, the choice of question 
to unearth attitudes to energy use in the 
home is vital. For its part, the DWP material 
deprivation indicator contains the three 
questions whose results are shown in Table 
6.4 each of which could point at fuel poverty 
while generating different responses. 
81. For example, responses may reflect so-
called ‘conditioned expectations’ whereby 
a response is governed by what someone 
feels it is reasonable to say based on 
assumptions about what they can rightly 
or fairly expect, or their past, possibly 
deprived, experiences, rather than what 
the rest of the population would judge to 
be their needs. This could partly explain the 
stability of these indicators. 
82. The review also received evidence 
suggesting that there is the risk of 
stigma attached to ‘admitting’ to having 
difficulties in meeting energy bills or needs. 
Some respondents also argued that the 
issue of ‘tackling fuel poverty’ should 
be referred to as ‘providing affordable 
warmth’ so that policies could be more 
effectively delivered on the ground. 
83. While one would expect that subjective 
assessments of fuel poverty would be 
Table 6.5: Self-reported fuel poverty compared to the 
current definition of fuel poverty, 2007, England
Able to keep comfortably 
warm in living room in 
winter
Not in 
fuel 
poverty 
(%)
In 
fuel 
poverty 
(%)
Total (%)
Yes (%) 80.9 11.4 92.3
No (%) 5.9 1.8 7.7
Total 86.8 13.2 100
Source: EHCS, 2009 (DECC)
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‘poor’, perhaps to avoid a perceived stigma. 
Alternatively, if it was known that a positive 
answer generated resources, some might 
be tempted to say they did have problems. 
At a national level such problems could 
well make policy-makers reluctant to see 
subjective indicators as robust enough to 
shape policy. 
to identify those needing assistance, 
without a complicated requirement 
to assess household income or energy 
efficiency to deem someone to be fuel 
poor. However, this presupposes that 
householders respond honestly and reliably 
to questions asking whether or not they can 
keep their home adequately warm. People 
are often reluctant to identify themselves as 
Using households’ subjective description of the position they are in is a markedly different approach 
from the current one and other options examined here. One advantage of this approach is to cross-
check the trends shown by other measurement approaches, and it is striking that recent trends in 
relevant responses are very different from those in the official fuel poverty series. However, individual 
perceptions may be very different from those of society as a whole, and people (particularly elderly 
people) may be reluctant to say that they face a particular problem. Responses also vary depending 
on precisely what question is asked. Such questions are most useful as a way of complementing 
more objective approaches, giving a reality check on them. From this point of view it would be 
helpful to re-incorporate questions about self-reported fuel poverty into the EHS.
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Low income, low 
relative SAP
After fuel costs poverty
After housing costs
(adjusted threshold)
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Source: Fuel poverty dataset, 1996 – 2009, (DECC), English Housing Survey, 
1996 – 2009, (DCLG)
Note: there have been some changes in the methodology used to calculate fuel poverty 
statistics from year to year, which affect all the time series presented here. See Annex B 
for details of these changes.
Figure 6.7: Number of households in fuel poverty under all 
indicators compared, selected years 1996 – 2009, England
Number of households (millions)
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6.7 Overview of 
aggregate numbers of 
households
86. For comparative purposes following the 
individual explanations of each indicator, 
Figure 6.7 below shows how the ‘V’ shape 
of the fuel poverty problem as depicted by 
the current definition compares to the trend 
identified by the main options explored in 
detail above.
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Chapter	6	summary
This chapter has considered modifications to the existing definition and alternative ways of 
measuring fuel poverty.
In terms of composition, each indicator identifies households as fuel poor in ways one might expect 
given their respective design features. For example, those definitions that measure income after 
housing costs tend to consist of a greater proportion of families compared to the current before 
housing costs definition.
The regional breakdown is also affected most noticeably by income measurement after housing 
costs: London accounts for a greater proportion of the households captured than when before 
housing costs income is used. 
Perhaps of more significance, each of the indicators examined has given rise to a set of particular 
insights:
•	 looking at income after housing costs, rather than before, arguably gives a better picture of a 
household’s disposable income and affordability of its fuel bills;
•	 using a spending threshold that changes over time based on contemporary behaviour of society as 
a whole has appeal in principle, and would remove the extreme sensitivity of the current definition 
to price changes;
•	 some form of fuel poverty gap indicator would give a very helpful sense of the depth of fuel 
poverty by supplementing indicators on its extent;
•	 examining the number of households who are in after fuel costs poverty helpfully focuses on 
those who are pushed into poverty by the scale of their bills; 
•	 looking directly at the number of households with both low income and living in energy inefficient 
(low SAP) homes reflects both the spirit of WHECA and popular perceptions of the problem;
•	 subjective indicators of fuel poverty could supplement other approaches and provide a cross-check 
on the trends shown. 
However we have also seen that all of these options have drawbacks. Amendments to the current 
approach address specific issues but remain subject to the underlying problems associated with 
using a ratio. A depth indicator based on the current definition is very sensitive to very low reported 
incomes and shows trends in aggregate ‘fuel poverty gaps’ that are even more sensitive to price 
levels than the current indicator. Looking at poverty after fuel costs is essentially a more sophisticated 
measure of poverty, not of the particular issue of fuel poverty. A simple low income low relative 
SAP overlap indicator ignores the other elements driving households costs. Subjective indicators are 
affected by issues of stigma and doubts about their robustness. 
Building on the analysis in this chapter, Chapter 7 therefore examines whether it is possible to 
construct an indicator that can exploit the advantages both of the current definition and some of the 
alternatives we have examined.
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1. No single way of measuring the scale of 
a social problem will be without its flaws. 
As we saw in Chapter 5, the current fuel 
poverty indicator, despite its key strengths, 
has several. Most of these relate to the 
way it is based on a ratio of spending 
need to income, compared to a fixed 
threshold. This explains the way that fuel 
prices dominate the trends it reveals and its 
sensitivity to the precise assumptions used 
in its construction. Using different income 
measures or adjusting the threshold in 
line with contemporary spending patterns 
would have advantages but would not 
change this fundamental problem.
2. Of the other approaches examined in 
Chapter 6, the idea of looking directly 
at the number of people who have both 
low incomes and live in energy inefficient 
homes (option E) has the great attraction 
of reflecting the wording of the Warm 
Homes and Energy Conservation Act 2000 
(WHECA), that is, focusing on the overlap 
between the two. As we saw in Chapter 
4, this captures what makes fuel poverty 
distinct from several perspectives. However 
using energy inefficiency (low Standard 
Assessment Procedure (SAP) ratings) by 
itself fails to capture the other factors that 
affect households’ need to spend. These 
are better captured by the way in which 
required spend is calculated within the 
current definition.
3. It is therefore potentially rewarding 
to examine whether there is a way of 
combining these two approaches, which 
is what we do in this Chapter. We look at 
an indicator which shows the number of 
people or households who have both low 
incomes relative to the rest of society and 
a high need to spend relative to others, 
using, for the latter, the same approach 
as the one that underpins the current 
definition.
4. The approach we show draws on insights 
from the suggestions explored in Chapter 6 
in four other ways:
•	 it uses an after housing costs measure of 
income;
•	 it looks at household costs relative to the 
median spending needs of the whole 
population in the same year;
•	 it takes account of the way in which 
those with high fuel costs can be pulled 
into poverty;
Examining the 
overlap between 
low incomes and 
high costs
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•	 it embodies a separate indicator of the 
depth of fuel poverty – ‘the fuel poverty 
gap’ – for fuel poor households on 
average and in aggregate, alongside a 
conventional indicator of its extent.
5. The analysis below suggests that this would 
come closer than other approaches to 
capturing WHECA’s focus on, ‘household(s) 
living on a lower income in a home that 
cannot be kept warm at a reasonable cost’, 
as well as the Energy Act 2010’s focus on 
both the numbers in fuel poverty and how 
badly affected households are.
A Low income – 
High Costs indicator
How it works
6. Figure 7.1 shows in broad terms how this 
approach might work. Households are 
defined as fuel poor where their household 
income is low and where their required 
energy spending in order to achieve an 
adequate standard of warmth is above 
a specified threshold. Fuel poverty is 
therefore represented by the shaded area 
in Figure 7.1. This is analogous to the 
approach shown in Figure 6.5, but focusing 
on costs, not just on SAP ratings.
7. Using an indicator of this kind would 
require the setting of thresholds for ‘lower’ 
income and ‘unreasonable’ costs. As for 
all indicators that have been reviewed, this 
would require some judgement to be made 
and many combinations are possible. We 
therefore look first at some of the issues 
involved.
Setting the energy cost threshold
8. The energy cost threshold we use below 
is based on the median required spending 
of all households. In other words it takes 
costs for a low-income household as 
being ‘unreasonable’ if they exceed what 
households in general – who have much 
higher incomes and generally larger homes 
– would need to spend. Importantly, within 
Income threshold
Energy
cost
threshold
Increasing income  
Increasing
energy
costs
Income above 
threshold/lower 
energy costs 
Income below 
threshold/lower 
energy costs 
Income above 
threshold/higher 
energy costs 
Fuel poor: Income  
below threshold/ 
higher energy
costs 
Figure 7.1: Fuel poverty defined as the overlap between 
low income and high energy costs
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is the kind of approach explored in Section 
6.4 above in measuring after fuel costs 
poverty (see Figure 6.3). First, we look at 
household income after deducting housing 
costs (adjusted for household size and 
composition as in DWP’s Households Below 
Average Income (HBAI) analysis). Under 
our approach, we add each household’s 
modelled fuel costs to DWP’s (After 
Housing Costs) poverty line to give the 
household’s income threshold. We then 
compare the household’s income with 
this threshold. It is very hard to see how it 
could be argued that anyone below this 
line was not on a ‘lower income’; indeed a 
case could be made for a more generous 
threshold, but this one is consistent with 
other official approaches to poverty 
measurement.
The combined thresholds
12. Figure 7.2 provides a conceptual graph 
of the resulting picture, which is a 
development of the simpler version in 
Figure 7.1. Households that are below 
the conventional 60 per cent of median 
income poverty line and have energy costs 
above the threshold (such as Household 
A) are classified as fuel poor. So are 
some households with high energy costs 
that would be just above a conventional 
poverty line (such as household B). The 
line showing the income threshold slopes 
because of the impact of allowing for 
required fuel costs.
13. Put simply, setting the income and 
reasonable cost thresholds as described 
above would mean that households would 
be considered fuel poor where:
(a)	 they	had	required	fuel	costs	that	
were	above	the	median	level;	and
these calculations, we adjust modelled 
bills for household size and composition. 
This reflects the idea that the amount it is 
‘reasonable’ to expect a small household 
to spend is different from that for a large 
household. The particular adjustment we 
use in the approach below matches the 
one we use in setting the income threshold, 
but other approaches are possible.154 By 
implication this approach suggests that 
reasonable costs are at or below median 
costs, while unreasonable costs are above 
the median. The reasons for taking this 
approach are discussed in Box 7.2 below.
9. One key implication of this relative 
approach is that by themselves rising prices 
do not change the position of particular 
households relative to the threshold. We 
may all see price rises as ‘unreasonable’ but 
that does not mean that we all become 
fuel poor. Instead, the effects of rising (or 
falling) prices affect the proposed indicator 
in two ways:
(a) they increase (or reduce) the ‘fuel 
poverty gap’;
(b) they pull some households just above 
the income threshold into (or out of) 
fuel poverty.
10. Although we adopt a specific approach to 
the fixing of thresholds for the modelling in 
this report, there are a number of ways in 
which the reasonable cost threshold could 
be set. Some alternatives are presented in 
Annex B and they are the subject of specific 
consultation questions. This is a complex 
area and we welcome views.
Setting the income threshold
11. In setting a threshold for what constitutes 
a ‘lower’ income an obvious starting point 
154 See Box 7.1 below and Annex B.
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(c) modelling energy costs to reflect 
required needs to achieve adequate 
warmth (as currently) rather than using 
actual spending;
(d) adjusting the modelled fuel bill for 
household size and composition, 
alongside the adjustment made for 
incomes.
16. In principle, it would be better to count 
the number of people affected by fuel 
poverty, rather than the number of 
households, in line with the HBAI analysis. 
This would remove the way in which the 
current measure gives less weight to the 
problems of larger households, particularly 
those with children. For the moment, for 
comparative purposes we continue to show 
results for households. We compare trends 
for individuals and households in Figure 7.8 
below. For its part, Box 7.1 discusses the 
issues involved in adjusting for household 
size and composition.
(b)	were	they	to	spend	that	amount,	
they	would	be	left	with	a	residual	
income	below	the	official	poverty	
line.
14. Under this approach, if energy prices are 
high, there will be more people pushed 
below the income threshold as required 
fuel spending rises.
15. Behind the broad principle on where to 
set the thresholds, there are some specific 
decisions needed to implement the 
approach. Our analysis is based on:
(a) measuring incomes adjusted for 
household size and composition 
(equivalised) – this is in line with current 
best practice and matches the approach 
taken by DWP for its HBAI analysis;
(b) measuring incomes after housing costs;
Increasing income  
Increasing
energy
costs
B
A
Income threshold
Median
required
energy
costs
Figure 7.2: Fuel poverty defined as the overlap between 
high energy costs and low (after housing and energy costs) 
income
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Box	7.1:	Adjusting	incomes	for	household	size	and	composition
One of the issues in analysis of household incomes is always how to allow for household size and 
composition. Most people would agree that a family of four will not be as well off or able to have 
the same standard of living as a single person with the same cash income. Ranking them in the same 
place in terms of whether they are rich or poor is not therefore appropriate.
In its analysis of poverty and income distribution, the Department for Work and Pensions – in line 
with international and academic best practice – adjusts household incomes to allow for this problem. 
The process is technically known as ‘equivalisation’ and the adjusted incomes are sometimes called 
‘equivalent incomes’ or ‘equivalised incomes’.
This is an issue for understanding fuel poverty in two ways. The first is simply presentational. We 
often want to understand how households in different circumstances are affected by aspects of the 
problem, including by income group. Where possible in earlier chapters we have therefore presented 
results by income group ranked in terms of adjusted or equivalent incomes, rather than just by total 
household income. This gives a better picture of, for instance, the relative income positions of those 
with more or less energy efficient homes.
The second is more fundamental. When looking at how income should be taken into account in 
determining whether a household should be counted as fuel poor or not, the issue arises as to 
whether that income should be adjusted for household size and composition. With the current 
ratio-based definition, this has not been such a prominent issue. If incomes were adjusted for family 
size, there would be a strong case for doing the same to assessed energy needs. Making the same 
adjustment to both sides of the fraction would cancel out and make no difference to the calculation. 
We did not, therefore, explore suggestions of this kind further in Chapter 6.
However, with the approach suggested in this Chapter, the question does arise. We have based 
our assessment here as to whether households have low incomes or not on the basis of incomes 
adjusted for household size and composition, in line with best practice within poverty measurement, 
giving results that are consistent with other official analysis.
The further question then arises as to how to reflect household size and composition in relation 
to costs. Our analysis suggests that we should do this by adjusting modelled bills using the same 
adjustment factors as we use for incomes. However, other choices are possible and we discuss some 
of the issues involved in the notes to this Chapter in Annex B. We would welcome views on this.
The fuel poverty gap
17. We have already argued that it would be 
useful to have a measure of the depth of 
fuel poverty alongside the extent. One of 
the consequences of the approach being 
set out is that it allows us to calculate a 
‘fuel poverty gap’ without the sensitivity 
to very low and mis-reported incomes 
that affected the analogous indicator we 
explored in Section 6.3.
18. For a particular household, the fuel poverty 
gap would be the difference between 
its required costs and the threshold for 
reasonable costs, as shown for household A 
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Figure 7.3: Calculation of the ‘fuel poverty gap’
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Fuel poverty gap
In 2004 2.8 million households would 
have been fuel poor using this indicator, 
compared to 1.2 million under the current 
definition. In 2009 the number would have 
fallen slightly to 2.7 million households, 
compared to nearly 4 million under the 
current definition. In 1996 the number 
would have been 2.9 million, compared to 
5.1 million under the current definition.
21. The estimates suggest that the low 
income and high costs is a relatively stable 
measure. It counts a very similar average 
number of households as fuel poor over 
the period to the current definition but 
without its dramatic fluctuations. The small 
fall in the number of households over time 
reflects the reduction in poverty since 2001 
and the improvement in the relative energy 
efficiency of the housing stock for low-
income households. Changes in fuel prices 
have some effect on the numbers counted 
in fuel poverty: at the margin some 
households will have been pulled into fuel 
poverty since 2004, offsetting the other 
improvements.
in Figure 7.3. Where a household is one of 
those drawn into fuel poverty by the high 
level of its fuel costs (such as household 
B), the fuel poverty gap would be the 
reduction in fuel costs needed to bring it 
above the income threshold line. These 
gaps show the extent to which the energy 
costs for these households exceed the 
reasonable cost threshold and, therefore, 
provides a sense of the depth of the 
problem for them.155
19. These individual fuel poverty gaps for each 
household can be summed to produce an 
aggregate fuel poverty gap, giving an idea 
of the scale of the national problem.
Modelling the measure
20. Figure 7.4 shows how many households 
would have been identified by this 
indicator, as well as the aggregate ‘fuel 
poverty gap’, alongside the current 
measure for selected years since 1996. 
155 Please see Annex B for an explanation of how the 
adjustment made for household size and composition is 
taken into account when calculating fuel poverty gaps.
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Figure 7.4: Number of households in fuel poverty under 
current indicator and low income high cost indicator, 1996 
and 2003 – 2009, England
Source: Fuel poverty data, 1996 and 2003 – 2009 (DECC)
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24. Unlike for the other indicators we 
investigate, in modelling this approach 
we adjust both income and costs for 
household size and composition (see Box 
7.1). As we have seen, the approach gives 
a higher absolute number of fuel poor 
households in 2004 than was found under 
the current indicator. Compared to the 
current indicator those counted as fuel 
poor include a larger proportion of families 
with children and a smaller proportion of 
single person households, although the 
overall effect is less marked than for other 
options (see Annex B, Figures B.4 and 
B.5). By 2009, a larger proportion of those 
counted as fuel poor are single people 
aged under 60 and a smaller proportion are 
older, single people. This is likely to be due 
to changes in relative incomes, including 
falling pensioner poverty.
25. From a regional perspective, under this 
indicator those regions with relatively high 
housing costs, such as London, account for 
a larger proportion of fuel poor households 
than under the current definition. This 
22. The figure also shows the size of the 
(aggregate) fuel poverty gap measured in 
the way described. This was £1.1 billion 
in 2009, representing the extent to which 
households in or on the margins of fuel 
poverty would have to pay higher costs to 
keep warm than typical households with 
much higher incomes. It is this indicator 
that captures the effects of changing fuel 
prices: the aggregate gap measured in 
real terms is 52 per cent higher in 2009 
than it was in 2004 and is on a par with its 
1996 level.
23. One of the tests for each of the approaches 
we have examined is how effectively they 
reflect the drivers of fuel poverty. In this 
case the number of households counted 
as fuel poor is most affected by changes 
in the level of poverty and by the energy 
efficiency of the homes in which those 
with low incomes live. Fuel prices do affect 
the numbers counted as fuel poor, as high 
prices bring more households below the 
income threshold. However, it is principally 
the fuel poverty gap that shows the way 
in which the problems faced by fuel poor 
households worsen as prices rise.
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reported incomes were classed as fuel poor 
under the current definition, together with 
a few of those with very high relative costs 
and higher incomes. Many of those below 
the (far from generous) income threshold 
and with costs above or well above the 
national median were not counted as fuel 
poor by the current definition.
28. By contrast, in 2009, most – but not all – 
of those with low incomes and high costs 
were officially counted as fuel poor. In 
addition many of those with the lowest 
reported incomes were classed as fuel poor 
under the current definition , even if they 
had very low required heating costs.156 
There are also households with incomes 
well above the poverty lines – some 
approaching or even above median income 
– that are classed as fuel poor because of 
the very high relative costs of their homes.
29. It is helpful to consider the situations 
of households in different quadrants of 
Figures 7.5 and 7.6 (shown in simplified 
form in Figure 7.7).
(a) Those in the top right quadrant 
(A in Figure 7.7) have both required 
spending below the median and 
incomes above the income threshold. 
They are not classed as fuel poor under 
either definition (unless prices rise very 
high under the current definition) and 
would not be classed as such by many 
of those concerned with the problem 
of fuel poverty.
156 The figures show the effective minimum level of required 
fuel spending under the current methodology; even 
someone in a home with a SAP of 100 would be counted as 
needing to spend amounts, based on the national average, 
on appliances etc. That is why virtually no households are 
assessed as having required fuel costs below 40% of the 
national median.
is the effect of measuring incomes after 
housing costs. However, the North West 
remains the region accounting for the 
highest proportion of fuel poor households. 
See Annex B, Figures B.6 and B.7.
Fuel poverty under the 
current and alternative 
definitions
26. The relationship between this indicator of 
households with low incomes and high 
costs and the current definition can be 
seen in more detail in Figures 7.5 and 7.6. 
These show – for a random sub-sample 
for presentational reasons – the way in 
which the two indicators would classify 
households within the housing surveys 
in 2004 and 2009. The households are 
plotted to show their incomes in relation 
to the median (along the horizontal axis) 
and their costs in relation to the median 
(along the vertical axis). The [solid bars] 
show the low income-high costs boundary 
(extending to higher relative incomes in 
2009 because fuel prices were higher 
relative to incomes). The households 
within this boundary represent 2.8 million 
from the whole population in 2004 and 
2.7 million in 2009. The small fall results 
from improvements in poverty and the 
energy efficiency of the homes of poor 
households. At the same time, the fuel 
poverty gap rises from £730m to £1.1 
billion in real terms.
27. The charts also indicate as black dots those 
that would be classed as fuel poor on 
the current definition and as white dots 
those that would not. In 2004 only those 
households with very high relative costs 
and low incomes or with the very lowest 
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Figure 7.6: Households classed as fuel poor under the 
current definition and with low incomes and high costs, 2009
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Figure 7.5: Households classed as fuel poor under the 
current definition and with low incomes and high costs, 2004
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incomes – indeed even negative ones 
(after allowing for housing costs). 
Where incomes fall well below the 
poverty line – below 60 per cent of the 
national median – some are classed as 
fuel poor under the current definition 
in 2009. A few with even exceptionally 
low required fuel spending are also 
classed as fuel poor in 2009 under 
that definition because of their very 
low or minimal reported incomes. 
Such households are clearly a very high 
priority for assistance of some kind: 
they are deep in poverty, for instance, 
not receiving the benefits to which 
they are entitled, or only entitled to 
benefits that leave them well short 
of the poverty line. What is not clear, 
however, is whether it is helpful to class 
them as fuel poor. They do not – on the 
face of it – fit WHECA’s description of 
having above reasonable costs to keep 
warm. There is rather little that further 
energy efficiency improvements can 
do to help. Rather, they urgently need 
higher incomes.
(b) Those in the bottom right quadrant (B) 
have costs above the median level but 
do not have low incomes (depending 
on how this is defined). One would 
expect them to be the focus of policies 
designed to improve energy efficiency, 
but it may come as a surprise that some 
of them would currently be classed 
as fuel poor despite their moderate 
income levels.
(c) Those in the bottom left quadrant 
(C) are those with both relatively low 
incomes and relatively high costs. 
These are the households that are 
most obviously the target of policies to 
address fuel poverty and are the ones 
classed as fuel poor under the low 
income high costs definition. It may 
again come as a surprise that many 
of them were not classed as fuel poor 
under the current definition in 2004.
(d) Those in the top left quadrant (D) 
have low incomes but relatively low 
spending required to keep warm. 
Some of them have very low (reported) 
Increasing income  
Increasing
energy
costs
BC
AD
Figure 7.7: Households with different combinations of 
incomes and costs
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Pros and cons
31. By capturing the set of households that 
have a combination of low income and 
relatively high costs, this approach aligns 
most closely with the definition of fuel 
poverty set out in WHECA.
32. As is shown by the trend in Figure 7.4 
above, the headcount measure (i.e. the 
number of households that have low 
incomes and face relatively high costs) 
suggests that the number identified has 
changed only slowly over time, as have 
their characteristics (see Tables B.1 and 
B.2 in Annex B). This consistency would 
be helpful for policymakers and those 
delivering policy as they could be more 
confident that policies would continue 
to be targeting the correct group of 
households. The stability in the trend may 
also more fairly reflect the underlying 
situation in English households: it is not at 
all obvious that the structural problem of 
fuel poverty was reduced by three-quarters 
from 1996-2004 or that it has increased 
by more than three times since then, as 
implied by the ‘V-shaped’ trend under the 
current definition. The use of a relative 
The number of individuals 
affected
30. The figures shown in Figure 7.4 related to 
the numbers of households counted as fuel 
poor under each approach in order to allow 
comparison. However, it can be argued 
that it is more appropriate to look at 
changes in the number of individuals who 
are affected. This would give more weight 
to trends affecting larger numbers of 
people and would be more consistent with 
other poverty indicators. The results of the 
analysis we have conducted in relation to 
the current definition and the low income 
– high costs indicator can be seen in Figure 
7.8. As can be seen, in 1996 the current 
definition identified 9.3 million individuals 
as fuel poor. By 2009 this figure was 20 per 
cent lower at 7.4 million, having dipped to 
1.8 million in 2003. By contrast, the low 
income – high costs indicator would have 
found 5.1 million people to be living in fuel 
poverty in 1996, 4.7 million in 2003 and 
4.8 in 2009 (9 per cent of the population 
and a fall of about 6 per cent since 1996).
Figure 7.8: Number of households and individuals in fuel 
poverty under the current definition and the Low Income 
High Costs indicator, 1996-2009, England
Source: Fuel poverty dataset (DECC), English Housing Survey (DCLG)
Note: The dotted lines provide a straight-line trajectory between years where there are 
no additional data points.
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cost threshold is one of the reasons for the 
more stable picture given by this approach 
(see Box 7.2).
33. Another advantage of this approach 
compared to the current definition is that 
it would be more robust to the issue of 
low reported incomes within the EHS. A 
large number of households within the 
EHS report very low (or zero) incomes. That 
some of this is due to under-reporting is 
a known weakness in the EHS data and 
one which has the implications for fuel 
poverty as currently defined which we 
explored in Chapter 5. The combination 
of a very low reported income and a fuel 
poverty definition that is based on a ratio 
means that this group of households will 
be classified as fuel poor almost irrespective 
of the energy efficiency of their homes, as 
can be seen in Figure 7.6. By moving away 
from a ratio approach, the low income high 
costs measures would avoid this problem.
34. However, as was the case with all of 
the options that have been discussed 
above, this approach would not help with 
the precise identification of fuel poor 
households on the ground, as determining 
whether a household is fuel poor would 
still require detailed information on the 
dwelling and household circumstances. 
Box	7.2:	Relative	or	absolute	cost	thresholds
A key issue which arises with this approach – with important implications – is whether the threshold 
used to define reasonable costs is set in relative or absolute terms. The way in which we define it 
within the modelling work presented here is in relative terms. We take it as being determined by 
the median level of spending need for all households, as produced by the modelling underlying the 
current fuel poverty calculations.
This has a number of powerful advantages:
•	 As a relative measure it means that as, for instance, the energy efficiency of the housing stock in 
general improves, so median required spending would fall, and with it the threshold. So, if lower 
income households failed to keep up with this, more of them would be counted as being in fuel 
poverty. This seems appropriate.
•	 Technically, it means that which households are counted as being fuel poor would be much more 
robust to the precise assumptions of the modelling than they are now. Issues and uncertainties 
around factors such as which non-heating costs are included, or the precise temperatures 
underlying the calculation of required fuel spending would affect both the calculation for an 
individual household, and the median for all households and so the threshold, in the same way. 
Any errors would largely cancel out. This contrasts with the comparison of required fuel costs with 
a fixed threshold (or indeed one based on an external number, such as current actual average 
spending), which is very sensitive to these assumptions.
•	 The effects of changing fuel prices are seen mainly through the size of the fuel poverty gap. While 
some households are pushed into fuel poverty by rising prices under the approach discussed in 
this Chapter, it is the increasing depth of fuel poverty that is the main effect.
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36. As we saw in Figure 7.4 above, the fuel 
poverty gap and the headcount indicator 
taken together reflect the impact of 
changing energy prices on fuel poor 
households. This can track the depth of 
the fuel poverty problem both in aggregate 
and for individual households.
37. In addition, the combination of the 
headcount and fuel poverty gap measures 
will reflect the impact of all policies which 
impact on the household energy bill, in 
that the fuel poverty gap indicator will 
capture the impacts of interventions that 
reduce household energy costs of fuel poor 
households, even if they do not move them 
over the reasonable costs threshold.
38. It is important to note that these indicators 
do not generally capture changes for 
low income households that only affect 
their incomes and not their costs, unless 
At the same time the criteria often used 
may be proxies for the issue shown. For 
example, a SAP proxy (for reasonable 
costs) and benefit eligibility proxy (for 
lower income) are relatively likely to place 
a household in the correct quadrant of 
the grid. By comparison, such proxies are 
less likely to lead to the calculation of 
the correct fuel poverty ratio. We shall 
investigate this further in our final report.
35. The use of calculated costs required to 
achieve warmth as in the current approach 
helps to overcome some of the problems 
of the low income and low SAP measure 
(Section 6.5). For example, the measure 
will only capture households that are 
facing relatively high costs. By contrast, 
the SAP-based threshold would identify a 
number of households in smaller dwellings 
that actually have relatively modest energy 
requirements.
Box	7.2:	Relative	or	absolute	cost	thresholds	(continued)
It would be possible to argue, however, that the reasonable costs threshold should be a fixed 
amount, specified in pounds per week in some way. While in some ways easier to explain, this 
would, however recreate many of the difficulties with the current definition, explored in Chapter 
5. In particular, as prices rose and fell, large numbers of households would be classed as moving in 
or out of fuel poverty, even though their incomes and energy efficiency of their homes remained 
constant. It is also a little hard to define what that threshold should be, except by reference to the 
costs faced by typical households in some way.
We have therefore both set out and modelled the low income high costs indicator using a relative 
threshold for costs, not an absolute one.
Having done that, there is a further decision, which is what the threshold should be relative to. 
We have used median equivalised required spending as this reflects what is happening to typical 
households. Using the average (mean) would mean that the threshold would be affected by, for 
instance, very large or expensive properties in a way that would not seem to accord with most 
people’s notion of what was reasonable. Equally, we have used 100 per cent of median spending. 
Some other multiple could in practice be used, but it is a little hard to see what the rationale for a 
different choice might be.
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conventionally measured, showing up, for 
instance, as a reduction in the number of 
households counted by DWP as being in 
severe poverty. Where a change in income 
does carry households across the income 
threshold, there would also be a reduction 
in the extent of fuel poverty.
the income change for a given 
household carries it across or close 
to the low income threshold and out 
of fuel poverty.157 What does happen 
is a reduction in poverty gaps, as 
157 Some households carried to just below the income 
threshold, but not across it, could however see a 
reduction in their fuel poverty gap.
Chapter	7	summary	
An indicator based on looking at the number of households with both low incomes (relative to 
median incomes) and high required fuel costs (relative to median required fuel costs) has several 
advantages by comparison with the current definition:
•	 It allows separate calculation of the extent of fuel poverty (the number fuel poor) and the depth of 
the problem (the fuel poverty gap), rather than conflating them.
•	 The number of households classed as fuel poor would have averaged just under 3 million under 
both definitions since 1996 (see Figure 7.4). The number of individuals affected averaged around 
5 million under both definitions (Figure 7.8). However the slow downward trend in the number 
with low incomes and high costs may give a much better representation of the scale of the 
underlying problem than the ‘V’ shape from the current definition.
•	 The impact of changing fuel prices on the depth of the problem for those affected is captured by 
the average fuel poverty gap, which falls from £413 in 1996 (at 2009 prices) to £256 in 2004, but 
rises to £409 in 2009 (an aggregate amount of £1.1 billion).
•	 Calculating the extent of fuel poverty in this way is more robust than the current definition, both 
to data problems (such as misreporting of income) and to the assumptions used in calculating 
required spending (such as the precise temperatures used).
•	 Because the measure is much more stable in terms of who is identified as fuel poor, it is also much 
more stable in terms of which groups of people are identified as being at risk of fuel poverty than 
the current measure.
•	 Under the current definition, many households with low incomes and relatively high energy 
requirements were counted as not being fuel poor in 2003 and 2004. Correspondingly, 
interventions that were targeted on households that might have been thought in common sense 
terms to be at risk were assessed as benefiting people outside the target group, potentially giving 
a misleadingly gloomy assessment of their effectiveness.
•	 The use of a fuel poverty gap measure also allows the impact of interventions to be seen, even 
if they do not quite bring someone across the line that would bring them out of fuel poverty. 
However the impact of interventions that only affected incomes without taking households across 
the threshold would reduce the depth of poverty as conventionally measured, but not generally 
the depth of fuel poverty.
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1. The evidence we have examined and 
presented confirms that fuel poverty is 
a distinct issue and a serious problem. 
It deserves and requires attention, as 
recognised by Parliament when it adopted 
the Warm Homes and Energy Conservation 
Act 2000, although progress since then has 
been slow.
2. The Act captures, in our view correctly, 
the overlap between two basic factors: 
income and costs. As it states, a household 
is affected by fuel poverty if it has a lower 
income and faces above reasonable costs 
– which will often be for reasons outside 
its control – to achieve adequate warmth. 
Fuel poverty is a priority for a range of 
coinciding concerns, including poverty 
alleviation, health and well-being, energy 
efficiency and carbon saving.
3. The fact that people with high heating 
costs cannot maintain, for the same level 
of income, the same standard of living 
as others, is a concern for those who 
approach fuel poverty from the perspective 
of a focus on poverty in general. This 
is especially the case given that the 
factors that lead to those high heating 
costs are beyond the control of some 
households. The nature, location, size and 
characteristics of the dwelling, lack of 
access to lower cost fuel through being 
off the gas grid, and difficulties in getting 
the best prices are all factors that can lock 
households into high costs. Our calculation 
is that households in or on the margins 
of poverty faced extra costs to keep 
warm above those for typical households 
with much higher incomes added up to 
£1.1 billion in 2009.
4. Linked to this concern is the fact that doing 
something about the costs side of the 
equation – largely this means improving 
energy efficiency – can be a cost-effective 
and sustained way of improving living 
conditions for those on low incomes.
5. The health issues associated with living 
in the cold are another preoccupation 
for those concerned by fuel poverty. Not 
all of the health concerns relate to cold 
indoor temperatures – exposure to the 
cold outdoors is also important. And not 
all cold indoor temperatures are linked to 
fuel poverty. But as we discuss in Chapter 
3 even if, on a conservative estimate, only 
a tenth of excess winter deaths are linked 
to cold indoor temperatures caused by fuel 
poverty, this is more than the level of fatal 
road accidents. Beyond mortality caused by 
fuel poverty, there is evidence of negative 
physical and mental health impacts of fuel 
poverty. Reducing the incidence of health 
and well-being problems caused by fuel 
Conclusion and 
questions for  
consultation
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poverty would reduce demands on the 
NHS, although the scale of these benefits is 
not easy to calculate.
6. The issue of fuel poverty also ties in 
strongly with the urgent need to tackle 
climate change, as part of which a priority 
is to improve energy efficiency standards in 
UK homes in order to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions. But climate change policy 
delivery is made more difficult by the 
existence of fuel poverty. If the price 
mechanism is used to encourage carbon 
reduction, some low-income householders 
face disproportionate costs, but the 
capital investment needed to bring about 
efficiency improvements and carbon 
savings is beyond them. If carbon emissions 
from these households are to be reduced, 
assistance will be needed. Once made, 
interventions should have a sustained 
impact on the costs they face and then in 
a combination of warmer homes and their 
own carbon reductions.
7. For all these reasons, fuel poverty is clearly 
a distinct problem.
8. Given this conclusion, the question then 
follows of how to measure the problem. 
While doing something about it is obviously 
the priority, measurement matters, so 
that changes in the scale and depth of 
the problem can be understood, policies 
designed effectively to address it, and the 
impact of interventions made ascertained.
9. In Chapters 5, 6 and 7 we set out the pros 
and cons of the current definition and of 
a range of modifications and alternative 
approaches. The current approach has a 
key strength: its focus on required, not 
actual, energy spend. In any modification 
of the definition this should be retained. 
However, the precise form of the 
indicator – based on a ratio against a fixed 
threshold – gives it certain weaknesses. It 
generates, for instance, a trend over the 
last fifteen years – a rapid decline followed 
by an equally rapid rise – which does not 
reflect what happened in the underlying 
causes of the problem. This is because 
while the indicator is affected by each 
of the three drivers (household income, 
energy efficiency and fuel prices) of fuel 
poverty, it is dominated by fuel prices to 
the extent that the impact of changes in 
the others can barely be discerned. One 
way of understanding this weakness is by 
considering that the trends generated by 
the current definition reflect two aspects 
of the problem – its extent and its depth – 
simultaneously. It would be more helpful to 
separate them.
10. We also discuss how the ratio basis of the 
current definition and its measurement 
against a fixed threshold make its results 
highly sensitive to the precise assumptions 
made in relation to the data on which it 
is based.
11. After examining a series of possible 
modifications and alternatives to the 
current approach in Chapter 6, we 
conclude that while they each bring 
insights to understanding the problem, 
they also have weaknesses. We therefore 
explore in Chapter 7 whether there is a way 
of building on the strengths of the current 
definition, but to use the information on 
which it is based in a different way. This is 
to look more directly at what is described 
in WHECA and in everyday discussions of 
what fuel poverty is and how to tackle it: 
to focus on households which both have 
low incomes and have high costs.
12. This kind of ‘Low Income-High Costs’ 
indicator would use the existing datasets 
and needs-based energy model both to 
show the number of households and 
individuals affected by fuel poverty, and 
to show the depth of the problem – their 
CHAPTER 8 
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last fifteen years shown would be similar 
under the low income-high costs indicator. 
However at times some households that 
are currently classed as fuel poor would not 
be so under this approach. In particular, 
there are some households with such 
low reported incomes that they would 
currently be classed as fuel poor, even 
if they had very energy efficient homes. 
Such households are clearly a very high 
priority for assistance of some kind: they 
are deep in poverty, for instance, because 
they are not receiving the benefits to which 
they are entitled, or are only entitled to 
benefits that leave them well short of the 
poverty line. What is not clear, however, is 
whether it is helpful to class them as ‘fuel 
poor’. They do not – on the face of it – fit 
the WHECA description of having above 
reasonable costs to keep warm. There is 
rather little that further energy efficiency 
improvements can do to help. Rather they 
urgently need higher incomes.
16. Looked at in this way, the underlying 
problem of fuel poverty did not almost 
disappear in the early 2000s, but nor has 
progress almost entirely been reversed. 
This is not necessarily a huge comfort: 
a reduction only from 2.9 to 2.7 million 
households (and from 5.1 to 4.8 million 
individuals) affected by such a serious 
problem over thirteen years is deeply 
disappointing, as is the major increase in 
the depth of the problem in the last six 
years, as measured by the fuel poverty gap. 
It is hardly on track for its elimination in 
five years’ time.
17. As we have explained , there are different 
ways of looking at this problem, and 
different choices that could be made if the 
approach we propose were implemented. 
We would welcome views on the analysis 
and ideas presented in this report, and give 
some specific questions for consultation 
individual and collective fuel poverty gaps. 
Under this approach, fuel poverty exists 
where a household has above reasonable 
costs of warmth and where meeting those 
costs would push it below an income 
threshold. To show its results, we have 
modelled this indicator using specific 
thresholds for income and costs, but other 
choices could be made.
13. Like the current definition, this approach 
responds to changes in income, energy 
efficiency and fuel prices. However, it 
does so in a way which more evenly 
reflects all three drivers. For example, the 
impact of fuel price increases is shown 
in an increased fuel poverty gap and in 
a number of households on the margins 
being pushed into fuel poverty. However, 
price increases do not dominate or lead to 
great swings in the number of fuel poor 
households identified. At the same time 
if prices fell, the core extent of the fuel 
poverty problem would remain visible but 
the fuel poverty gap would show how 
the depth of fuel poverty for individual 
households was reduced.
14. Using the data available, this approach 
would suggest that the extent of fuel 
poverty has been on a slow downward 
trajectory since 1996, but with a wide 
fluctuation in fuel poverty gaps, at their 
lowest in 2003 and at essentially the same 
peak levels in 1996 and 2009. We believe 
this reflects the structural issues at the 
heart of fuel poverty. Our understanding 
of the evidence suggests that the extent 
of the fuel poverty problem had not 
been reduced by three-quarters by 2004, 
compared to 1996. But equally it has 
not increased by more than three times 
since 2004.
15. Compared to the current definition, the 
average level of fuel poverty over the 
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in Box 8.1. In the final report we will 
discuss the response to these, how they 
inform our final recommendations, and 
look at the implications of the definition 
for understanding the effectiveness of the 
range of policy interventions available to 
tackle fuel poverty.
Box	8.1	Consultation	on	the	interim	report
Above we have set out our view that fuel poverty is a distinct and serious problem which is well 
described by the Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act (WHECA). We have also argued 
that the current definition used to assess changes in the problems has some serious weaknesses 
alongside its various strengths. We have therefore discussed and analysed modifications and 
alternatives to it, including the combination of a Low Income-High Costs and fuel poverty gap 
indicator. We would welcome views on the analysis we have presented and the conclusions drawn 
from it.
In our final report we will make recommendations on the issues explored in this report, and look at 
issues covered by the review’s terms of reference that have not been explored in this report, notably 
implications for assessing the effectiveness of policies.
Consultation	questions
We welcome general views on the report, but in particular we would be interested in responses to 
the following questions:
a. Do you agree with the conclusion that the problem of fuel poverty is, as set out in 
WHECA, centred around the combination of low incomes and required energy costs above 
reasonable levels?
b. Does Chapter 3 set out a comprehensive analysis of health and well being impacts associated 
with fuel poverty? Is there further compelling evidence relating to those impacts discussed or 
others that the review would benefit from considering?
c. Do you agree with our analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the current fuel poverty 
indicator, as set out in Chapter 5, and of modifications and alternatives to it in Chapter 6?
d. Do you agree with our analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the approach based on a 
Low Income-High Costs indicator and fuel poverty gap, as set out in Chapter 7?
e. Do you have any views on the thresholds the review has used for the preferred indicator, as set 
out in Chapter 7 (and discussed further in Annex B)?
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Box	8.1	Consultation	on	the	interim	report	(continued)
Responding	to	the	consultation
Responses to these questions or further submissions of evidence should be sent to the review team 
no later than 18 November 2011. Submissions should be sent to:
Hills Fuel Poverty Review Secretariat
c/o Department of Energy and Climate Change
3 Whitehall Place
London
SW1A 2AW
Or
hillsfuelpovertyreview@decc.gsi.gov.uk
Confidentiality	and	data	protection
Information provided by you in response to this publication, including personal information, may be 
subject to publication or disclosure in accordance with the access to information regimes (these are 
primarily the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA), the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) and the 
Environmental Information Regulations 2004).
If you consider that information you provide should be treated in confidence, please provide the 
reasons for this when submitting your response. Your request will be considered in accordance 
with the FOIA and the code of practice. An automatic confidentiality disclaimer generated by your 
IT system will not, of itself, be regarded as binding on the Department.
The Department will process your personal data in accordance with the DPA.
If you have any comments or complaints about the call for evidence process, please e-mail: 
consultation.coordinator@decc.gsi.gov.uk. 
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Causes of  
fuel poverty 
Terms of Reference
Annex A
Independent Review
The terms of reference for the review are:
1) To consider fuel poverty from first principles: 
to determine the nature of the issues at its 
core, including the extent to which fuel poverty 
is distinct from poverty, and the detriment it 
causes.
2) As appropriate and subject to the findings 
under (1), to develop possible formulations for 
a future definition and any associated form of 
target, which would best contribute to:
•	 addressing the underlying causes 
identified;
•	 helping Government focus its resources 
(which are set out in the Spending 
Review for the period to 2014-15) 
and policies on those who need most 
support;
•	 measuring the cost-effectiveness of 
different interventions in contributing to 
progress towards any target; and
•	 developing practical solutions, 
particularly around identification 
and targeting of households and 
measuring progress resulting from 
Government action.
The review is independent of Government. 
The review relates only to fuel poverty as 
regards England.
reference
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Causes of  
fuel poverty 
hapter notes
(2)  The Secretary of State (as respects 
England) or the National Assembly 
for Wales (as respects Wales) may by 
regulations—
 (a)  specify what is to be regarded for 
the purposes of subsection (1) as a 
lower income or a reasonable cost 
or the circumstances in which a 
home is to be regarded for those 
purposes as being warm, or
 (b)  substitute for the definition in 
subsection (1) such other definition 
as may be specified in the 
regulations.
(3)  Before making regulations under 
subsection (2), the Secretary of State or 
the National Assembly for Wales shall 
consult—
 (a)  persons appearing to the Secretary 
of State or the Assembly to 
represent the interests of persons 
living in fuel poverty, and
 (b)   such other persons as the Secretary 
of State or the Assembly thinks fit.
B.1 Review Background 
and Fuel Poverty in 
Context (Chapter 1)
The Warm Homes and Energy 
Conservation Act 2000
1. The full text of the Act is as follows:
Warm Homes and Energy Conservation 
Act 2000
An Act to require the Secretary of State 
to publish and implement a strategy for 
reducing fuel poverty; to require the setting 
of targets for the implementation of that 
strategy; and for connected purposes.
[23rd November 2000]
Be it enacted by the Queen’s most 
Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice 
and consent of the Lords Spiritual and 
Temporal, and Commons, in this present 
Parliament assembled, and by the authority 
of the same, as follows:—
1 Meaning of “fuel poverty”
(1)  For the purposes of this Act, a person 
is to be regarded as living “in fuel 
poverty” if he is a member of a 
household living on a lower income in 
a home which cannot be kept warm at 
reasonable cost.
Annex B
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(4)  In preparing the strategy or any 
revision of the strategy, the appropriate 
authority shall consult—
 (a)   local authorities or associations of 
local authorities,
 (b)   persons appearing to the 
appropriate authority to represent 
the interests of persons living in fuel 
poverty,
 (c)   the Gas and Electricity Markets 
Authority and the Gas and 
Electricity Consumer Council, and
 (d)   such other persons as the 
appropriate authority thinks fit.
(5)  The appropriate authority shall 
take such steps as are in its opinion 
necessary to implement the strategy.
(6)  The appropriate authority shall—
 (a)   from time to time assess the impact 
of steps taken under subsection (5) 
and the progress made in achieving 
the objectives and meeting the 
target dates,
 (b)   make any revision of the strategy 
which the authority considers 
appropriate in consequence of the 
assessment,
 (c)   from time to time publish reports 
on such assessments.
(7)  If the appropriate authority revises the 
strategy, it shall publish the strategy as 
revised.
(8)  In this section—
 “the appropriate authority” means—
 (a)   as respects England, the Secretary 
of State, and
(4)  Regulations under subsection (2) shall 
be made by statutory instrument; and 
a statutory instrument containing such 
regulations made by the Secretary of 
State shall be subject to annulment 
in pursuance of a resolution of either 
House of Parliament.
2 Strategy relating to fuel poverty
(1)  It shall be the duty of the appropriate 
authority to prepare and publish, 
before the end of the period of twelve 
months beginning with the relevant 
commencement, a strategy setting out 
the authority’s policies for ensuring, by 
means including the taking of measures 
to ensure the efficient use of energy, 
that as far as reasonably practicable 
persons do not live in fuel poverty.
(2) The strategy must—
 (a)   describe the households to which it 
applies,
 (b)   specify a comprehensive package 
of measures for ensuring the 
efficient use of energy, such as 
the installation of appropriate 
equipment or insulation,
 (c)   specify interim objectives to be 
achieved and target dates for 
achieving them, and
 (d)   specify a target date for achieving 
the objective of ensuring that as far 
as reasonably practicable persons in 
England or Wales do not live in fuel 
poverty.
(3)  The target date specified under 
subsection (2)(d) must be not more 
than fifteen years after the date on 
which the strategy is published.
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(2)  This Act may be cited as the Warm 
Homes and Energy Conservation 
Act 2000.
(3)  Section 2 shall not come into force 
as respects Wales until such day as 
the National Assembly for Wales 
may by order made by statutory 
instrument appoint.
(4)  This Act extends to England and 
Wales only.
WHECA – judicial review
2. A case for judicial review of WHECA was 
brought in 2008 against a backdrop of 
rising fuel poverty numbers. Friends of 
the Earth and Help the Aged1 maintained 
that the Government – the defendants2 
– had failed to meet their duties under 
subsections 2(5) and 2(6) of WHECA. They 
argued that the Act gave the defendants 
flexibility in terms of “selecting the route 
but not the destination” in terms of the Act 
and the 2001 Strategy. They accused the 
Government of “diluting an imperative into 
a broad policy discretion” and of “not doing 
what is reasonably practicable to achieve the 
targets because of budgetary constraint in 
allocating funds to possible measures.”
3. The Government argued that it was 
“already taking all measures which 
were reasonably practicable to meet the 
2010 and 2016 targets set out in the 
strategy” and that it was not “reasonably 
practicable” to take all of the measures 
that would be required to eradicate 
fuel poverty, as such measures “are 
not necessarily cost effective” and “the 
resources are not available to pay for them 
all at the present time.”
1 The successor organisation to Help the Aged is Age UK.
2 At the time of the original case in 2008, the defendants 
were the Secretaries of State at Defra and BERR. At the time 
of the appeal, the sole defendant was the Secretary of State 
at DECC.
 (b)   as respects Wales, the National 
Assembly for Wales;
  “the relevant commencement” 
means—
 (a)   as respects England, the day on 
which this Act is passed, and
 (b)  as respects Wales, the day on which 
this section comes into force as 
respects Wales.
(9)  In relation to any time before the 
commencement of section 3(1) of 
the Utilities Act 2000, the reference 
in subsection (4)(c) to the M1Gas and 
Electricity Markets Authority and the 
Gas and Electricity Consumer Council 
shall have effect as a reference to the 
Director General of Gas Supply and the 
Director General of Electricity Supply.
3 Expenses
  There shall be paid out of money 
provided by Parliament—
 (a)   any expenses of the Secretary of 
State under this Act; and.
 (b)   any increase attributable to this 
Act in the sums payable under any 
other Act.
4   Interpretation, short title, 
commencement and extent.
(1)  In this Act “local authority” means—
 (a)   in relation to England, the council 
of a county, district or London 
borough, the Common Council of 
the City of London or the Council of 
the Isles of Scilly, and
 (b)  in relation to Wales, the council of 
a county or county borough.
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8. Of prime relevance, and framed through 
this legislation, is the role of Ofgem 
in regulating the energy markets. The 
Authority’s principal objective is:
to protect the interests of existing and 
future consumers in relation to gas 
conveyed through pipes and electricity 
conveyed by distribution or transmission 
systems. The interests of such consumers 
are their interests taken as a whole, 
including their interests in the reduction 
of greenhouse gases and in the security 
of the supply of gas and electricity 
to them.5
9. When performing its duties, Ofgem must 
also “have regard to the interests of 
individuals who are disabled or chronically 
sick, of pensionable age, with low incomes, 
or residing in rural areas.”6
10. Ofgem must also have regard to 
environmental and social guidance 
published by the Secretary of State. The 
most recent version of this guidance was 
issued in January 2010. The guidance sets 
out the Government’s expectation that 
Ofgem will “take a strong lead in co-
ordinating and ensuring that consumers 
on low incomes (or who are otherwise 
vulnerable to fuel poverty) are able to 
benefit from competitive markets.”7
11. Specific measures listed in the 
guidance are:
•	 the promotion of transparent charging;
•	 ensuring there are no unnecessary 
barriers to switching;
5 http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/About%20us/Authority/Pages/
TheAuthority.aspx
6 Utilities Act 2000. Available at: http://www.legislation.gov.
uk/ukpga/2000/27/contents
7 Available at: http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/
meeting_energy/markets/regulation/regulation.aspx
4. In his judgment3 The Hon Mr Justice 
McCombe dismissed the claimants’ 
argument that the Government had 
breached its duty under WHECA by taking 
budgetary considerations into account. 
He concluded,
Parliament obliged the Secretary of 
State to formulate a policy strategy to 
ensure, so far as reasonably practicable, 
the desired objectives. It required him 
to publish his aspirations by way of 
targets. It then required the government 
to take the steps which in its opinion 
were necessary to implement the policy 
strategy. Government took up the 
challenge by (amongst other things) 
specifying that it would try, so far as 
reasonably practicable, to achieve 
the targets. In doing so, it imported a 
statutory duty to make those efforts. 
It did not assume a statutory duty to 
achieve the desired results, whatever 
the cost.
5. In July 2009, the civil division of the 
Court of Appeal heard an appeal against 
the original judgement. This appeal was 
dismissed.4
Further information on the 
legislative context
6. Chapter One introduced some of the 
legislation that is relevant to fuel poverty. 
The following sub-section provides 
additional information.
Energy market regulation
7. There is a range of regulation in place 
affecting the energy market.
3 http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2008/2518.
html
4 http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2009/810.html
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Parliament on the UK’s progress towards 
targets and budgets.
14. There is a specific provision in the Act 
relating to fuel poverty. The Act states 
that the Secretary of State, when taking 
decisions on carbon budgets, and 
the Committee on Climate Change, 
when considering its advice on such 
decisions, must take into account “social 
circumstances, and in particular the likely 
impact of the decision on fuel poverty.”
European legislation
15. In 2009, the European Parliament and the 
Council of Ministers adopted a range of 
legislative measures based on proposals 
from the European Commission as part 
of its so-called third package of energy 
market measures. Of particular relevance 
to the issue of fuel poverty are two 
Directives – one relating to gas9 and one 
relating to electricity10 – which contain 
similar provisions on consumer protection, 
including protection of vulnerable 
consumers. The Directives refer to the issue 
of “energy poverty” and require Member 
States to take certain types of measure, as 
illustrated by this section taken from the 
electricity Directive:
Article 7
Member States shall take appropriate 
measures to protect final customers, 
and shall, in particular, ensure that there 
are adequate safeguards to protect 
vulnerable customers. In this context, 
each Member State shall define the 
concept of vulnerable customers which 
9 Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for 
the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 
2003/55/EC
10 Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the 
internal market in electricity and repealing Directive  
2003/54/EC
•	 ensuring that consumers do not suffer 
undue economic disadvantage as a result 
of their payment method;
•	 addressing issues which have a particular 
impact on low income and vulnerable 
consumers and those in receipt of 
Pension Credit;
•	 working to reduce levels of 
disconnections and arrears and to 
eradicate mis-selling;
•	 monitoring energy supply companies’ 
social programmes;
•	 developing incentive mechanisms to 
encourage gas network extensions 
where appropriate.
Climate Change Act 2008
12. This Act8 became law in late 2008 and 
established a legally binding target of at 
least an 80 per cent cut in UK greenhouse 
gas emissions by 2050 as well as a target 
of a reduction of at least 34 per cent 
by 2020, both against a 1990 baseline. 
Underpinning the delivery of this target is a 
system of carbon budgets that puts a limit 
on emissions over five-year periods. The 
first three budgets (2008-12, 2013-17 and 
2018-22) were set in May 2009. In 2011, 
the Government made initial proposals for 
the fourth carbon budget (2023-27) which 
are currently going through Parliament. The 
Government must report to Parliament its 
policies and proposals to meet the budgets.
13. The Act also created the Committee on 
Climate Change (CCC), an independent, 
expert body that advises the Government 
on the level of carbon budgets and on 
where cost-effective savings can be 
made. The CCC submits annual reports to 
8 Available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/27/
contents
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prepare new national measures to address 
“energy poverty”, it can be seen that 
this new European legislation does not 
significantly alter the policy landscape 
in England, where the issue has been 
subject to domestic policies for more than 
a decade.
17. The review team understands that there is 
an effort underway within the European 
Commission to develop a measure of 
“energy poverty” that can apply across 
the European Union. We hope that the 
European Commission will find material of 
interest in this report in developing such 
a measure.
Changes to fuel poverty 
measurement
18. Changes to the measurement of fuel 
poverty are made annually. In general, 
there are two types of changes:
•	 amendments to the English Housing 
Survey (EHS) that in turn affect the input 
data for the fuel poverty calculation;
•	 improvements in the precise 
methodology used to model bills or 
income, as endorsed by the Fuel Poverty 
Methodology Group.
19. Changes to the EHS happen routinely 
and tend to have a fairly small effect on 
the fuel poverty numbers. For example, 
in recent years, DCLG improved the 
recording of income from savings in the 
EHS, by changing the bands available for 
interviewees to choose from. This will 
have had a very small impact on DECC’s 
measurement of fuel poverty.
20. Changes in the modelling methodology 
itself can have a larger impact and tend to 
happen less frequently, for example as a 
may refer to energy poverty and, inter 
alia, to the prohibition of disconnection 
of electricity to such customers in critical 
times. Member States shall ensure 
that rights and obligations linked to 
vulnerable customers are applied. In 
particular, they shall take measures to 
protect final customers in remote areas. 
They shall ensure high levels of consumer 
protection, particularly with respect to 
transparency regarding contractual terms 
and conditions, general information and 
dispute settlement mechanisms. Member 
States shall ensure that the eligible 
customer is in fact able easily to switch to 
a new supplier. [...]
Article 8
Member States shall take appropriate 
measures, such as formulating national 
energy action plans, providing benefits 
in social security systems to ensure the 
necessary electricity supply to vulnerable 
customers, or providing for support 
for energy efficiency improvements, to 
address energy poverty where identified, 
including in the broader context 
of poverty.
16. In its consultation document relating to 
the transposition of these Directives into 
UK law11 DECC explained that the current 
policy and legal framework in the UK met 
the requirements of these Directives in 
these areas. It explained that the 2001 UK 
Fuel Poverty Strategy defined vulnerability, 
as required by the EU legislation, and 
pointed to additional elements of the UK’s 
framework, such as Ofgem’s statutory 
duties (see above). Whereas for certain 
Member States, it will be necessary to 
11 The consultation is available at: http://www.decc.gov.
uk/assets/decc/consultations/eu-third-package/586-eu-
third-package-condoc2.pdf. It is understood that DECC 
will confirm this position when it informs the European 
Commission of how the UK has transposed the Directives 
into UK law.
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impact on fuel poverty in the year of 
introduction, the overall effect was to 
reduce average incomes compared with the 
old method, and in general lead to a rise in 
fuel poverty, and the depth (or severity) of 
fuel poverty. Therefore, this change would 
also affect the size of any fuel poverty gap 
that incorporates income.
2007 changes
24. Introduction of the half house, standard 
heating regime. Previously households were 
assigned one of three heating regimes, 
and assumed to heat their whole house 
for either the whole day or only part of the 
day, or to heat half of their house for the 
whole day. The new regime assumed that 
employed households living in a property 
large for their needs would heat only part 
of the dwelling for part of the day. This 
led to a small reduction in total energy 
consumption and therefore fuel poverty.
25. Some improvements to the recording 
of income from savings and benefits
2008 changes
26. Changes to the source data used for 
producing average prices for non metered 
(coal and solid fuel and heating oil) fuels. 
This had only a very small impact on 
modelled bills.
27. A further complication is the way that 
changes are made. The fuel poverty 
data are based on two years of EHS data 
combined with the oldest year in each 
combined dataset remaining unchanged 
from the previous year. Therefore changes 
in methodology will only affect one half 
of the data in the year of introduction, 
and will take two years to fully impact on 
the data. Changes in the methodology 
result of the peer review recommendations, 
or when new research brings to light 
evidence that can improve the current 
method. For example, changes to the 
imputation of low incomes in 2006, 
which became more aligned with DWP’s 
Households Below Average Income 
statistics. The list below summarises some 
of the main changes that have been made 
since the peer review of methodology 
in 2004.
2005 changes
21. Changes to modelling of fuel consumption, 
with the addition of an algorithm to 
better allow for ‘thermal bridging’. 
DECC quantified this as a large impact 
on fuel poverty, increasing modelled fuel 
consumption for space heating for all 
households and leading to a rise at the 
time (holding other things equal) of more 
than 100,000 households in the existing 
measurement of fuel poverty. The impact 
is likely to vary with the measurement, and 
one that places additional emphasis on fuel 
costs will show a larger impact than one 
that reduces their emphasis.
2006 changes
22. Changes to the period of the source data 
for average prices for metered fuels to 
bring the period in to line with the EHS 
collection period. This coincided with a 
period of large price rises, in turn increasing 
the number of fuel poor households in 
2006 by over 100,000.
23. Changes to the method of income 
imputation for low income households, 
resulting in fewer imputations to income 
and more households with very low 
incomes (including for the first time 
some households with zero and negative 
incomes). Although this had only a small 
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will mean that holding everything else 
constant, the level of fuel poverty will 
change. This will affect the official level 
of fuel poverty as published by DECC 
and will also impact on the alternative 
measurements we have compiled in 
this report.
B.2 Payment methods 
for electricity (Chapter 2)
28. Figures 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9 in Section 2.3 
showed payment methods for gas for 
UK households by household type, 
income group and tenure. Below are the 
corresponding charts for electricity.
% of households
Source: Fuel poverty statistics, 2011, DECC
Figure B.1: Methods of payment for electricity by 
household type, 2009, England
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% of households
Source: Fuel poverty statistics, 2011, (DECC)
Figure B.3: Methods of payment for electricity by tenure, 
2009, England
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
 Standard credit 
 Pre payment 
 Direct debit 
 Private rented  Owner occupied  RSL  Local authority 
Tenure of property
% of households
Source: Fuel poverty statistics, 2011, (DECC)
Figure B.2: Methods of payment for electricity by income 
group, 2009, England
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31. Understanding composition by household 
type is a key element of effective policy 
design. Different types of household can 
be targeted in practice in different ways, 
for example on the basis of broad benefit 
eligibility, the approach currently preferred 
by the Government. So, where an indicator 
captures a large proportion of pensioner 
households, there would be an incentive to 
use eligibility for given pensioner benefits 
to be used as a proxy means of targeting 
fuel poverty policy. We will examine the 
targeting of fuel poverty policies in our 
final report and expect to show the extent 
to which the current proxies used in policy 
design would identify the same households 
as those identified as fuel poor under our 
proposed indicator.
Composition by household 
type
32. Figure B.4 and Figure B.5 show total 
number of households captured by each 
indicator broken down by household type 
in 2004 and 2009. The detailed numbers 
underpinning these figures are then given 
in Table B.1 and Table B.2.
B.3 Composition under 
each indicator (Chapters 
5, 6 & 7)
29. This Annex provides details on the 
composition by household type and by 
region for each indicator examined in this 
report. It would be more appropriate to 
count the number of individuals affected 
by this problem – in the spirit of WHECA 
– but we present this information by 
number of households for comparative 
purposes. Evidently, if one indicator 
finds proportionally more multi-person 
households than another one, the total 
number of people affected will be higher 
under the former.
30. It is worth recalling that each 
indicator identifies the extent of the 
problem differently and in different ways. 
The breakdowns given here need to be 
considered in the perspective of varying 
overall numbers (see Figures 6.7 and 
7.4). Further, although a comparison of 
the household composition under each 
measure is of some interest, particularly 
in comparison to the current indicator of 
fuel poverty, there is no sense in which 
any particular distribution should be seen 
as desirable. It is our view that the right 
indicator will identify the right household 
types. At the very least, an indicator 
designed to reflect the core problem, 
with thresholds and other characteristic 
elements fixed accordingly, is likely to lead 
to the correct identification of the type of 
household affected.
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% of group made up by household type
Fuel Poverty datasets, 2004 and 2009 (DECC)
Figure B.5: Proportion of households by type identified by 
each indicator, 2009, England
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Figure B.4: Proportion of households by type identified by 
each indicator, 2004, England
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Table B.1: Number of households (000s) identified by each indicator by household type, 2004, England
Couple 
with 
child(ren)
Couple 
(over 60) 
no  
child(ren)
Couple 
(under 
60) no  
child(ren)
Lone 
parent 
with 
child(ren)
One 
person 
(over 60)
One 
person 
(under 
60)
Other 
multi-
person 
household TOTAL
Current definition 54 134 108 91 450 356 44 1,236
After housing costs  96  67  113  150  296  564  94 1,379 
Twice median 355 630 277 444 1,340 811 224 4,081
After fuel costs 1,107 572 394 895 909 831 353 5,061
Low SAP/low income 359 278 180 297 506 369 154 2,143
Low income/High costs 187 334 188 408 854 762 115 2,847
Fuel Poverty datasets, 2004 and 2009 (DECC)
Table B.2: Number of households (000s) identified by each indicator by household type, 2009, England
Couple 
with 
child(ren)
Couple 
(over 60) 
no  
child(ren)
Couple 
(under 
60) no  
child(ren)
Lone 
parent 
with 
child(ren)
One 
person 
(over 60)
One 
person 
(under 
60)
Other 
multi-
person 
household TOTAL
Current definition 381 733 281 347 1,184 763 275 3,964
After housing costs  485  425  300  466  815  983  261  3,735 
Twice median 494 891 350 444 1,412 916 337 4,844
After fuel costs 1,122 683 469 968 457 937 450 5,086
Low SAP/low income 508 312 218 335 132 332 207 2,044
Low income/High costs 216 394 172 415 555 836 128 2,716
Fuel Poverty datasets, 2004 and 2009 (DECC)
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Composition by region
33. Figure B.6 and Figure B.7 show total 
number of households captured by each 
indicator broken down by English region 
in 2004 and 2009. The detailed numbers 
underpinning these figures are then given 
in Table B.3 and Table B.4.
% of group in region
Source: DECC (for current definition); own calculations for other indicators
Figure B.7: Proportion of households by region identified 
each indicator, 2009, England
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Figure B.6: Proportion of households by region identified 
by each indicator, 2004, England
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Table B.3: Number of households (000s) identified by each indicator by region, 2004, England
  EE EM L NE NW SE SW WM YH TOTAL
Current definition 141 141 119 103 190 133 134 153 163 1,236
After housing costs 141  103  233  85  182  171  164  156  145  1,379 
Twice median 409 371 420 329 639 481 408 493 531 4,081
After fuel costs 483 397 902 321 718 616 480 573 570 5,061
Low SAP/low income 208 205 281 101 301 249 251 290 257 2,143
Low income/High costs 271 223 390 208 430 350 309 333 334 2,847
Source: DECC (current definition); own calculations for other indicators
Key: EE – East of England; EM – East Midland; L – London; NE – North East; NW – North West; SE – South East; SW – South West;  
WM – West Midlands; YH – Yorkshire and Humber
Table B.4: Numbers of households (000s) by region identified by each indicator, 2009, England
  EM EM L NE NW SE SW WM YH TOTAL
Current definition 388 398 402 272 649 411 411 589 444 3,964
After housing costs  364  347  584  230  576  419  355  483  378  3,735 
Twice median 464 475 502 330 812 525 501 690 544 4,844
After fuel costs 475 447 918 281 749 621 462 620 512 5,086
Low SAP/low income 213 231 345 102 258 242 196 273 184 2,044
Low income/High/costs 253 274 348 187 444 305 281 355 270 2,716
Source: DECC (current definition); own calculations for other indicators
Key: EM – EE – East of England; East Midland; L – London; NE – North East; NW – North West; SE – South East; SW – South West;  
WM – West Midlands; YH – Yorkshire and Humber
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Options for setting the 
threshold between reasonable 
and unreasonable costs
37. How the threshold for reasonable costs 
relates to household size is a big issue. 
There are various options for setting the 
thresholds for unreasonable energy costs. 
These include (but are not limited to):
(a) a common unadjusted threshold (e.g. 
the median modelled energy bill for all 
households);
(b) thresholds set by what modelling 
shows to be the median value for each 
household type; and
(c) thresholds derived from the median 
equivalised modelled bill (the option we 
use in Chapter 7) or in some other way.
38. The following sections set out how these 
thresholds might work alongside some of 
the pros and cons of each approach.
A common unadjusted threshold
39.  One option would be to set the threshold 
on the basis of the median modelled 
energy bill for all households.
40. A single threshold of this nature would not 
reflect the needs of different household 
types very well as it applies the same 
test of reasonableness to small and large 
households.
B.4 Low income high 
cost indicator thresholds 
(Chapter 7)
Threshold setting under this 
indicator
34. Chapter 7 set out a possible definition of 
fuel poverty based on the overlap between 
lower income and unreasonable costs. As 
discussed in the chapter, the definition 
requires two thresholds to be set, one for 
income and one for costs.
35. Our approach to the income threshold 
is based on after housing costs incomes, 
adjusted for household size and 
composition, as used in DWP’s HBAI 
analysis. We take a ‘lower income’ to mean 
below a threshold based on 60 per cent of 
median income after housing costs, plus 
each household’s modelled energy bill. This 
value will be affected by changes in fuel 
prices and in energy efficiency standards in 
homes. As such, the threshold will change 
over time. Although there would be other 
ways of setting this threshold, we do not 
examine them here.
36. The approach we have taken to the 
calculation of the costs threshold is set 
out in some detail in Chapter 7. However, 
below we consider a range of possible 
approaches to this issue. We also comment 
further on certain aspects of the way we 
have conducted our calculations. The 
judgement involved is important and we 
would therefore particularly welcome views 
on this issue.
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and the more energy efficient family of 
four is not (£1,300 compared to £1,500).
44. There are two main problems with this 
approach. First, it would require the 
calculation, in effect, of a wide range 
of thresholds, reflecting the diversity 
of household size and composition in 
England. This would include household 
types with relatively few observations. 
Second, within any given household type, 
one half of households would always 
have unreasonable costs. This could lead 
to some perverse findings. For instance, 
many lone parents live in relatively 
energy efficient social housing. For such 
households the median bill may be rather 
low compared to similarly sized households 
of other types.
Thresholds based on the median 
adjusted modelled bill
45.  Another way to take account of the 
needs of different households would be to 
adjust the modelled bills using some form 
of equivalence scale. Equivalence scales 
are commonly used when comparing the 
incomes of different households where 
they are used to adjust net household 
income to reflect household composition. 
Of relevance here, they also have the 
advantage of overcoming difficulties 
relating to sample size.
46. Official poverty and income distribution 
statistics use the OECD equivalence scale in 
which a couple with no children is taken as 
the benchmark with an equivalence scale 
of 1.0 and a single adult household has an 
equivalence scale of 0.58 (i.e. the single 
person household only requires 58 per 
cent of the income of the couple without 
children to attain the same standard of 
living).
41. For example, suppose that the median 
modelled household energy bill is £800 for 
a single person, £1,500 for a family of four 
and £1,200 for all households. Suppose that 
there are two households: one is a single 
person in a low energy-efficiency home, 
with a modelled energy bill of £1,100 and 
the other is a family of four in an energy-
efficient home with a modelled energy bill 
of £1,300. The use of a single threshold for 
unreasonable costs set at £1,200 would 
mean that the one-person household is 
not classed as facing unreasonable costs 
whereas the family of four is. This is in spite 
of the fact that the family of four faces low 
costs relative to similar types of households 
(and vice versa for the one-person 
household). This suggests that we may 
want to consider a more sophisticated costs 
threshold that takes account of household 
size and composition (and, therefore, 
household needs).
Thresholds set by what modelling 
shows is the median energy bill for 
each household type
42. One option to reflect the varying needs 
of different households would be to set 
different thresholds for each household 
type. For example, the threshold for 
unreasonable costs for a one-person 
household could be based on the median 
modelled energy cost for all one-person 
households.
43. Based on the simple two household 
examples used above this would mean that 
the threshold for a one-person household 
would be set at £800 and the threshold for 
a family of four would be £1,500. These 
thresholds would mean that the low energy 
efficiency one-person household is facing 
unreasonable costs (£1,100 compared to 
£800, giving a fuel poverty gap of £300) 
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age of 14) the threshold becomes £1,680 
(£1,200 x 1.4).  The low-efficiency one-
person household would therefore be 
facing unreasonable costs (a bill of £1,100 
compared to the threshold of £696) and, 
assuming income below the threshold, 
would have a fuel poverty gap of £404.  
The family of four would not be facing 
unreasonable costs (a bill of £1,300 
compared to the threshold of £1,680).
49. The key advantage of equivalising the 
modelled bills is that the judgement about 
whether a household is facing reasonable 
costs allows for the varying needs of 
different household types, avoiding the 
problems with the first option, albeit at the 
cost of some added complexity. It could 
also be argued the OECD After Housing 
Costs equivalisation factors (as used for the 
modelling in Chapter 7) are not necessarily 
appropriate. It may be that the additional 
energy spending that is required to take 
account of each additional member of 
the household would not be the same as 
the additional amount of income that is 
required for additional household members 
to maintain an overall standard of living. 
Equivalising the modelled bills could then 
require a bespoke set of factors created 
for this purpose, but this would add 
considerable complication.
50. For the purposes of checking the extent 
to which fuel poverty concerns the 
relativity between incomes and required 
fuel spending in some form there is also 
an intuitive appeal in using the same way 
of adjusting for household size in looking 
at both incomes and costs. Indeed using 
different scales could produce some 
anomalous results.
47. Relating this idea to the notion of 
reasonable costs under the low income – 
high costs indicator would mean applying 
equivalence factors to the modelled energy 
bills for all households, from which the 
median would then be taken. Household 
equivalence factors would then be applied 
to the median figure to give a different 
cost threshold for each different household 
(by size and composition). The modelled 
energy bill for each household would 
then be compared with the appropriate 
equivalised threshold. So a single person 
household’s bill would be compared with 
the equivalised threshold for a single 
person household. Where the modelled  
bill is higher than the equivalised threshold, 
the household faces unreasonable  
costs and would be in fuel poverty if 
household income fell below the income 
threshold. For such households, the 
difference between the modelled bill  
and the equivalised threshold is the fuel 
poverty gap.12
48. For example, suppose again that the 
equivalised median modelled household 
energy bill is £1,200 and that we use the 
OECD equivalisation After Housing Costs 
factors to adjust the threshold to reflect 
different household types.  For a single 
person household (equivalisation factor 
of 0.58) the threshold becomes £696 
(£1,200 x 0.58).  For the family of four 
(equivalisation factor of 1.4, assuming 
two adults and two children under the 
12  For technical convenience, in our modelling of the low 
income – high costs indicator we make these calculations in 
a slightly different way, but with exactly the same end-result. 
This consists of comparing each household’s equivalised 
modelled bill to the median equivalised modelled bill.  Where 
the former is higher than the latter, the household is taken 
as facing unreasonable costs. If household income is also 
below the threshold, the household is then classed as being 
in fuel poverty and the difference between its equivalised 
modelled bill and the median equivalised modelled bill is 
the fuel poverty gap, in terms of equivalised costs. We then 
convert the fuel poverty gaps back into cash amounts, 
reversing the equivalisation process. However, as a way of 
describing the process, the explanation above is intuitively 
somewhat easier to follow. 
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not, how the definition and associated 
target might be amended to address 
this;
•	 whether, and to what extent, the 
current definition of fuel poverty 
allows Government to focus resources 
and policies on those who most 
need support;
•	 the cost effectiveness of measures to 
address fuel poverty (including measures 
impacting on income, fuel bills and 
thermal efficiency of homes);
•	 how, under any definition, the fuel poor 
can be best identified and help targeted 
to them.
3. More than 60 organisations or individuals 
responded to the call for evidence. They 
are listed in Appendix 1, except where 
they have requested their response to 
be anonymous. This is a summary of the 
responses received.
Causes and Impacts
4. On the causes of fuel poverty, respondents 
identified three main drivers of fuel 
poverty: low income, energy inefficient 
homes and high fuel costs. The majority 
Summary of the  
responses o the 
call for evidence
Annex D
Background
1. In March 2011, the review launched a call 
for evidence asking for submissions of 
relevant evidence in order to inform our 
work. The review was asked to consider 
fuel poverty from first principles, to 
determine the nature of the issues at its 
core, the extent to which fuel poverty is 
distinct from poverty, and the detriment 
it causes. Secondly, and subject to those 
findings, the review was asked to develop 
possibly formulations for a future definition 
and any associated form of target. With 
that in mind the call for evidence asked for 
contributions to those areas.
2. Specifically, the call for evidence asked for 
evidence relating to:
•	 the nature of the issues at the core of 
fuel poverty;
•	 what makes fuel poverty distinct from 
poverty defined in various ways;
•	 the impact of fuel poverty, its extent and 
who it most affects;
•	 whether the current definition and 
target for fuel poverty allow the issue at 
its core to be tackled effectively and, if 
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•	 low income households, especially lone 
parents, pensioners, those living with 
long term illness or disability and carers. 
Some households with incomes above 
those considered to be “low” are also 
pushed into poverty by high bills;
•	 rural households, whose homes are 
typically harder to treat, are more likely 
to be off the gas grid, have lower 
than average wages or be in seasonal 
employment and incur high travel costs;
•	 Households in the private rented 
sector, where there may be barriers 
to the installation of energy efficiency 
measures, legal issues for leaseholders of 
flats and hard to treat homes.
What are the impacts of 
fuel poverty?
7. Respondents highlighted a range of 
impacts, both physical and non-physical.
8. Although one respondent noted that there 
is still a lack of understanding around 
health impacts, many were supportive of 
the findings of the Marmot Review. Specific 
impacts cited were:
•	 200,000 unnecessary hospital admissions 
each year;
•	 long term adverse impacts on the health 
and wellbeing of individuals going 
without food and other essentials in 
order to heat their homes;
•	 increased susceptibility to cardiovascular 
and respiratory disease;
•	 children from cold homes were said to 
be more than twice as likely to suffer 
respiratory problems.
agreed that it was the combination of 
these factors that led to a household being 
in fuel poverty.
5. Respondents also identified a variety of 
additional contributory and exacerbating 
factors including:
•	 an ageing population;
•	 growth of the private rented sector 
(where housing standards tended to be 
lower and there was less incentive to 
undertake home improvements);
•	 lack of awareness of and ability to access 
the best deals in the energy market;
•	 lack of awareness of and access to 
new technology;
•	 lack of protection for low income 
customers in the competitive market;
•	 under-occupancy (which was a 
growing trend);
•	 shifts in household income (particularly 
temporary changes caused by 
unemployment);
•	 impacts of climate change on seasonal 
temperatures;
•	 lack of awareness of available assistance 
(and a reluctance to access it).
Who is most affected by 
fuel poverty?
6. Respondents felt that all ages were thought 
to be affected, but pointed out that the 
specific impacts varied with age. They 
identified certain groups likely to be more 
at risk:
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to convert income into adequate warmth” 
– Consumer Focus) as reasons for fuel 
poverty. Another respondent felt that fuel 
poverty was more hidden than income 
poverty, as it can be more easily disguised 
(e.g. by only heating a property when 
friends or family visit).
13. Respondents highlighted that the 
interventions for tackling fuel poverty 
tended to be different from those used 
to address income poverty. For example 
energy efficiency measures can help where 
income maximisation might not work 
e.g. for pensioners: “The distinguishing 
characteristic of fuel poverty is that it 
includes the energy efficiency of the 
home… Working to reduce fuel poverty 
through energy efficiency programmes 
could make a significant difference” 
(AgeUK).
Definitional issues
14. Many respondents argued that the existing 
definition was either fit for purpose, or that 
focusing on definitional issues served as 
a distraction from addressing the issue of 
fuel poverty through practical action.
15. Others felt that “the existing working 
definition of fuel poverty does not 
provide a framework for government that 
facilitates an optimal focus of resources 
and policies where support is most 
needed” (Scottish Power).
16. Several respondents, even where 
they felt the definition was broadly 
appropriate, proposed areas where it 
could be improved. Some argued that key 
features of the current definition should 
be retained. These can be summarised 
as follows:
9. The social impacts cited by respondents 
included:
•	 stigma and isolation;
•	 negative impact on financial well-being;
•	 children at greater risk of long term 
socio-economic detriment e.g. more 
days off school, negative impact on 
educational attainment, mental health 
problems in adolescents;
•	 an association between crime and 
fuel poverty.
Is fuel poverty distinct 
from income poverty?
10. Respondents felt there were strong links 
between income poverty and fuel poverty. 
All acknowledged that there was not an 
exact correlation between the two but 
differed as to whether this was because 
fuel poverty was a subset of income 
poverty, or a distinct and separate issue.
11. Some felt it was a subset of income 
poverty rather than a specific issue in its 
own right: “no-one is fuel poor who is 
otherwise well off” (Milton Keynes Council) 
or that it was “a symptom of general 
poverty” (E-On).
12. Others felt that fuel poverty could 
not be explained in income terms alone: 
“Income is an extremely important factor in 
fuel poverty…[but] it is not the only factor” 
(Citizens Advice Bureau). Respondents 
highlighted the link to energy inefficiency, 
the immediate and specific risk of health 
implications (Bromford Group), the link 
to energy prices and the lack of control 
households had over their ability to turn 
income into heat (“variations in homes 
means households have an unequal ability 
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an understanding of actual behaviour 
and costs.
19. Respondents also put forward views on 
various technical elements BRE model used 
in the current definition to estimate the 
scale of fuel poverty:
•	 Temperature standards: some expressed 
concern that the temperature standards 
should not be changed without strong 
supporting evidence. However some 
felt that the standards needed to be 
examined to ensure they met the needs 
of the most vulnerable.
•	 Average tariffs: use of average tariffs 
would tend to underestimate costs so 
there is a need to understand how much 
people are actually paying.
20. Whilst several respondents argued that 
the current definition is fit for purpose, 
many of these also acknowledged that 
there were issues with the current way of 
measuring fuel poverty. On balance, they 
did not feel that these mattered enough 
to warrant modification of the current 
definition.
21. There was some support for the 
measure to capture fuel poverty on a 
relative basis, including to reflect best 
practice and for the form to be comparable 
to other poverty measures. Others felt the 
definition should be developed to reflect 
the severity/depth of fuel poverty, and also 
to allow for recognition of progress or 
‘distance travelled’.
22. A couple of respondents also 
suggested an “at risk” category for those 
who fell just below the current threshold 
and were therefore not counted as fuel 
poor but were nonetheless at risk.
•	 Need to spend: several respondents 
stressed the importance of retaining a 
‘need to spend’ approach, because of 
the issue of under-heating and because 
it was objective. However some worried 
that the current ‘need to spend’ model 
did not reflect vulnerabilities effectively.
•	 After Housing Costs: Several respondents 
argued for the measurement of income 
in the definition to be calculated on an 
After Housing Costs basis, as this would 
better reflect a household’s disposable 
income. Some felt this would help 
targeting the households most at risk of 
fuel poverty.
•	 Equivalisation: A few respondents raised 
the issue of equivalisation of income (a 
measure of household income that takes 
account of different household sizes 
and composition). This would allow for 
comparison with other poverty measures 
and was likely to identify more working 
age families as being fuel poor. Others 
argued that this was unnecessary.
17. Some respondents pointed out more 
general issues with the current definition:
•	 Sensitivity to energy price changes: 
Several respondents highlighted the 
sensitivity of the current model to 
changes in energy prices, which given 
the increasing fluctuations in price made 
the definition unsuitable.
•	 The ratio problem: A few submissions 
highlighted that a ratio implied an 
incentive for a short term reduction 
in bills rather than longer-term, cost 
effective energy efficiency measures.
18. A few respondents argued strongly that 
actual spending should be assessed, 
with temperatures, in order to build 
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•	 SAP: the most common proposal was 
for a SAP related element to be include 
in a future definition of fuel poverty, 
recognising the interaction of income 
with energy efficiency levels.
•	 Affordable warmth: some respondents 
felt that the term ‘fuel poverty’ 
stigmatized people and could be having 
an impact on uptake of interventions. 
Renaming the problem ‘affordable 
warmth’ would remove the stigma, 
making uptake of policy programmes 
more appealing and therefore more 
effective.
•	 Minimum Income Standards: One 
respondent, building on the work of the 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation and the 
Centre for Research into Social Policy, 
proposed using a minimum income 
standards approach to measuring fuel 
poverty. A variant of this, an Affordability 
Index was also proposed. Under the 
index, assumptions would be made 
about likely occupancy of a given 
household, the minimum state income 
for such a households and therefore the 
level of SAP that would be affordable.
Interventions
28. The call for evidence also asked for views 
on the most cost effective interventions.
29. When responding on the effectiveness  
of measures, many suggested that the 
impact of Government policies was 
regressive as those on lower incomes 
ended up paying a greater proportion 
of their income than others on a higher 
income. Several also felt that many of the 
policies for addressing the issue treated the 
symptoms of fuel poverty rather than the 
underlying causes.
Interventions and 
targeting
Targeting
23. There were different opinions on what the 
definition should be used for. Some felt it 
was only an overall measure of the scale of 
the problem and not intended to be used 
for target setting or practical policy making.
24. Some noted that while the definition was 
fit for purpose, the targets were unrealistic 
and should be reassessed. As fuel prices 
will continue to push up fuel poverty 
numbers so targets should be set relating 
to annual fluctuations or specific outputs.
25. A few noted that while the definition 
could model the scale of fuel poverty at a 
national level, it could not be used on the 
doorstep by potential delivery agents, such 
as local councils or doctor’s surgeries to 
identify those in fuel poverty.
26. One very frequently cited suggestion in the 
responses was for greater data sharing, 
although respondents did not necessarily 
agree on what needed sharing, or who 
it should be shared with. Many cited the 
sharing of Department for Work and 
Pensions data in relation to the Warm 
Home Discount as a model to follow. 
Others felt that Local Authorities had a 
key role to play.
Alternative definitions
27. A few proposed some alternative or 
supplementary ways of measuring fuel 
poverty, though many highlighted the 
difficulties in using effective proxies:
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•	 fufilling microgeneration potential in fuel 
poor homes;
•	 rebates for fuel bills – in some cases it 
was suggested that these go directly to 
the energy supplier;
•	 free fuel allowance scaled according to 
household size;
•	 referral schemes and training frontline 
staff (the role of the NHS);
•	 educational initiatives: use of 
technology/how to reduce bills/impact of 
cold homes on health;
•	 Rising Block Tariffs;
•	 fair trade tariff;
•	 simplification of tariff information;
•	 a CERT extension/super priority group.
33. Finally, Scottish and Southern Energy 
(and others) made a suggestion for a Fuel 
Poverty Agency. (We understand this is 
now being examined in detail by FPAG.)
34. Many suggested ways in which 
government policies could be made more 
effective. These included improving co-
ordination – for example, tackling fuel 
poverty in conjunction with child poverty, 
financial exclusion and unemployment – 
and factoring in savings to the NHS as well 
as carbon emissions reductions.
30. Specific comments on various 
measures, both current and future, 
included:
•	 The eligibility criteria for the Winter Fuel 
Payment (which is currently extended 
to all pensioners, but no other groups) 
should be changed to remove well-off 
recipients and extended to less well-off 
non-pensioners (e.g. those in receipt of 
the Cold Weather Payment).
•	 Many were concerned that the 
Green Deal would not help to tackle 
fuel poverty.
•	 The introduction of a minimum standard 
for the Private Rented Sector was 
welcomed by many as an effective 
policy, though a few felt the date for 
compliance should be brought forward.
•	 A couple noted that Warm Front had 
been effective (and were concerned that 
it was ending with no successor policy 
in place).
31. In terms of the most effective solutions, 
the most frequently cited measure was 
energy efficiency improvements: “Capital 
investment can deliver a permanent and 
sustainable solution” (FPAG). Respondents 
were also supportive of area based 
approaches. Income maximisation through 
benefit entitlement checks, though 
resource intensive, could have significant 
results (increasing income by up to £3,000).
32. Other suggestions included:
•	 (higher) standards for the private rented 
sector i.e. to a higher level than those 
already announced;
•	 recovery of the cost of environmental 
programmes on a consumption basis;
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Local Government Group
Macmillan Cancer Support
Mayor of London
Milton Keynes Council
Dr Richard Moore
National Housing Federation
National Pensioners Convention
National Energy Action
North West Carbon Action Network
Northern Housing Consortium
Northern Ireland Fuel Poverty Group
Ofgem
Ofwat
Orbit Heart of England
Rights to Warmth
Rotherham NHS
Rushmore Healthy Living
RWE nPower
Save the Children
Scottish & Southern Energy
Sustainable Uist
The Environment Centre
UK Business Council for Sustainable Energy
UK Public Health Association
Universal Benefit society
Wakefield Council
Professor Gordon Walker
West Sussex Council
Westminster City Council
Zacchaeus 2000 Trust
Zenex Energy
Zenex Technologies
Appendix 1: List of 
respondents to the call 
for evidence
Action with Communities in Rural England 
(ACRE)
Age UK
Association for the Conservation of Energy
British Gas/Centrica
British Heart Foundation
Bromford Group
Calor Gas
Carers UK
Carillion
Changeworks Resources for Life
Citizen’s Advice
City of York Council
Consumer Focus
County Durham Fuel Poverty Partnership
Cumbria Affordable Warmth Project
Durham County Council
Ealing Council
East Riding of Yorkshire Council
EDF Energy
End Fuel Poverty Coalition
Energy Action Scotland
E.ON
Fuel Poverty Action Group
Herefordshire Council
Housing Action
Independent Age
Islington Council
John Meldrum
Keyhouse
Leeds City Council
Professor Christine Liddell
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